LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
APPEAL DIVISION
Tribunal File No.: 25A-011
BETWEEN:
Cyriacus Obi Agbarakwe
Appellant
- and -
Law Society of Ontario
Respondent in appeal
Before: Pam Hrick (chair), Teresa Donnelly, Karen Hulan, Geneviève Painchaud, Natalia Rodriguez
Heard: In writing
Appearances:
Appellant, self-represented
Kristina MacDonald, for the respondent in appeal
Summary:
AGBARAKWE – Appeal – Licensing – Good Character – The appellant appealed the retroactive revocation of his licence – The appellant had previously been licensed, suspended, and ultimately disbarred in Alberta – The hearing panel determined that he had made deliberately false or misleading representations in the lawyer licensing application – The hearing panel identified the correct governing authority and made no errors in its findings or analysis – The appeal was dismissed.
REASONS FOR DECISION
OVERVIEW
1Pam Hrick (for the panel):– In Agbarakwe v Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONLSTH 45 (the Hearing Decision), a hearing panel determined that Dr. Cyriacus Obi Agbarakwe had made deliberately false or misleading representations in answering good character questions on his lawyer licensing application. These misrepresentations were discovered after the Law Society had already granted him a licence to practise law. The hearing panel determined that the appellant was deemed not to meet the good character requirement due to these misrepresentations. It therefore retroactively revoked his licence.
2Dr. Agbarakwe appeals the hearing panel’s decision on various grounds. The appeal proceeded by way of a written hearing.
3For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
4Before the hearing panel, this matter proceeded based on a partial agreed statement of facts; an agreed book of documents; the testimony and affidavit evidence of a Law Society of Ontario (LSO) investigator; and the testimony of Dr. Agbarakwe. The panel made detailed findings of fact, the most salient of which are set out below.
The good character requirement
5It is a requirement under s 27(2) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, and s 8(1)3 of the LSO’s By-Law 4 that an applicant must be of good character to be issued a licence to practise law.
6Subsection 8(2) of By-Law 4 states:
An applicant who makes any false or misleading representation or declaration on or in connection with an application for a licence, by commission or omission, is deemed thereafter not to meet, and not to have met, the requirements for the issuance of any licence under the Act.
The appellant’s licensing application to the LSO
7Dr. Agbarakwe submitted a licensing application to the LSO in November 2016 under the name “C. Obi Chukwu”.1 He answered “no” to all the good character questions and solemnly declared that “the facts contained in this application are true.” This included his responses to the following questions:
Question 7: “Have you ever been suspended, disqualified, censured or otherwise disciplined as a member of any professional organization? If yes, attach a letter or certificate of good standing to this application.”
Question 13: “Have you ever been sanctioned or had a penalty imposed upon you by a court, an administrative tribunal or regulatory body? If yes, provide details.”
8In fact, Dr. Agbarakwe had been licensed in Alberta in 2005. He was suspended by the Law Society of Alberta (LSA) and subsequently disbarred in 2014.
9Based on the assertions in his licensing application, Dr. Agbarakwe was called to the Ontario bar in January 2019.
10In March 2019, Dr. Agbarakwe applied to be admitted to the Refugee and Immigration roster of Legal Aid Ontario (Legal Aid) under the name “C. Obi Chukwu”.
11In neither application did he disclose that he had previously been a member of the LSA. On the Legal Aid application he answered “No” to a question asking whether he had been sanctioned by any other law society.
12In November 2020, he advised the LSO that he wished to cease practice effective that month. That same month, he formally changed his name to “Cyriacus Obi Agbarakwe.”
13In February 2021, the appellant requested that the LSO change his name on the rolls to “Dr. Cyriacus Obi Agbarakwe.”2
14In March 2021, the appellant similarly requested that Legal Aid update his name to “Cyriacus Obi Agbarakwe”, advising that he intended to return to active practice in May 2021. This prompted Legal Aid to conduct an investigation through which it ultimately discovered the appellant had been disbarred in Alberta in December 2014.
