LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

APPEAL DIVISION

Date: January 23, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 25A-025

BETWEEN:

Elnaz Mazinani

Appellant

• and -

Law Society of Ontario

Respondent in appeal

Before: Sophie J. Martel

Heard: January 8, 2026, by videoconference, and in writing

Appearances:

Naomi Lutes, for the appellant

Kristin Bailey, for the respondent in appeal

Summary:

MAZINANI – Appeal – Stay Pending Appeal ‒ The Lawyer had been found to have engaged in professional misconduct by attempting to mislead opposing counsel and the court about a settlement in a civil matter and threatening to make a complaint to the Law Society against another licensee to gain a benefit for her client ‒ The Law Society brought a motion for an interlocutory suspension of the Lawyer’s licence in the event a penalty disposition was not reached at the penalty hearing ‒ After the penalty hearing, the panel ordered revocation of the Lawyer’s licence ‒ The Lawyer had previously filed an appeal of the findings of professional misconduct and amended this to also appeal the penalty and costs order ‒ She further filed a motion requesting a stay of the order, which included revocation of her licence ‒ The panel denied the request for a stay, finding that while the appeal raised a serious issue to be tried and that the Lawyer would suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted and the appeal is successful, the balance of convenience did not favour granting a stay ‒ It found that the seriousness of the misconduct findings in this and other proceedings and the risk of further misconduct outweighed the possible impact to the Lawyer’s client base, so the interests of justice did not favour a stay ‒ The previous interim stay was revoked and the request for a stay was denied.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION FOR A STAY

1Sophie Martel:– Elnaz Mazinani seeks an order staying the Hearing Division’s order of December 15, 2025, revoking her licence, pending her appeal.

2Reasons in another discipline matter involving Ms. Mazinani were released after the motion hearing but prior to the release of these reasons. The parties were invited to make post-hearing written submissions regarding this decision, which they provided on January 19 and 20, 2026.

3For the following reasons, I deny the stay.

BACKGROUND

4For reasons reported at Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2025 ONLSTH 114, the hearing panel found that two of the three particulars alleged by the Law Society had been established. It concluded that Ms. Mazinani attempted to mislead opposing counsel and the court about the date a settlement offer was served in a civil matter, contrary to Rule 2.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (the Rules) (particular 1). They also concluded that in another matter, Ms. Mazinani threatened to make a complaint to the Law Society against another licensee to gain a benefit for her client contrary to Rule 3.2-5 (particular 3).

5For the purposes of this stay motion, the parties focused on the first particular -the misleading finding. At issue before the hearing panel was whether Ms. Mazinani had served an offer to settle on September 19, 2016 or September 20, 2016. I briefly outline the facts below.

6Mr. Schorr, another licensee, represented the plaintiffs in a civil matter while Ms. Mazinani represented the defendants. On September 20, 2016, after a settlement conference, Mr. Schorr instructed his law clerk to accept a settlement offer dated June 18, 2015 for $55,555.55 (served by the defendants’ previous lawyer). This settlement offer stated that it was open until the trial of the action. The law clerk faxed the acceptance to Ms. Mazinani’s office at 1:27 p.m. on September 20, 2026.

7Mr. Schorr testified, however, that later that same day, September 20, 2016, at 5:23 p.m., a woman served him with a letter from Ms. Mazinani dated September 19, 2016, the day prior, with an offer to settle for $17,333, which offer rescinded all prior settlement offers. The process server who served Mr. Schorr with the document is also Ms. Mazinani’s mother.

8The evidence from Ms. Mazinani and her mother was that the offer to settle for $17,333 was served on September 19, 2016.

9Ms. Mazinani’s position that the offer to settle was served on September 19, 2016, is also the evidence that she provided in the plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement. In a decision dated October 18, 2017, following a hearing on October 5, 2017, Madame Justice Bird ordered judgment for Mr. Schorr’s client in the amount of $55,555.55 with costs on a full indemnity basis. She found that the second offer to settle purporting to revoke the first offer was served on Mr. Schorr at 5:23 p.m. on September 20, 2016, not on September 19, 2016. The defendants’ appeal of this decision was denied on October 22, 2018.

10The issue before the Hearing Division was whether the second offer to settle had been served on September 19 or 20, 2016. The hearing panel preferred the evidence of Mr. Schorr and found that Ms. Mazinani’s evidence did not accurately reflect the truth of what took place.

11The Hearing Division released its reasons on findings on August 26, 2025, and directed the Tribunal’s scheduling coordinator to schedule a penalty hearing. The penalty hearing occurred on December 15, 2025.

