K. Swinton

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment on an appeal, the respondent Aviva Canada Inc. requested that the court reopen its decision based on a recently released Supreme Court of Canada decision regarding the standard of review.

Aviva argued that the new decision altered the applicable standard of review from reasonableness to correctness due to concurrent jurisdiction provisions in the Insurance Act.

The court denied the request, noting that the parties did not agree an error had been made and finding that it was not in the interests of justice to withdraw the reasons and rehear the case on the merits.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to clarify the costs and interest awarded in its previous decision (2012 ONCA 143).

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $6,700, costs of the trial to be agreed upon or assessed, and pre- and post-judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant applied to re-open his abandoned appeal from a manslaughter conviction relating to the death of his infant grandson.

He argued that new understandings of Shaken Baby Syndrome following the Goudge Inquiry suggested his conviction might be a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the case did not turn solely on Shaken Baby Syndrome but on cumulative circumstantial evidence, including an unexplained skull fracture, and the applicant failed to provide an innocent explanation for the injuries.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a 'Covenant and Postponement of Claim' valid and enforceable against it.

The appellant argued it was a guarantor, not a principal debtor, and was released from liability due to a failure to receive a demand notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific language of the Covenant precluded the appellant from relying on the lack of notice, and that the appellant had ratified the events that might have otherwise entitled it to release.

The appellant landlord appealed an order regarding a commercial lease dispute.

The issues included the commencement date of the lease, the commencement date for parking space rent, and the payment of a leasehold improvements allowance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the lease commenced when the demising walls were built and the premises were delivered, and that parking rent commenced when the parking spaces were turned over.

The court amended the order on consent to direct the leasehold improvements allowance to be paid directly to the sub-tenant.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.