15In early March 2023, a Legal Aid investigator advised the LSO of its concern that Mr. Chukwu was the disbarred “Cyriacus Obi Agbarakwe” from Alberta. Acting on this information, the LSO commenced a good character investigation.
16Based on its own investigation findings, Legal Aid voided the appellant’s roster membership in March 2023, retroactive to the date he was first admitted. It advised Dr. Agbarakwe of its investigation findings and the voiding of his roster membership by way of a letter dated March 27, 2023.
17During the LSO’s good character investigation, the appellant was interviewed and conveyed the following:
- He denied being suspended by the LSA.
- He denied reading the statement of admitted facts he signed at an LSA discipline hearing (described below), and claimed he did not know a resignation under s 61 of the Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8, in Alberta resulted in disbarment.
- He admitted to misconduct at the LSA hearing, and that he was not acting under duress when he signed the statement of admitted facts.
- He received the Notice to Profession advising of his disbarment, but “did not agree with it” and “had no reason to fight”.
- He was suffering from a mental health disorder during the discipline proceeding in Alberta, but was no longer suffering from the disorder at the time of the LSO interview.
Suspension and disbarment by the Law Society of Alberta
18Dr. Agbarakwe was licensed as a lawyer and practised law in Nigeria before immigrating to Alberta, where he was called to the bar in March 2005. While a member of the Alberta bar, the appellant went by the name “Cyriacus Agbarakwe”.
19As of September 2011, he requested that his lawyer status be changed to inactive.
20Between January and September 2012, 23 citations were issued against the appellant, and he was directed to a discipline hearing. The alleged misconduct was serious, and included misappropriation of trust funds, misleading the court, and affixing fraudulent documents to his sworn affidavit.
21Dr. Agbarakwe attempted to resolve the hearing by agreeing to resign under s 32 of the Legal Profession Act. This would have resulted in his name being struck from the roll, with no other consequence. Given the nature of the misconduct, the LSA would not agree to this proposed resolution and asserted that a s 61 resignation (resulting in a deemed disbarment) was appropriate.
22In early December 2014, while represented by counsel, Dr. Agbarakwe requested an adjournment of the discipline hearing. That request was denied and the hearing proceeded as scheduled.
23At the outset of the hearing, at which Dr. Agbarakwe was no longer represented by counsel, he made another request for an adjournment. This request was also denied. He then attempted to bring an application to resign under s 32 of the Legal Professions Act, but the Hearing Committee concluded it had no jurisdiction to hear it.
24The discipline hearing proceeded with the first witness. Part way through this witness’s testimony, Dr. Agbarakwe advised counsel for the LSA that he wished to resign under s 61 of the Legal Profession Act.
25After a brief adjournment of the hearing, the Hearing Committee reconvened the next day as a Resignation Committee to hear the resignation application. As part of the application, Dr. Agbarakwe signed a statement of admitted facts that included the following paragraph immediately above the signature line:
I further acknowledge that I have read s. 61 of the Legal Profession Act and have considered that my resignation application is a deemed disbarment pursuant to the definition of “disbar” in s. 1(c) of the Act.
26The Resignation Committee accepted his resignation under s 61 of the Legal Profession Act. Dr. Agbarakwe provided a signed undertaking that he would surrender his Certificate of Enrolment to the LSA. He also undertook not to apply for reinstatement. The LSA published a Notice to the Profession on December 19, 2014 stating that Dr. Agbarakwe was disbarred and had been suspended at the time of his disbarment.
THE HEARING PANEL’S CONCLUSIONS
27At the good character hearing before the Tribunal, the hearing panel found that Dr. Agbarakwe knew he had been suspended by the LSA at the time he applied for admission to the Ontario bar. Through his counsel at the time of the LSA hearing, he cited the fact that “I am under suspension” as one of six reasons why an adjournment should be granted in early December 2014. Dr. Agbarakwe testified before the hearing panel that he had no recollection of being suspended at that time and that he had not written the six reasons his counsel put forward supporting an adjournment. The hearing panel found him not to be credible on this point, and that the documentary evidence contradicted his testimony.