12Prior to the penalty hearing, the Law Society brought a motion for an interlocutory suspension of Ms. Mazinani’s licence in the event a penalty disposition was not reached on December 15, 2025. Accordingly, the hearing of December 15, 2025, was to receive evidence and submissions on penalty and costs and, if a disposition was not reached, to hear the Law Society’s motion for an interlocutory suspension of Ms. Mazinani’s licence until a decision was released.

13According to the panel’s endorsement of December 15, 2025, the panel took 30 minutes to deliberate after the conclusion of the parties’ submissions on penalty and costs. It then returned and delivered its decision, which included the immediate revocation of Ms. Mazinani’s licence. The panel denied Ms. Mazinani’s request that it delay the start of the revocation to allow for an orderly transition of clients. The hearing panel indicated that written reasons would follow. Written reasons have not yet been released.

14Ms. Mazinani had previously filed a notice of appeal of the Hearing Division’s misconduct findings on September 26, 2025. She filed an amended notice of appeal on December 18, 2025, appealing the penalty and costs order in addition to the misconduct findings. On December 18, 2025, she also filed her notice of motion seeking a stay of the Hearing Division’s order of December 15, 2025.

15Ms. Mazinani sought prompt scheduling of the motion, but given the upcoming holidays, the Law Society did not have any available counsel for at least two weeks. Following a proceedings management conference on December 22, 2025, the Tribunal Chair ordered an interim stay of the revocation order until the stay motion was heard on January 8, 2026.

16After hearing the evidence and submissions of counsel on January 8, 2026, I advised the parties that I was reserving my decision and invited submissions on whether the interim stay should be extended. Following submissions, I decided to order an interim stay given that I expected to release my decision in this matter in a month or less, such that the balance of convenience favoured extending the current status quo, which was a stay of the revocation order.

THE TEST FOR A STAY PENDING AN APPEAL

17Section 49.63 of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 provides:

49.36 (1) An appeal to the Appeal Division does not stay the decision or order appealed from, unless, on motion, the Appeal Division orders otherwise.

(2) In making an order staying a decision or order, the Appeal Division may impose such terms and conditions as it considers appropriate on the licence of a person who is subject to the decision or order.

18As found in the above legislative provision, a stay is not automatic and the party seeking the stay has the burden of establishing that it should be granted.

19In deciding whether to grant a stay, the following three criteria must be considered:

• Does the appeal raise a serious issue to be tried? At this stage, the Appeal Division does not determine the merits of the appeal and the moving party need not show that her appeal will succeed. Rather, she must show that the appeal is arguable and not frivolous.
• Will the licensee suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted and the appeal is successful?
• Does the balance of convenience favour granting a stay? The protection of the public is key when assessing the balance of convenience. The risk of further misconduct or harm to clients and others, as well as public confidence in the administration of justice and the self-regulation of the legal profession if a stay is granted are relevant considerations.

20The above factors are not watertight compartments, and the ultimate question is whether the interests of justice favour a stay.

APPLICATION TO THIS CASE

21The parties agreed that the first two considerations of the test are met in this case even though they disagreed about the strength of the grounds for appeal and the degree of harm that would be suffered if a stay is not granted.

The appeal raises a serious issue to be tried

22The appellant’s notice of appeal lists the following grounds in her notice of appeal:

• That the panel erred by failing to properly consider the evidence from client H.Z. (one of Ms. Mazinani’s clients in the underlying civil litigation).
• That the panel erred in its credibility analysis by subjecting the evidence of Ms. Mazinani and her witnesses to a different standard of scrutiny than that of Mr. Schorr.
• That the panel failed to fully grapple with the credibility issues in Mr. Schorr’s evidence.
• That the panel failed to adequately consider the absence of evidence obtained by the Law Society’s investigator, namely the failure to interview other key witnesses.
• That the panel erred by failing to adequately consider Ms. Mazinani’s evidence that the breach of the Rules regarding the third particular was based on a misunderstanding of the rules.
• That the panel’s conclusions on particulars 1 and 3 were unreasonable.
• That the penalty imposed by the panel was unreasonable and disproportionate to the moral blameworthiness of the conduct.

23I agree that the above grounds of appeal raise arguable issues on appeal and are not frivolous.

24The Law Society also submitted that while raising arguable issues on appeal, the grounds of appeal are weak because they mostly relate to credibility findings. The Law Society submitted that the strength of the grounds of appeal could be considered under the third part of the test, the balance of convenience, which I address later in these reasons.

The applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted

25I also agree that Ms. Mazinani will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted and she is ultimately successful in her appeal, particularly if she is successful in the appeal of the panel’s conclusion that she misled opposing counsel and the court. Ms. Mazinani will have suffered financial loss in respect of the closure of her practice as well as reputational loss.

26The loss is somewhat less if she is only successful on the penalty findings, because Ms. Mazinani agrees that she would have been subject to at least a suspension of six months based on the panel’s misconduct findings. However, even in this case, there remains a reputational harm associated with a revocation versus a suspension order. Furthermore, as submitted by Ms. Mazinani, it is easier to suspend a practice for several months than to end it altogether.

27Ultimately, I accept that this consideration is met.

The balance of convenience

28The parties focused their evidence and submissions on this third consideration, which requires weighing multiple factors in deciding whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of a stay. The parties addressed the seriousness of the misconduct findings, the strength of the appeal grounds, the impact on Ms. Mazinani’s clients, the past discipline history and other complaints before the Tribunal. While they agreed that all these things could be considered, they disagreed as to the weight to be given to them.

29As stated in Law Society of Ontario v Robson, 2022 ONLSTA 12 at para 27, the balance of convenience is the highest hurdle for the majority of those seeking a stay of a suspension pending appeal. The same is true where a stay of revocation is sought. In a regulatory matter, the individual interests of the licensee must be balanced against the protection of the public, the maintenance of the administration of justice and the preservation of public confidence in professional self-regulation and discipline.

The impact on Ms. Mazinani’s existing clients

30Ms. Mazinani’s affidavit, filed as part of this motion, indicates that at the time of revocation, she had over 300 active client files, many involving scheduled court appearances in the upcoming months. She has a busy family law practice and many of her client files are about parenting and custody disputes involving children and urgent financial and support matters. She indicates that many of her clients are of low-income marginalized immigrant communities with little English-speaking skills. She adds that they do not have the financial means to obtain new counsel. She referenced several upcoming trials and appeals in the next six months.

31There is only one other lawyer at Ms. Mazinani’s firm, her brother, who carries his own case load. According to the affidavits of Ms. Mazinani and Mr. Mazinani, it would not be possible for him to assume carriage of Ms. Mazinani’s files.

32While the Law Society recognizes that impact to third parties, such as to existing clients, is a valid consideration in weighing the balance of convenience, it submitted that this impact is of Ms. Mazinani’s own making. The Law Society highlighted that Ms. Mazinani has known since the Hearing Division released its misconduct findings in late August 2025 that a penalty hearing would be scheduled, and penalty findings made. Accordingly, Ms. Mazinani could have started the transition of clients at that time.

33The Law Society also noted that it had advised Ms. Mazinani prior to December 15, 2025, that it would be seeking the penalty of revocation and filed a motion for an interlocutory suspension if the panel reserved on its penalty findings at the December 2025 penalty hearing. Accordingly, the Law Society submitted that Ms. Mazinani should have been prepared for the possible revocation or interlocutory suspension of her licence. Furthermore, Ms. Mazinani also had the opportunity to transition files after the interim stay was granted on December 22, 2025.

Discipline history

34In Law Society of Upper Canada v Mazinani, 2015 ONLSTH 197, the Tribunal found that Ms. Mazinani had engaged in professional misconduct in failing to reply promptly and completely to requests for information from the Law Society, in failing to maintain proper financial records, and in failing to attend onsite interviews to inspect her books and records. Ms. Mazinani had satisfied all the Law Society requests by the time the hearing concluded. Ms. Mazinani was reprimanded regarding this misconduct: Law Society of Upper Canada v Mazinani, 2016 ONLSTH 80.

35In Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2020 ONLSTH 123 (the 2020 decision), the Tribunal found that Ms. Mazinani:

• failed to serve Client Z to the standard of a competent lawyer;
• breached Client Z’s confidentiality without authorization;
• breached Client NA’s confidentiality without authorization;
• engaged in two separate breaches of the by-laws by: i. depositing funds prior to an account being rendered, and ii. failing to deposit funds into trust;
• failed to comply with a court order in a dispute with opposing counsel (Mr. Clarke);
• misled the court and opposing counsel (Mr. Lane) and failed to act with integrity;
• threatened a Law Society complaint against Mr. Lane to gain a benefit for her brother/client; and
• failed to act with integrity and encourage respect for the administration of justice by her improper proposal of a mutual withdrawal of Law Society complaints.

