LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: March 18, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 24H-002

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

• and -

Ganesh K Balaganthan

Respondent

Before: Paul Aterman (chair), Randi Druzin, Mark Surchin

Heard: January 15, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances:

Kristin Bailey, for the applicant

Janani Shanmuganathan, for the respondent

Summary:

BALAGANTHAN – Professional Misconduct – Penalty and Costs – The Lawyer had been found to have engaged in professional misconduct by being wilfully blind to a fraudulent transaction; failing to make reasonable efforts to ascertain the purposes of his retainer or information about his client; and using his trust account for purposes other than providing legal services ‒ The panel found that because wilful blindness to a fraud is tantamount to knowledge, the presumptive penalty of revocation of licence must apply ‒ It determined that exceptional circumstances were not established, and ordered revocation of the Lawyer’s licence to practise law ‒ Costs of $24,000 were ordered.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON PENALTY AND COSTS

1Paul Aterman (for the panel):– In an earlier decision¹ we determined that Ganesh Balaganthan (the respondent) was wilfully blind to the fact that he was being used to advance a fraud and money laundering scheme.

2In our decision, we noted that the respondent was living through extremely difficult personal circumstances at the time he was drawn into the fraud. We also noted that, once he was contacted by bank fraud officials, he co‑operated fully with the bank and the police.

3Since the fraud he has co-operated with the Law Society in its investigation. He has practised for six years without incident.

4We now deal with the issues of penalty and costs. The respondent argues that his licence should be suspended for six months, or a longer period if we see fit. The Law Society requests that we revoke his licence.

5As we explain below, the mitigating circumstances in his case are powerful.

6However, the Tribunal’s decisions establish that wilful blindness to a fraud is tantamount to knowledge of that fraud.² They also establish that there is a presumption that a lawyer’s licence will be revoked if they knowingly participate in a fraud. The presumption can only be rebutted if there are exceptional circumstances.³

7Even when the mitigating circumstances are powerful – as they are here – this rarely justifies departing from the presumptive penalty of revocation. The Tribunal’s decisions are founded on the reasoning of the English Court of Appeal in Bolton v Law Society.⁴ The Court of Appeal says:

It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the Tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic. Often he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not offend again. On applying for restoration after striking off, all these points may be made, and the former solicitor may also be able to point to real efforts made to re-establish himself and redeem his reputation. All these matters are relevant and should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness.

[emphasis added]

8This passage accurately describes the situation in this case. While we have a great deal of sympathy for the respondent, a penalty less than revocation would send the wrong message to the profession and the public. This is why we order the revocation of his licence.

9In the reasons below, we first discuss the mitigating factors. Then we explain why they do not amount to exceptional circumstances.

MITIGATING FACTORS IN THIS CASE

10In our earlier reasons, we set out the difficult personal circumstances that the respondent was dealing with at the time he was drawn into the fraud. He delayed starting his practice after he qualified to care for his son, who was suffering from brain cancer. At the same time, he was also caring for the youngest of his three sons, who faced very serious health problems of his own.

11In our reasons, we accepted that these circumstances affected his judgement. But we did not accept that his judgement was so impaired that he could not think at the level expected of a reasonable lawyer.

The fraud was a single transaction over a short period of time

12His counsel points out that the fraudster, Hyang, was the respondent’s first client. The deposit of money stolen from the City of Surrey taxpayers was the first deposit into his trust account. The fraud took place very quickly.

13These are all circumstances that weigh in his favour. There are many examples of cases where the licensee:

• has years of experience;

• is wilfully blind to repeated fraudulent transactions;

• allows the transactions to continue over a prolonged period of time; and

• initially denies involvement and fails to co-operate in righting the wrong.

14As his counsel points out, this is not the case here. While a newly qualified lawyer is not held to a lesser standard of professional responsibility than a reasonably competent lawyer, we accept that the respondent did not have the benefit of years of experience. The fraud was a single transaction that was over in three days. Everything happened quickly. This gave him less time to reflect on what he was doing.