28The panel also found that Dr. Agbarakwe knew he had been disbarred by the LSA. He knew that a resignation under s 61 of the Legal Profession Act was a different type of resignation, with different consequences, than one initiated under s 32 of that Act. During the LSO investigation, he had also admitted he had received the Notice to Profession advising of his disbarment.
29Before the hearing panel, Dr. Agbarakwe’s testimony was that:
- he was suffering from a mental health disorder at the time of the Alberta discipline hearing;
- he felt coerced into signing the admitted statement of facts;
- he did not admit to the truth of the facts in the statement of admitted facts;
- he did not fully read the statement of admitted facts; and
- he had not read the Notice to the Profession.
30The hearing panel noted that its role was to determine whether Dr. Agbarakwe knew he had been suspended and then disbarred at the time he applied for a licence from the LSO. Its role was not to determine what he understood and agreed to at the time he signed the statement of admitted facts, nor to second-guess the LSA’s discipline/resignation process. The hearing panel held that if Dr. Agbarakwe did not fully read the statement of admitted facts before he signed it, as he claimed, then he was wilfully blind to its contents. It found that “[r]egardless of whether he read those documents or was wilfully blind to their contents, we find that Dr. Agbarakwe knew that he was suspended and then disbarred”.
31The hearing panel concluded that Dr. Agbarakwe knowingly and deliberately provided false responses to questions 7 and 13 in the good character section of his licensing application. As a result, he was deemed not to have met the good character requirements at the time he applied to the LSO for a licence to practise law.
32Analyzing s 8(2) of By-Law 4, the hearing panel held that it had no discretion to allow a licence to stand once it found the applicant deliberately made false or misleading representations or declarations in their application for a licence: Law Society of Upper Canada v Stewart, 2012 ONLSAP 30 at paras 25 and 41. As set out above, s 8(2) states:
An applicant who makes any false or misleading representation or declaration on or in connection with an application for a licence, by commission or omission, is deemed thereafter not to meet, and not to have met, the requirements for the issuance of any licence under the Act. (emphasis added)
33The hearing panel rejected Dr. Agbarakwe’s submission that the panel had no jurisdiction to rescind his licence retroactively, notwithstanding the Divisional Court’s decision to the contrary in Amendola v Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 4123.
34The hearing panel rejected Dr. Agbarakwe’s submission that he made an honest mistake in failing to disclose that he resigned from the LSA, because he did not interpret his resignation as a disciplinary action, and believed until April 2023 that he had resigned under s 32 of the Legal Profession Act. The hearing panel found this argument to be disingenuous and that the appellant’s evidence overall “lack[ed] candour and credibility”.
35In the result, the hearing panel refused Dr. Agbarakwe’s application for licensing and revoked his licence retroactively.
ISSUES
36Dr. Agbarakwe appeals from the hearing panel’s decision. In accordance with a prior direction of the Tribunal, which was given at the appellant’s request, the appeal was heard in writing.
37The appellant pursues several grounds of appeal. He submits that the hearing panel erred by:
- Treating Amendola as binding precedent, despite the case being decided per incuriam.
- Retroactively applying s 8(2) of By-Law 4, thereby undermining vested rights and legal certainty.
- Failing to apply modern principles of reasonableness by ignoring pivotal mental health evidence and mitigating circumstances.
- Misapplying the legal standard for misrepresentation and wilful blindness.
- Rejecting rehabilitation and unblemished post-licensure conduct.
38We address each of these grounds below. The first and second grounds are dealt with together. The third and fifth grounds are also dealt with together.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
39The standard of review to be applied is (a) correctness on questions of law, and (b) palpable and overriding error on questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law where the legal principle is not readily extricable: Law Society of Ontario v Manilla, 2021 ONLSTA 25 at para 10.