36The Tribunal suspended Ms. Mazinani’s licence for six months: Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2021 ONLSTH 72.

37Ms. Mazinani submitted that the prior misconduct occurred many years ago, around the same time as the misconduct in the current case, in the 2015-2017 period. She relies on the affidavit evidence that the firm is fundamentally different now than in the years covered by the prior allegations and misconduct, with robust procedural safeguards.

38The Law Society submitted that the additional findings of misconduct now on appeal raise serious acts of dishonesty and are consistent with the earlier findings of misconduct.

More recent Law Society Tribunal decision

39At the time of the motion hearing of January 8, 2026, there was a pending application alleging that Ms. Mazinani had engaged in misconduct. The application had been heard but the decision was on reserve. The hearing panel released its reasons for decision on January 14, 2026: Law Society of Ontario v Mazinani, 2026 ONLSTH 7 (the 2026 decision). On January 15, 2026, I invited the parties to make post-hearing written submissions in respect of these reasons, which they provided on January 19, 2026 (Law Society) and January 20, 2026 (Ms. Mazinani).

40In the 2026 decision, the hearing panel concluded that:

• In February 2021, in support of an adjournment request, Ms. Mazinani deliberately provided misleading evidence in affidavits she prepared and filed with the court about the timing and circumstances of the resignation of her client’s expert.
• On February 1, 2021, Ms. Mazinani deliberately failed to be candid about the purpose and the expected length of a recess that she requested during a settlement conference. Ms. Mazinani requested and obtained a 15-minute break to deal with an urgent matter, without advising opposing counsel or the court that she actually had a trial management conference, which lasted over 60 minutes.

41In her written submissions of January 20, 2026, Ms. Mazinani submitted that the release of these reasons does not affect the first two branches of the test in that the appeal remains arguable and the harm to her remains irreparable should the stay not be granted. She also submitted that the prejudice to her clients has not changed such that the balance of convenience continues to favour a stay. She indicated that if the Tribunal was concerned about a risk to the public, she was prepared to follow any practice restrictions deemed appropriate such as a restriction on not entering any new client relationships.

42In its written submissions of January 19, 2026, the Law Society submitted that the misconduct found in the 2026 decision is very similar to the findings under appeal. The findings show a clear and long-standing pattern of serious dishonesty in Ms. Mazinani’s interactions with the judicial system and a troubling lack of integrity. Given the seriousness of the misconduct findings in the 2026 decision and her history of related integrity breaches, revocation or a lengthy suspension will certainly follow. As a result, Ms. Mazinani is now facing an additional lengthy practice interruption that mitigates any prejudice to her and her clients from the denial of a stay pending the appeal. Furthermore, the recent findings increase the risk to the administration of justice if a stay is granted. There is a risk that Ms. Mazinani will continue to file misleading or fraudulent documents before the courts.

Other complaints

43Stoney Baker, counsel in the Law Society’s Intake and Resolution Department, provided oral and affidavit evidence in this motion.

44Between May 17, 2023 and December 12, 2025, the Law Society received 13 complaints about Ms. Mazinani. A 14th complaint was received after Ms. Baker affirmed her affidavit on December 12, 2025. One of the 13 complaints received prior to December 12, 2025, alleges that Ms. Mazinani misappropriated settlement funds and misapplied trust funds. This is the only complaint (of the 13 received prior to December 12, 2025) that has been transferred to investigation services with instructions for powers to investigate. The remaining complaints were discontinued by the Intake and Resolution Department. Most of these complaints were discontinued without seeking representations from Ms. Mazinani.

45In her oral evidence, Ms. Baker explained that the complaints were discontinued based on the Law Society’s assessment of how best to use its limited resources. Given that there are two matters before the Tribunal, the Law Society decided to hold off on the other complaints, which it can re-open if deemed appropriate. All the discontinuation letters, addressed to the complainants and copied to Ms. Mazinani, contain similar language. They thank the complainant for bringing their complaint to the Law Society’s attention and reference the regulatory actions already taken with respect to Ms. Mazinani. The letters indicate that as the Law Society is fulfilling its public interest mandate by taking action with respect to Ms. Mazinani’s conduct, it will not be investigating their complaint at this time but that the Law Society may choose to reactivate their complaint later.

46Ms. Baker was not involved in the complaint that was referred to investigation. In respect of the other 12 matters received prior to December 12, 2025, she testified she had not evaluated the merits of the complaints. However, she testified that the number of complaints was considerable and that taken together, she viewed the complaints as high-risk.

