Evan Weber

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug charges.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis that there was no forensic evidence connecting the accused to illicit items in a safe, concluding that the accused lacked the requisite knowledge of the presence of drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error of law, as constructive possession can be proven by circumstantial evidence without forensic evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking conspiracy, brought applications for a stay of proceedings alleging their s. 11(b) Charter rights to a trial within a reasonable time were infringed.

The total delay was 41.5 months.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court deducted defence delay and delay caused by discrete exceptional circumstances, including a judge's conflict of interest and an unexpectedly lengthy preliminary hearing.

The remaining delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the parties reasonably relied on the prior Morin framework.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and arson after pouring gasoline in a bedroom where his former partner and her seven-year-old daughter were sleeping, and setting it on fire.

The accused claimed the complainant started the fire herself after he announced he was leaving her for a former girlfriend.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as lacking credibility and defying common sense, applying the W.(D.) framework.

Relying on the complainant's evidence, expert fire investigation, and medical evidence, the court found the accused deliberately set the fire with the specific intent to kill the occupants.

The accused was found guilty on all eight counts.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.