40As the Divisional Court explained in Khan v Law Society of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 1951 at para 73, “palpable” means “clear to the mind or plain to see”, and “overriding” means “determinative”, in that it “affected the result.”
Analysis
Did the hearing panel err by treating Amendola as binding and violate the presumption against retroactivity by retroactively voiding the appellant’s licence?
41The appellant submits that Amendola was decided “per incuriam” (meaning “through carelessness” or “by inadvertence”). He submits this is because the Divisional Court did not consider foundational principles, including the presumption against retroactivity, and did not engage with the Supreme Court of Canada’s established jurisprudence on legal certainty. For these reasons, Amendola was not binding and the hearing panel erred in relying on it. Neither the Law Society Act nor the By-Laws authorize retrospectively voiding licences, in the appellant’s submission. If we decide Amendola deserves deference, the appellant asks that we treat that decision as confined to its facts, rather than as establishing a generally applicable rule.
42The Law Society submits that the hearing panel dealt with this issue in its decision and applied the correct legal test derived from Amendola.
43In its reasons for decision, the hearing panel correctly identified Amendola as the governing authority by which the Tribunal is bound when considering the scope and application of s 8(2) of By-Law 4. The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to refuse a licence even after it had been issued: Hearing Decision at para 52, citing Amendola at paras 62-70. The court concluded that this provision necessarily means a licence can be retroactively refused when an applicant is found to have knowingly or deliberately made false or misleading representations in a licensing application. This is because the original determination of good character – a prerequisite to being granted a licence to practise law – was based on misrepresentations. This interpretation is “consistent with the legislative purpose of protecting the public and ensuring high ethical standards in the professions”: Amendola at para 68. As the hearing panel noted, “[w]hether an applicant’s false statement is discovered before or after licensing, its bearing on the applicant’s integrity and character, and the risk to the public, is the same”: Hearing Decision at para 53, citing Amendola at para 70.
44There was no error of law in the hearing panel’s analysis. Amendola is binding on the Tribunal and its application to the circumstances of this case does not give rise to any error of mixed fact and law.
45Courts have recognized a per incuriam exception to horizontal stare decisis. This exception permits a court to depart from binding decisions issued by a court of coordinate jurisdiction if “the court failed to consider some authority such that, had it done so, it would have come to a different decision because the inadvertence is shown to have struck at the essence of the decision”: R. v Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para 77. It will only be in “rare” circumstances that this exception applies: Sullivan at para 77.
46The per incuriam exception has no application in these circumstances. Here, we are dealing with a binding precedent issued by a court that sits in review of the Tribunal’s decisions. The appellant has not cited any authority that permits us to depart from Amendola. In any event, the Divisional Court in that case conducted a proper textual, contextual, and purposive analysis of s 8(2) of By-Law 4, anchored in the Tribunal decision under review. The hearing panel properly identified and applied this interpretation to the facts. We therefore dismiss these grounds of appeal.
Did the Tribunal fail to apply modern principles of reasonableness by ignoring pivotal mental health evidence, mitigating circumstances, rehabilitation, and positive community contributions?
47The appellant submits that the hearing panel’s decision is not transparent, intelligible, and justified – the hallmarks of a reasonable decision – because it did not engage with his mental health impairments, lack of intent, or post-licensure rehabilitation. He further submits the panel ignored evidence that he had practised in Ontario with no disciplinary record; had volunteered, mentored, and served underrepresented communities; and had received the Queen Elizabeth II Platinum Jubilee Medal from the Lieutenant Governor of Alberta in 2023.
48The LSO submits that the hearing panel’s factual finding of intent warrants deference. It also points to the mandatory language of s 8(2) of By-Law 4, endorsing the hearing panel’s conclusion at para 50 that “[a] hearing panel does not have any discretion to allow the licence to stand once it makes a finding that the applicant deliberately made a false or misleading representation or declaration in their application.”