47Ms. Mazinani submitted that the complaints could not be viewed as high-risk given that they were not referred for investigation. Furthermore, she highlighted that they were for the most part one-sided since she had not been asked for representations in response to most of the complaints. She also submitted that the number of complaints was not necessarily high given that the Law Society receives thousands of complaints yearly with a high percentage about family law licensees.

48The Law Society, while not suggesting that these complaints should play a large role in the balancing exercise, submitted that the number of complaints in approximately two-and-a-half years was remarkable based on Ms. Baker’s evidence and based on common sense.

Other considerations

49The Law Society also submitted that the grounds of appeal, while raising arguable issues, mostly relied on the panel’s credibility findings, which are entitled to deference. The Law Society submitted that Ms. Mazinani would have an uphill battle regarding these appeal grounds. The Law Society submitted that the strength/weakness of the grounds of appeal could be considered in the weighing of the balance of convenience. Ms. Mazinani, on the other hand, submitted that the grounds were not limited to credibility assessments and that in any event, appeals of credibility matters need to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. It has not been necessary for me to decide whether the strength of the grounds of appeal is a valid consideration when assessing the balance of convenience as I have refused the stay on other grounds.

50Ms. Mazinani also argued that the absence of penalty reasons has prejudiced her in respect of her ability to argue why her penalty appeal has merit. It has also prejudiced her in respect of when she can perfect her appeal. She indicated that her appeal is close to being perfected. At this junction, however, she is mostly waiting for the penalty hearing transcripts and the penalty reasons. She is amenable to an order that expedites the appeal once the penalty reasons have been released.

The balance of convenience weighs against granting the stay

51The seriousness of the misconduct is reflected in the imposition of the penalty of revocation. In revoking her licence, the hearing panel concluded that Ms. Mazinani should not be allowed to continue to practise law. As stated in Law Society of Ontario v Rappaport, 2023 ONLSTA 19 at para 23, whether as a matter of public protection or maintaining public confidence, a decision that a respondent should no longer be entitled to practise weighs heavily in assessing the balance of convenience and the interests of justice.

52While I agree that the findings on appeal address misconduct that occurred many years ago, this does not diminish the seriousness of the misconduct. There is a risk to the preservation of public confidence in professional self-regulation and discipline when a lawyer who has been found to have concocted evidence and lied to the courts is allowed to continue to practise.

53There is now also an additional finding of misconduct, in respect of misconduct that occurred in February 2021, in the 2026 decision. Of particular concern is that the findings also concluded that Ms. Mazinani deliberately included misleading information in affidavits that she drafted and filed with the court. At the motion hearing on January 8, 2026, argued before the 2026 decision was released, Ms. Mazinani emphasized the fact that the discipline conclusions in respect of her current appeal dealt with misconduct that occurred many years ago and that there had been no further findings of misconduct since then. This argument is no longer accurate.

54It is troubling that the more recent findings (the 2026 decision) for misconduct that occurred in 2021 is of the same type that occurred in the matter under appeal and in the previous 2020 decision. These three matters raise significant integrity concerns, which are difficult to address with practice restrictions. Ms. Mazinani has been found to be untrustworthy.

55Additionally, the Tribunal has received 14 complaints in a two-and-a-half year period. There is no evidence about the merits of these complaints. Nevertheless, I agree with the Law Society that the number of complaints raises red flags.

56This is not a case like Rappaport where there was no evidence of any risk of further misconduct and where it did not make any practical difference whether a five-month suspension was served now or later. Penalty principles are weighed differently depending on the case. While all penalty decisions must consider the protection of the public, the penalty principles of general and specific deterrence as well as rehabilitation of the licensee are given significant weight in cases where a suspension is ordered. Revocation decisions, on the other hand, focus less on the rehabilitation of the licensee because the seriousness of the misconduct is such that a licensee cannot be allowed to continue to practise in order to adequately protect the public and maintain public confidence in the profession’s ability to self-regulate.

57The risk of further misconduct, as evidenced by the seriousness of the misconduct findings, the similarity of these findings to the 2020 and 2026 decisions and the large number of recent complaints outweighs the possible impact to Ms. Mazinani’s current client base. Furthermore, these clients themselves are potentially at risk given what appears to be a pattern of integrity lapses. While I understand Ms. Mazinani’s concern about the absence of reasons, which may delay the appeal hearing, such prejudice does not outweigh the need to protect the public and maintain its confidence in the administration of justice. In my view, the interests of justice do not favour a stay. I deny the stay request and revoke the interim stay.

58The costs of this motion are reserved to the panel hearing this appeal.