Glenn Bogue aka Spirit Warrior v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONLSTA 13

LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

APPEAL DIVISION

Date: May 15, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 25A-024

BETWEEN:

Glenn Bogue aka Spirit Warrior Appellant

• and -

Law Society of Ontario Respondent in appeal

Before: Gerald Chan Heard: In writing

Appearances: Appellant, self-represented Kristin Bailey, for the respondent in appeal

Summary: BOGUE – Reconsideration Motion – Fresh Evidence – Recusal – Jurisdiction – Panel composition – Transcripts – Stay pending appeal – The Appellant appealed the hearing panel’s decision to dismiss his abuse of process motion and sought various forms of relief – The panel found that the Appellant provided no evidentiary support and or legal basis for his assertions – The Panel dismissed the motion.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION

1Gerald Chan:– This is a motion by the appellant, Glenn Bogue aka Spirit Warrior (the Appellant), for various relief prior to the hearing of this appeal. For the reasons given below, the motion is dismissed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2On August 12, 2019, a panel of the Hearing Division found that the Appellant was, and continued to be, incapacitated under s 37(1) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 (the Act): Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2019 ONLSTH 107. On February 10, 2020, the panel indefinitely suspended the Appellant’s licence until certain conditions were met: Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2020 ONLSTH 21. The Appellant’s licence remains suspended.

3On April 23, 2025, the Appellant filed an application to terminate the suspension of his licence to practise law that was ordered in the capacity application. The Law Society sought an order dismissing the application as an abuse of process. Following a written hearing, the Chair of the Tribunal permanently stayed the Appellant’s motion as an abuse of process: 2025 ONLSTH 86.

4The Appellant now appeals this finding. As part of this appeal, the Appellant has brought a motion seeking various forms of relief. Specifically, the Appellant seeks:

• An order requiring the hearing panel to reconsider the dismissal of his motion and staying the appeal until this is done.
• An order transferring this appeal to an Indigenous Tribunal of the Appellant’s choice.
• An order requiring this motion to be heard by a lay member of the Tribunal.
• An order permitting the Appellant to cross-examine Dr. Philip Klassen, Teresa Donnelly, and/or Catherine Banning.
• An order requiring the Law Society to pay for the transcripts of the cross-examination of Dr. Klassen.
• An order permitting the introduction of fresh evidence.
• An order requiring me to recuse myself from the appeal.

5The Appellant had also sought an order to join the proceedings in this appeal with his ongoing proceedings before the Hearing Division (24H-116), in which the Law Society has brought a conduct application against the Appellant for practising while suspended. The Appellant brought a motion for this joinder order before both the Hearing Division and the Appeal Division. In an endorsement dated March 16, 2026, the Hearing Division dismissed the motion for joinder. In an endorsement dated March 26, 2026, I dismissed the motion for joinder on behalf of the Appeal Division for the same reasons.

6These reasons deal with the balance of the Appellant’s motion. Both parties have filed extensive materials. Following receipt of these materials, I directed this motion to proceed in writing.

Issue #1: Reconsideration Request

7The Appellant submits that the hearing panel should be directed to reconsider its decision below based on two cases, which were decided after the hearing panel released its reasons: Gitxaala v British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner), 2025 BCCA 430 (which he says builds on R. v Hape, 2007 SCC 26), and Irving v Wolastoqey, 2025 NBCA 129.

8The Law Society submits that if the Appellant believes there has been a relevant change in the law, he should make that argument on this appeal, and not on a motion to require the hearing panel to reconsider its findings. The Law Society points out that s 49.35(2) of the Act authorizes the Appeal Division to order a new hearing before the Hearing Division, but only after a hearing on the appeal.

9I agree with the Law Society. Case law is always developing and it is far from unusual that cases which one party contends are relevant will be released after a decision under appeal. Where this happens, arguments about the relevance of the subsequent case and its impact on the decision under appeal should be made on the appeal itself. The same is true where an appellant relies on case law that was decided prior to the decision under appeal and which that appellant says the hearing panel ignored or erroneously considered.

Issue #2: Transfer to an Indigenous Tribunal

10The Appellant requests that the hearing of this appeal be transferred to an Indigenous Tribunal of his choosing. The Appellant says this is required by the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

11The Law Society submits that there is no jurisdiction for this request under the Act. The Act does not establish, or grant jurisdiction to establish, an Indigenous Tribunal. Nor does it grant authority to the Tribunal to delegate its powers to any other tribunal established under other legislation.

12The Law Society points out that the Appellant has made similar requests on several other occasions: Law Society of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 38; Law Society of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2018 ONLSTH 46; Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2019 ONLSTA 19; Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2020 ONLSTA 11; Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2021 ONLSTA 2; and Bogue v Bogue, 2023 ONSC 1642. Those requests were denied.

13I agree with the Law Society that this Tribunal, which is a creature of statute under the Act, has no jurisdiction to order the transfer of the hearing to an Indigenous Tribunal of the Appellant’s choosing. The Appellant has not pointed to any jurisdictional source within the Tribunal’s enabling statute, even interpreted in light of UNDRIP, for this request.

Issue #3: Hearing by a lay member

14The Appellant submits that this motion should be heard by a lay member of the Tribunal “whose duty is to protect the Public and its Natural Resources”. The Appellant’s position is based on an alleged conflict arising from the fact that licensees “earn their living via the [Law Society]”.

