First degree murder

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by excluding a co-accused's out-of-court hearsay statements, admitting the co-accused's guilty plea and agreed statement of facts, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, correctly admitted the edited guilty plea to preserve trial fairness, and provided a clear and error-free jury instruction regarding post-offence conduct.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought interim judicial release pending her appeal, citing concerns about contracting COVID-19 in custody.

The court assessed the application under the public interest criterion of s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

Finding that the grounds of appeal were not strong, the offence was exceptionally serious, the release plan was inadequate, and the COVID-19 risk in her institution was low, the court concluded that the applicant's detention remained necessary in the public interest.

The application for release was dismissed.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the court considered whether the two accused should be committed to stand trial for first-degree murder in a stabbing death.

The Crown argued the murder was planned and deliberate or occurred during a forcible confinement.

The court found no evidence of planning or deliberation, and concluded any confinement was inherent in the act of killing rather than a distinct act.

The accused were committed to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his wife and the attempted murder of his daughter following a stabbing in the family home.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on first-degree murder based on planning and deliberation, as well as constructive murder via unlawful confinement.

The Crown also sought committal for attempted murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on the accused's internet searches and statements prior to the offence.

The court also found sufficient evidence of unlawful confinement of both the deceased and the daughter.

Finally, the court found sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill the daughter.

The accused was committed to stand trial on first-degree murder and attempted murder.

In a jury trial on a first degree murder indictment arising from a planned drug-related shooting, the court issued written reasons addressing objections to the jury charge and counsel's closings.

The court held that an out-of-court statement about a distinctive licence plate was inadmissible for its truth because it was hearsay and did not meet the excited utterance exception.

The court also gave a strong Hay warning on weak police identification evidence, ruled that haircut evidence lacked probative value as after-the-fact conduct, and corrected improper closing submissions by both Crown and defence where they exceeded the evidentiary record.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused of manslaughter and acquitted the third.

The Crown appealed a reviewing judge's decision to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for first degree murder and substitute a committal for second degree murder.

The accused was charged with first degree murder based on the allegation that he caused the victim's death while committing a sexual assault.

The reviewing judge found no evidence of lack of consent to the sexual act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the first degree murder committal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not exceed his jurisdiction.

The Court held that the nature of the injuries, the position of the body, and the short timeframe supported a reasonable inference that the sexual contact was not consensual.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the accused to lead her lengthy, exculpatory police video statement as part of her defence under the Edgar exception for prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct principles and reasonably exercised his discretion in finding the statement was spontaneous and made when the accused was first confronted with an accusation of a crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

On a written judicial screening application under the former faint hope regime, the applicant sought leave to proceed to a jury for a reduction in parole ineligibility following a first degree murder conviction.

The court applied s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code and considered the applicant’s character, institutional conduct, the nature of the offence, victim information, and other relevant circumstances.

Despite the highly aggravating facts of a calculated murder-for-insurance plot and the applicant’s initial denial and flight from Canada, the court found the applicant’s institutional record exemplary, his programming and insight substantial, and his current risk to public safety low.

The court held that the application had a substantial likelihood of success and directed that a jury be empanelled.

In a first degree murder appeal arising from a joint trial with antagonistic defences, the appellant's counsel was required to withdraw mid-trial and no replacement counsel could be found despite extensive efforts.

The trial judge refused severance or a mistrial and instead appointed amicus curiae with an expanded mandate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge asked the wrong question, relied on unsupported considerations, failed to consider highly relevant factors, and thereby unreasonably exercised discretion under the interests of justice standard.

