Manslaughter

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter and first degree murder, respectively, following a fatal shooting during a home invasion.

On appeal, one appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting highly prejudicial 'resemblance evidence' from his parents based on a surveillance video.

The other appellant argued the trial judge's W.(D.) instructions were deficient for failing to incorporate exculpatory eyewitness evidence, and that the Crown's closing address improperly denigrated that evidence using inadmissible scientific claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed with both appellants, finding the resemblance evidence inadmissible and the jury instructions combined with the Crown's improper closing address fatal to trial fairness.

Both appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

The offender, an Indigenous man, pled guilty to manslaughter after fatally cutting the victim's throat during an altercation over a drug debt.

The victim had initially attacked the offender with a baton while both were under the influence of fentanyl.

The court conducted a detailed Gladue analysis, noting the offender's significant rehabilitative efforts while on bail, including completing treatment programs and reconnecting with his culture.

Emphasizing restorative justice principles, the court sentenced the offender to 22 months of time served and three years of probation.

Youth criminal trial on a charge of second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing during a late-night marijuana transaction.

The defence asserted self-defence under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, alleging that the deceased and others lured the drug supplier to the residence in order to rob him and attacked the accused and the supplier without warning.

The court found the robbery scenario more likely than not, accepted that the accused acted for a defensive purpose, and held the Crown failed to disprove the reasonableness of the accused’s response in the circumstances, including his age, size, the sudden group assault, and lack of safe escape.

The accused was acquitted because the Crown failed to prove a culpable homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judge-alone homicide trial arising from the disappearance of two young women connected by forensic and circumstantial evidence to the accused’s apartment, including DNA evidence, body dismemberment, body-part storage in a chest freezer, and extensive inculpatory statements.

The court admitted count-on-count similar act evidence under the Handy framework, finding sufficient connectivity between the two incidents to support limited uses including death, culpable homicide, coincidence rebuttal, and after-the-fact conduct analysis.

On the evidence relating to one victim, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused death by repeated blunt-force head strikes during a sexual assault, and that the murder was first degree under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

On the other count, the court found the accused unlawfully caused death and dismembered the body, but the evidentiary gap on intent left a reasonable doubt on murder, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of her former boyfriend.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined its own key witness on a prior inconsistent statement without bringing an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and subsequently used the inconsistency to impeach the witness's credibility during closing submissions.

The trial judge permitted this use and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held that this improper cross-examination and the subsequent use of the evidence prejudiced the appellant's defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused stood trial on a charge of manslaughter arising from a fight in which the deceased later died after a cardiac arrest.

The Crown's causation theory depended entirely on forensic pathology evidence inferring neck compression by a headlock, despite the absence of any eyewitness evidence of that act and the accused's denial.

Applying the causation standard, the W.(D.) framework, and the circumstantial evidence principles in Villaroman, the court found the expert opinion insufficiently robust to exclude reasonable alternative explanations for the cardiac arrest, petechial hemorrhages, and internal neck fracture, including resuscitation efforts.

The Crown failed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt, and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with manslaughter of his mother and assault causing bodily harm to his aunt after he pushed his aunt out of the house, causing her to fall into his mother, who then fell down concrete stairs and later died.

The Crown abandoned the manslaughter charge and sought a conviction for aggravated assault based on transferred intent.

The court found that aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm were not lesser included offences of manslaughter, but unlawfully causing bodily harm was.

The court rejected the accused's defences of consensual fight, self-defence, and defence of property, finding them lacking an air of reality.

The accused was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm against the aunt and unlawfully causing bodily harm against the mother.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1992 in connection with the death of her stepdaughter, largely based on the pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Decades later, fresh expert evidence unanimously discredited Dr. Smith's findings regarding the cause and mechanism of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the original guilty plea was uninformed and the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and arson-related offences after his hardware store was destroyed in a fire set by co-conspirators to collect insurance proceeds.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning regarding colluding witnesses, improperly admitted hearsay statements under the co-conspirator exception, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 12-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the appellant's high degree of moral blameworthiness.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent, an Emergency Task Force officer, on a charge of manslaughter.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by weighing the evidence regarding the careless use of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error.

The preliminary inquiry judge properly engaged in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence, and there was no evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care required of an ETF officer.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence for manslaughter.

The Crown conceded that there was an error in the jury charge regarding party liability for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for manslaughter.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding party liability for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his mother, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by failing to put forward the defence of intoxication, inadequately instructing on discreditable conduct, and failing to properly instruct on the requisite intent for murder and the elements of manslaughter.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidentiary foundation for an intoxication defence and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-year parole ineligibility period was fit for a brutal second degree murder in a domestic context.

The appellant appealed her 9-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing it was outside the appropriate range and failed to give meaningful effect to her Aboriginal status under Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered and distinguished relevant case law, and appropriately balanced rehabilitative and Gladue objectives with the paramount need for public safety given the appellant's substance abuse and risk to the community.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury and by improperly instructing the jury on how to use his post-offence conduct to infer intent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there was an air of reality to the subjective element of provocation despite the appellant's testimony that he was not angry.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could use the appellant's bizarre post-offence conduct to infer an intent to kill, as such conduct was equally consistent with manslaughter.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant pled guilty to manslaughter after accidentally shooting his friend with a prohibited firearm while in a vehicle.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to properly apply s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code regarding his Aboriginal heritage and erred in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application of s. 718.2(e) given the mandatory minimum sentence, but the majority held the trial judge failed to give sufficient mitigating weight to the appellant's positive life steps.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to five years.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender on bail, killed a police officer while fleeing arrest in a stolen vehicle.

He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a 10-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was unfit and the sentencing judge erred in her findings of fact, admission of a video tribute, and application of sentencing principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence in these circumstances.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to commit the accused for manslaughter rather than murder.

The accused was charged in the death of his severely disabled brother, who died from starvation and infected bedsores.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing the evidence and determining that gross negligence did not equate to the mens rea for murder, rather than assessing whether a jury could reasonably infer the requisite intent.

The appeal was allowed, and the accused was committed to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give instructions on post-offence conduct, a Vetrovec warning, the defence of accident, the elements of manslaughter, causation, and the victim's reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that the defence counsel at trial had not requested the omitted instructions or objected to the charge.

The applicant applied to re-open his abandoned appeal from a manslaughter conviction relating to the death of his infant grandson.

He argued that new understandings of Shaken Baby Syndrome following the Goudge Inquiry suggested his conviction might be a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the case did not turn solely on Shaken Baby Syndrome but on cumulative circumstantial evidence, including an unexplained skull fracture, and the applicant failed to provide an innocent explanation for the injuries.