Kristin Bailey

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked following findings of professional misconduct.

She appealed to the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, but failed to perfect her appeal for 11 months.

A single adjudicator of the Appeal Division dismissed the appeal for delay without a formal motion from the Law Society.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal without a motion and that a five-person panel was required.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's rules permit it to control its own process, initiate procedural steps, and dismiss an unperfected appeal via a single adjudicator's procedural order.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the appeal hearing to file materials in accordance with the Rules, including seeking leave to file a factum with a larger word count and a reply factum.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment and directed the parties to attend a case conference to establish a timetable for perfecting the appeal.

The defendants, Recovery Science Corporation (RSC) and Stephen Tan, brought a motion for summary dismissal of the plaintiff's negligence claim, arguing that a signed Liability Waiver released them from liability.

The plaintiff alleged faulty equipment, inadequate investigation, careless removal of a GPS ankle bracelet, and misleading information provided to police, leading to his re-arrest for breach of recognizance.

The court found the Waiver valid and binding but determined that significant factual issues remained regarding the cause of damage to the ankle bracelet and whether the defendants provided forthright information to police.

The court concluded that these issues, including credibility assessments and expert report scrutiny, required a trial and could not be fairly resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The defendants' motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking to assist in the commission of a sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony, despite inconsistencies regarding intoxication and memory, to be credible on the core facts of non-consensual sexual activity and choking, corroborated by physical injuries and DNA evidence.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to contradictions with physical evidence.

The defense of mistake of age was rejected, as the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and was found to be reckless as to her underage status, having ignored "red flags" regarding her appearance and circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a jury trial.

The complainant, who was in a long-term relationship with the appellant, recanted her initial allegations at the preliminary hearing and trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements, the admission of prior disreputable conduct evidence, and the admission of the complainant's police statement for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, particularly regarding the principled exception to hearsay and the use of prior bad acts to understand the relationship.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to provisionally strike the defendants' jury notices in a motor vehicle accident claim due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court noted the significant backlog of civil jury trials in Windsor and the prejudice the plaintiffs would suffer from further delay, particularly regarding the statutory reduction of pre-trial income loss.

The court granted the motion, ordering the matter to proceed as a judge-alone trial unless civil jury trials resume in Windsor by the scheduled trial date.

The defendants brought a motion seeking production of a future care cost report and an income loss report from the plaintiff's 2007 motor vehicle accident benefits file.

The plaintiff had sued for injuries sustained in a 2011 slip and fall.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested reports were predicated on medical assumptions and had no relevance since the prior medical reports had already been disclosed to the defendants' experts.

A defendant was charged with sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, and other associated offences.

The case relied on overwhelming circumstantial evidence, including CCTV footage, DNA evidence, and the defendant's statement to police.

The court found the defendant's denial and an eyewitness's testimony unreliable due to intoxication and inconsistencies with video evidence.

The judge concluded that the circumstantial evidence, including matching clothing, items, and physical characteristics, left no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, dismissing the innocent explanation as an implausible coincidence.

A similar act application by the Crown was dismissed due to lack of probative value and inconsistencies.

Michael Haughton, 47, sought a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, citing the availability of electronic monitoring as a material change in circumstances.

This followed a previous dismissal of his bail application where the Crown met its onus on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found electronic monitoring to be a material change but ultimately dismissed the application, concluding that the proposed release plan, even with electronic monitoring, was insufficient to address the substantial likelihood of re-offending due to Haughton's extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance, and severe crack cocaine addiction.

The court also found that confidence in the administration of justice would be seriously eroded by his release.

Michael Haughton, charged with numerous break and enter offences and breaches of court orders, sought a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including delays due to COVID-19 and his asthma.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong and the proposed surety plan inadequate.

Despite the increased risk of COVID-19 in custody and the applicant's asthma, the court determined that the risk to public safety and the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice outweighed these concerns, dismissing the bail review application.

The accused applied for a bail review of a detention order on charges including possession for the purpose of trafficking and firearms offences.

The accused argued the justice of the peace erred by overemphasizing the strength of the Crown's case and that there were material changes in circumstances, including a new release plan, withdrawn charges, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the initial decision was not clearly inappropriate and the new circumstances, including the pandemic, would not have affected the balancing exercise given the accused's young age, health, and the unsuitability of a proposed surety.

The plaintiff, Alexandra Davidoff, brought claims against Paderewski Society Home (Niagara) and Rachel Goerz for malicious prosecution and intimidation, stemming from a prior defamation action.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court determined that the tort of malicious prosecution does not apply to civil proceedings, that absolute privilege bars tort claims based on communications in court proceedings, and that a lawyer owes no duty to an opposing party.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claims were struck out without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

Alexander Davidoff brought claims of malicious prosecution and intimidation against Paderewski Society Home (Niagara), Rachel Goerz, and Niagara Regional Housing (NRH), arising from a prior defamation action.

The defendants moved to strike these claims under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, holding that the tort of malicious prosecution does not apply to civil proceedings, that absolute privilege bars tort claims based on communications in court proceedings, and that a lawyer owes no duty to an opposing party in litigation.

The claims were struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

K.V. sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court judge's decision to quash a subpoena issued to the prosecuting Crown counsel in his ongoing sexual offence trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing lack of merit and delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the appeal not frivolous and that K.V. had a right to appeal, despite concerns about trial delay, as the complainant's evidence was complete.

K.B. was found guilty of four counts of sexually assaulting S.F., a vulnerable adult with the intellectual capacity of a child, over a four-day period.

He was acquitted of unlawful confinement.

The court considered sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences against vulnerable persons, and applied principles from cases involving child sexual abuse.

Aggravating factors included the victim's extreme vulnerability, the prolonged nature of the assaults, the victim's lack of escape means, and K.B.'s significant criminal record including prior assaults.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years for the sexual assault counts, to be served concurrently.

After credit for pre-trial custody, the remaining sentence was 2 years and 54 days.

Ancillary orders included a weapons prohibition, DNA sample order, lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and a non-communication order.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of George Washington Burnett.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his instructions on the elements of second degree and first degree murder, and in his instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation were properly tailored to the live issues at trial, that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was admissible and relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the jury was adequately instructed on the limited use of such evidence.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawful confinement involving a 26-year-old complainant with an intellectual disability.

The complainant went missing for four days, during which time she stayed at the accused's apartment and was repeatedly sexually assaulted.

The court applied the standard for child witnesses to assess the complainant's credibility and found her evidence reliable regarding the sexual assaults.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault but acquitted of unlawful confinement due to a reasonable doubt about whether the complainant was held against her will.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving causing death after making an illegal U-turn that resulted in a fatal collision with a motorcycle.

The court found that the defendant's driving was objectively dangerous, thus establishing the actus reus of the offence.

However, the court acquitted the defendant, concluding that while the driving constituted a departure from the standard of care, it did not amount to a "marked departure" required for criminal fault, but rather a single, momentary error in judgment.

The decision emphasized the distinction between civil negligence and criminal conduct, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant, a member of the Batchewana First Nation, appealed his sentence for sexual assault.

The sentencing judge imposed six months' imprisonment followed by three years of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in proceeding with sentencing based on an inadequate Gladue report without ordering a supplementary report.

The court directed the Crown to obtain a supplementary Gladue report to determine whether non-custodial alternatives were available.

After receiving the supplementary report, which confirmed that the Batchewana First Nation has no formal restorative justice programs and that meaningful community-based alternatives were not available, the court concluded that denunciation must be the primary sentencing objective.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and proportionate.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.