15We accept that these circumstances are less severe than ones where a licensee is wilfully blind to repeated transactions over a long period of time.

There is powerful evidence of strong community support

16A colleague and friend of the respondent, Nasif Abdullah, gave evidence about the respondent’s character. Mr. Abdullah is a criminal defence lawyer in Toronto who went to law school with the respondent. He testified that the respondent is deeply committed to the welfare of his family, and he made great personal sacrifices to qualify as a lawyer. Mr. Abdullah noted that, both as a police officer and a lawyer, the respondent is seen as a role model in the Tamil community. He said that he could not reconcile his view of the respondent with our findings of the respondent’s misconduct.

17The Law Society did not challenge any of Mr. Abdullah’s evidence, and he was both a credible and reliable witness. We accept his evidence as a genuine expression of how he views the respondent’s character.

18The respondent has produced 19 letters of support from family members, members of the legal profession and the Tamil community in Toronto.

19In Tribunal proceedings we often see letters of support that are generic in nature, repeat stock phrases and – inadvertently – send the message to the panel that the author of the letter of support does not really know what the case is all about.

20Not so here.

21The letters of support are genuine. They show that the authors understand our earlier decision. They reflect the individual relationship that each has with the respondent. They are highly credible and reliable expressions of support for the respondent.

22The letters also demonstrate that the respondent plays an important role in the Tamil community in Toronto. We accept his counsel’s submission that it is important for the community to see itself reflected in the ranks of the legal profession. One of his former clients says this of the respondent:

He has a rare ability to understand his clients’ lived realities, cultural backgrounds, and fears, and to advocate for them with skill and empathy. This quality is especially meaningful within the Tamil community, where language, trust and cultural understanding are essential to meaningful access to justice.

The respondent has practised for over six years without a problem

23There is no question that the respondent has conducted himself appropriately since the fraud was discovered. He continues to practise, mostly criminal defence work, with some real estate.

24The respondent does not argue that any delay in bringing these proceedings to a hearing has caused any prejudice to how he has presented his case.

ANALYSIS

25Imposing a penalty for professional misconduct has four possible objectives:

• specific deterrence, which is aimed at the individual licensee;

• general deterrence, which sends a message to all licensees;

• rehabilitation, restitution, and improving the competence of the individual licensee; and

• maintaining public confidence in the profession.⁵

26We think it is very unlikely that the respondent would repeat the misconduct. The uncontradicted evidence is that he now is hyper-vigilant in complying with the recommended measures to prevent money laundering and fraud.

27Because of this, the objectives of specific deterrence and rehabilitation don’t come into play here. But the objectives of general deterrence and maintaining public confidence in the profession do.

28Protecting the public through general deterrence and maintaining public confidence in the profession are the overriding considerations when the presumptive penalty of revocation is engaged. The English Court of Appeal in Bolton stresses the need for any member of the public to have a well-founded confidence that the lawyer they consult will be a person of unquestionable integrity.⁶

29The paramount goal of public confidence can be met if there are exceptional circumstances that overcome the presumption of revocation. However, the decision of the appeal panel in Mucha notes that it is not enough for the mitigating evidence to show that the misconduct was out of character and unlikely to recur. It must also explain why it occurred.⁷

30In this case, there is no evidence that explains to us why the respondent acted as he did. As we have noted, there is ample and compelling evidence that the respondent was living through an intensely difficult and stressful period in his life. But this – in and of itself – does not explain why he made the choices that he did.

31In his testimony, Mr. Abdullah told us that he could not reconcile our findings of misconduct with what he knows of the respondent. It was a mystery to him. This shows that the explanation as to why the respondent was wilfully blind to an obviously suspect transaction is missing.

32Frankly, we are just as puzzled as Mr. Abdullah. We have difficulty understanding why the respondent was wilfully blind to an obvious fraud, given that he appears to be a diligent and respected lawyer in his community.