Amicus was not an adequate substitute for counsel in a complex murder trial, and the resulting loss of representation deprived the appellant of a fair trial and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial due to unfair and inflammatory cross-examination and jury addresses by Crown counsel.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of alleged juror misconduct based on online comments made after the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the Crown's comments were ill-advised, they did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial when viewed in the context of the entire proceedings.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, concluding it did not prove Crown misconduct or compromise the integrity of the trial.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery of a drug dealer, during which two victims were unlawfully confined and shot to death.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the defence of alibi, a third-party suspect, the correction of defence counsel's closing address, the failure to give timely notice of an alibi witness, and the elements of accessorial liability for constructive first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to leave constructive first-degree murder to the jury for the non-shooter as an aider and abettor, and concluded that the verdicts were not unreasonable.

The 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for counselling and encouraging her boyfriend to kill the victim.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that two videotaped statements to police were inadmissible under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and appealed her adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant was not detained during the first interview and had validly waived her right to counsel in the second.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly concluded that a youth sentence would not provide sufficient long-term supervision to protect the public given the appellant's psychological profile and risk of reoffending.

The appellant appealed a conviction for first degree murder and conceded that a conviction for second degree murder was inevitable.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on planning and deliberation, including whether post-offence conduct could be considered and whether psychiatric evidence was properly left with the jury.

The court held that it was open to the jury to consider the appellant's actions after the killing in response to the defence theory of impulsive and disorganized conduct.

The court further held that the psychiatric evidence was primarily relevant to provocation, which lacked an air of reality, and that any remaining relevance to planning and deliberation was adequately addressed.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a joint murder appeal arising from a planned street robbery and fatal stabbing, the court held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that they could treat a co-accused's explanatory statements as adoptive admissions by silence against the appellants.

The record did not establish the factual context necessary to support an inference that either appellant could reasonably have been expected to respond, particularly where the statements were non-accusatory and related primarily to the declarant's own state of mind.

The court further held that, even if the evidence were capable of supporting adoption by silence, the jury charge lacked the necessary caution and analytical guidance.

One appellant received a new trial on first degree murder, while the other had his conviction set aside and a manslaughter conviction substituted.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for first degree murder arising from the fatal stabbing of a teenager during a group robbery incident.

The principal issue was whether the evidence could support constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code on the basis of actual or attempted unlawful confinement, including events in a catwalk, the ensuing chase, and a bear hug immediately preceding the stabbing.

The court held that the evidence was capable of supporting at least attempted unlawful confinement, that the restraint was distinct from the killing, and that the jury charge disclosed no reversible error.

Additional complaints concerning jurisdiction, prior discreditable conduct, victim good character evidence, exculpatory instructions, and hearsay rulings were rejected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed two first degree murder convictions arising from a motel room shooting, arguing that the principal eyewitness identification evidence should have been excluded, that defence expert evidence on identification frailties should have been admitted, and that the jury charge on identification was inadequate.

The court held that the eyewitness evidence was fully testable through the adversarial process and did not create the kind of prejudice that would justify exclusion.

The court declined to revisit existing authority limiting general expert evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification and upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the proposed opinion evidence was unnecessary.

Reading the charge as a whole, the court found the jury was adequately cautioned about the dangers of identification evidence, including the limits of witness confidence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the Crown's case was entirely circumstantial and that police vetting of prospective jurors constituted an abuse of process.

The court applied the unreasonable verdict standard and held that the cumulative effect of the evidence of motive, opportunity, access, and post-offence conduct was capable of supporting findings of unlawful killing, murder, and planning and deliberation.

The court also held that police checks for criminal records and outstanding charges, without Crown involvement and without any resulting unfairness in jury selection, did not amount to a per se abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had set aside the accused's conviction for first degree murder and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the first degree murder conviction, adopting the dissenting reasons of MacPherson J.A. at the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and murder.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a judge and jury.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could consider his post-offence conduct as consistent with a pre-existing plan and intention to kill.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, were fair, balanced, and accurate regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the jury's rejection of his insanity defence was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the case from Molodowic.

The Court held that the jury was faced with conflicting expert evidence, statements from the appellant, and circumstantial evidence that could reasonably be interpreted as showing he knew his acts were morally wrong.

The jury's finding that the appellant had not made out his defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code was not unreasonable.