Cronk J.A.

The appellant commenced a negligence action against the respondent dentists for substandard dental implant procedures.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying the discoverability test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was discoverable when the appellant's new dentist explained the nature of the problem and advised he would have conducted the procedure differently, which occurred more than two years before the action was commenced.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following the release of the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the parties agreed the appellant was entitled to 45 months' credit rather than the amount initially granted.

The Court of Appeal varied the sentence to 15 months to reflect the correct pre-sentence custody credit against the agreed-upon five-year total sentence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's order was reasonable and that the Board did not misapprehend evidence regarding cultural reactions to mental illness or the attitude of the appellant's parents toward his illness.

The appellant judgment creditor sought to enforce its judgment by having the sheriff sell the respondents' mortgaged property.

The sheriff required a mortgage discharge statement, which the mortgagee bank refused to provide without the respondents' consent, citing PIPEDA.

The respondents failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The appellant brought a motion to compel the mortgagee to produce the statement, which was dismissed based on binding precedent.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the mortgage discharge statement was sensitive personal information under PIPEDA, and the respondents could not be deemed to have impliedly consented to its disclosure to a judgment creditor.

The majority affirmed that the proper procedure to obtain the statement without consent is to seek an order for the examination of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18(6)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which would satisfy the court order exemption in PIPEDA.

The appellant, a court-appointed receiver, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to approve the full amount of legal fees requested on behalf of its counsel.

The motion judge had reduced the fees, finding them disproportionate to the size and complexity of the receivership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the court must ensure compensation is fair and reasonable, focusing on the value provided rather than just the mathematical calculation of hours multiplied by hourly rates.

The motion judge's assessment of the fees as excessive was upheld.

The appellant submitted the lowest bid for a highway widening project but failed to declare the value of imported steel, rendering the bid non-compliant.

The Ministry of Transportation investigated, deemed the bid non-compliant, and awarded the contract to the second-lowest bidder.

The appellant sued for lost profits.

The Court of Appeal held that while a Contract A arose upon submission of the bid, the Ministry acted reasonably in refusing to waive the non-compliance.

Furthermore, an exculpatory clause in the tender documents barred the appellant's claim for damages arising from the non-acceptance of its bid.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order that stayed their motion, transferred the proceeding, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

The court also noted that the appeal should be quashed due to the appellants' persistent failure to pay outstanding costs orders from previous proceedings.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent, an Emergency Task Force officer, on a charge of manslaughter.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by weighing the evidence regarding the careless use of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error.

The preliminary inquiry judge properly engaged in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence, and there was no evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care required of an ETF officer.