15The Law Society submits that the Appellant’s assertion of conflict rests on pure speculation. Licensees adjudicate hearings and motions before the Tribunal every day. There is no basis to find that all licensees would have a conflict of interest in relation to the Appellant’s motion.

16I agree with the Law Society. Ont Reg 167/07 sets out the composition of panels in hearings before the Hearing and Appeal Divisions of the Law Society Tribunal. They include (and indeed, mandate) licensee adjudicators in various circumstances. Thus, the reality of licensee adjudicators is embedded within the statutorily-created structure of the Tribunal. There is no basis to suggest that such adjudicators are incapable of being fair and impartial merely because they are remunerated for their work.

Issue #4: Cross-examinations

17The Appellant seeks to cross-examine Dr. Philip Klassen, Teresa Donnelly, and Catherine Banning prior to this motion being heard.

18Dr. Klassen was an expert witness before the Tribunal during his capacity hearing. The Appellant submits that his testimony was based on the DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Version V), which is a fraud. The Appellant further submits that Dr. Klassen based his opinion evidence on the Appellant’s mention (in his book) of the existence of UFOs, of which there is no confirmation.

19The Law Society submits that there is no evidence that the DSM-V is a fraud. With respect to the existence of UFOs, the Law Society submits that the Appellant can make this argument on appeal without the need to cross-examine Dr. Klassen. The Appellant has already provided audio recordings of the capacity proceedings in which Dr. Klassen testified.

20I agree with the Law Society. The Appellant has not articulated a basis for cross-examining Dr. Klassen in order to further his arguments on appeal. He is free to make submissions regarding Dr. Klassen’s testimony at the hearing of the appeal, and to buttress those submissions with fresh evidence (subject to admissibility). But he has not adequately explained why that fresh evidence must come from Dr. Klassen in the form of additional testimony on a cross-examination prior to the hearing of the appeal.

21With respect to Ms. Donnelly and Ms. Banning, both of whom are adjudicators with the Tribunal, the Appellant has provided no foundation for his request to cross-examine either of them.

Issue #5: Payment of transcripts

22The Appellant seeks an order requiring the Law Society to pay for the transcript fees of the cross-examination of Dr. Klassen in the capacity proceedings; or, alternatively, an agreed statement of fact based on the audio recordings that he has produced.

23The Law Society points out that the Appellant has not provided any financial evidence to demonstrate that he is unable to pay the cost of the transcripts. It is therefore not in the public interest to require the Law Society, and thus the legal professions, to pay for these costs.

24The Law Society submits that it is prepared to consider an agreement based on the audio recordings on the following conditions:

• the Appellant provides to the Law Society a list of the alleged statements made by Dr. Klassen during the capacity proceeding that he wishes to include in the ASF;
• the time stamp in the recording where the statements can be heard; and
• a brief outline of the relevance of each statement to live issues on the appeal.

25With respect to the transcripts, I agree with the Law Society’s submission. In the absence of some evidence of impecuniosity, the Tribunal has no basis upon which to order the Law Society to pay for the cost of transcripts that the Appellant wishes to rely upon to further his appeal.

26With respect to the ASF, it is not the role of this Tribunal to direct the parties to enter into an agreement on the facts. That is a matter for the parties to discuss amongst themselves and then to present to the Tribunal if an agreement can be reached.

Issue #6: Fresh evidence

27The Appellant has filed an exhibit book with 18 tabs of fresh evidence. The Appellant has also filed an affidavit dated March 12, 2026, setting out the fresh evidence that he seeks to have admitted on this appeal. These materials fall into the following categories:

• material related to a book or movie deal;
• evidence about UFOs; and
• material related to other topics covered in the Appellant’s books, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, the great pyramid, nutrition, banking, and Indigenous rights.

28The Law Society submits that the four-part Palmer test (Palmer v The Queen, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC)) has not been met. The materials are not relevant to a live issue on appeal, which is not an appeal of the capacity finding. All appeals of the capacity finding have been exhausted. Moreover, the proposed fresh evidence is not credible. The materials are either not supported by an affidavit or any other corroborating evidence, come from unknown sources, or have been discredited in other proceedings: MD v Alberta (Director of Child and Family Services), 2024 ABKB 565; World Energy GH2 Inc. v Benoit Ryan, 2024 NLSC 6; Cipolla v Ozkin, 2025 ONSC 173; and Law Society of Ontario v Bogue, 2025 ONLSTH 56.

29The question of whether the proposed fresh evidence meets the Palmer criteria — particularly that of relevance — is one that is bound up with the merits of the appeal itself. The appeal panel will be best suited to answering this question in the context of all of the submissions made by the Appellant and the Law Society on the appeal proper. Accordingly, the admissibility of the proposed fresh evidence is deferred to the hearing of the appeal.

Issue #7: Recusal from appeal panel

30The Appellant seeks my recusal from the appeal panel in this case.

31The Law Society submits that there is no basis for this request. It notes that the Appellant has not provided any grounds for such an order in his notice of motion, other than to request the calling of oral evidence and to state that he intends to rely on “[d]ocuments and articles regarding Recusal” without setting out what those materials are.

32I agree with the Law Society. In my endorsement dated February 27, 2026, I noted that the Appellant had suggested in email correspondence that he may be seeking my recusal but had not, at that time, brought any such motion. The Appellant subsequently amended his notice of motion to formally seek my recusal. However, he has not provided any basis for this request in evidence or submissions. Accordingly, the request is denied.

ORDER

33I order the following:

1. The Appellant’s motion is dismissed.
2. The costs of this motion will be reserved to the appeal panel.