49The hearing panel determined that Dr. Agbarakwe intentionally kept the fact of his suspension and disbarment from the LSO, and deliberately misled the LSO about this fact. This is a finding of fact subject to the standard of review of palpable and overriding error. We find that the hearing panel made no such error in arriving at this determination, which was well supported by the evidence before it.
50The hearing panel also engaged with the appellant’s assertion that he was dealing with a mental health disorder at the time of the Alberta discipline proceedings. While acknowledging this asserted mental health issue, the panel remained appropriately focused on the issue it was required to determine: “whether, when Dr. Agbarakwe made the application for a licence from the LSO, he knew that he had been suspended and then disbarred, such that he deliberately misled the LSO on the application”: Hearing Decision at para 45.
51Once the hearing panel found that Dr. Agbarakwe deliberately gave false answers to the good character questions at issue, s 8(2) afforded it no discretion to allow his licence to stand. It noted this in its reasons, citing Stewart at paras 25 and 41. This proposition has been applied consistently in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence: Singh v Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONLSTH 10 at paras 60-67, and Amendola at paras 69-70. It follows that any lack of disciplinary record, post-licensure rehabilitation, and community contributions were irrelevant to the hearing panel’s analysis. Therefore, it committed no reversible error by not referring to these in its decision. We accordingly dismiss these grounds of appeal.
Did the Tribunal apply the incorrect legal standard for misrepresentation and wilful blindness?
52The appellant submits that the hearing panel erroneously found he was wilfully blind, as this concept is confined to circumstances of deliberate avoidance. The hearing panel’s conclusion that he was wilfully blind ignored his testimony regarding “misunderstanding and mental illness”.
53The Law Society did not directly address the appellant’s submission regarding wilful blindness, but pointed to the hearing panel’s conclusion that he “made deliberate, false and misleading representations in his application for an L1 licence”: Hearing Decision at para 60.
54The hearing panel found that Dr. Agbarakwe knowingly and deliberately made false representations to the LSO. At para 9 it wrote, “We conclude that Dr. Agbarakwe knew that his answers to these good character questions were false and misleading, and that he gave deliberately false answers.” At para 46, it found “on the preponderance of the evidence that when he completed the LSO licensing application, Dr. Agbarakwe not only knew that he had been suspended, but he knew he had also been disbarred.”
55The hearing panel’s references to the concept of wilful blindness were made in the context of dealing with Dr. Agbarakwe’s assertions surrounding the LSA proceeding. It found that if Dr. Agbarakwe, as he claimed, did not read his statement of admitted facts before signing it, or did not read the Notice to the Profession communicating his own disbarment, then he was wilfully blind: Hearing Decision at para 47. Whether he read these documents or was wilfully blind to their contents, the panel concluded that Dr. Agbarakwe knew he had been suspended and disbarred. He deliberately kept this from, and deliberately misled, the Law Society about these facts in his licensing application: Hearing Decision at para 48.
56The Tribunal’s jurisprudence has established that “a deliberate misrepresentation is a misrepresentation made knowing it to be false or misleading or being reckless or wilfully blind with respect to the truth.”: Singh v Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONLSTH 10 at para 65, citing Dumanian v Law Society of Ontario, 2024 ONLSTA 7 at para 53.
57There was ample evidence to support the hearing panel’s finding that Dr. Agbarakwe knowingly made false and misleading representations on his licensing application. There is no basis on which to overturn this finding. As such, we do not give effect to this ground of appeal.
CONCLUSION AND COSTS SUBMISSIONS
58For these reasons, we make the following order:
- The appeal is dismissed.
- If the Law Society seeks costs, and if the parties cannot agree on quantum, the Law Society may make written submissions within 14 days of this order to which Dr. Agbarakwe may respond in writing within 28 days of this order. The submissions are limited to five pages, double-spaced, excluding a bill of costs.