33However, the need to understand why misconduct took place is integrally connected to the public’s confidence in the legal profession. In Bishop v Law Society of Upper Canada, the Divisional Court explains that the ‘why’ is essential:

Medical reasons or financial desperation or situations of duress serve as examples of the type of mitigating factors that may amount to exceptional circumstances but those situations are not exhaustive of such factors. That said, it remains the case that any such factors will normally have to be ones that would rise to the level where it would be obvious to other members of the profession and to the public that the underlying circumstances of the individual clearly obviated the need to provide reassurance to them of the integrity of the profession.⁸

[emphasis added]

34In other words, the explanation of the misconduct has to be so obvious and convincing that the profession and the public can look at the case and be confident that it is an isolated instance that will not cause them to wonder about the integrity of the profession as a whole.

35There are few cases where the presumption of revocation has been displaced. Where it has, the penalty has almost always still resulted in a loss of licence. With the exception of one case, revocation was reduced to permission to resign. The exception is Law Society of Ontario v McCullough,⁹ where the panel imposed an eight-month suspension and additional reporting requirements.

36The panel in McCullough had an extensive and detailed Gladue¹⁰ report before it that explained why the licensee in that case was before it. And while the parties did not agree on the length of a suspension, they made a joint submission that a suspension was the appropriate penalty. But in this case – as we note above – we don’t have an explanation of why the respondent acted as he did. In addition, the parties do not agree on the penalty. This is why we distinguish McCullough from this case.

37Further, we don’t consider that the evidence before us would justify departing from the presumption of revocation, and allow the respondent to resign. This is because the stresses he was going through are not, on their own, an explanation of why he acted as he did. Similarly, the expressions of community support don’t shed light on this question.

38The fact that he has practised for six years without incident is a positive factor, but not a particularly strong one. This is because the respondent was being investigated and ultimately faced this proceeding. In these circumstances, most licensees would not aggravate their own difficulties by engaging in further misconduct. Unlike the respondent in The Law Society of Upper Canada v Abbott,¹¹ the respondent in this case does not argue that delay has prejudiced his ability to present his defence to the Law Society’s allegations. The delay is not an exceptional circumstance here.

costs

39The Law Society has submitted a bill of costs of $24,000. This is close to its actual expenditure. The respondent agrees to pay this amount over a period of two years. The Law Society agrees to the payment schedule.

40Both the bill and the timeframe for payment are reasonable and reflect a joint position on this issue.

conclusion

41The presumption of revocation operates here because the respondent’s wilful blindness enabled the money laundering of fraudulently obtained funds. The presumption has not been displaced.

42The result is that the respondent’s licence is revoked, effective immediately.

ORDER

43We make the following order:

1. The respondent’s licence to practise law is revoked effective immediately.

2. The respondent shall comply with the Law Society’s Guidelines for Former Lawyers Whose Licences Have Been Revoked or Who Have Been Permitted to Surrender Their Licences.

3. The respondent shall pay costs to the Law Society in the amount of $24,000, over two years. A first instalment of $12,000 is payable by March 18, 2027. A second instalment of $12,000 is payable by March 20, 2028. Starting the day following the due date of each instalment, interest shall accrue on any unpaid part of the instalment, at a rate of 4% per year.

Footnotes

1. 1Law Society of Ontario v Balaganthan, 2025 ONLSTH 126.
2. 2Purewal v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2009 ONLSAP 10 at paras 31-33.
3. 3Law Society of Upper Canada v Mucha, 2008 ONLSAP 5 at paras 21-25.
4. 4[1994] 1 W.L.R. 512.
5. 5Law Society of Upper Canada v Adams, 2018 ONLSTH 20 at para 46.
6. 6Bolton at para 16.
7. 7Mucha at para 28.
8. 82014 ONSC 5057 at para 31.
9. 92022 ONLSTH 63.
10. 10R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC).
11. 112017 ONCA 525.