fair trial

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and preferred the line of cases holding that the dock is the customary position for an accused.

The court found that seating the accused in the dock does not infringe the presumption of innocence, avoids the prejudice of having multiple security officers surrounding the accused at counsel table, and ensures the accused remains visible to the jury.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with murder, was released on bail.

A mandatory publication ban under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing.

Following misleading public comments by politicians and the police chief, the accused brought an application to partially lift the publication ban on the bail reasons to counterbalance the misinformation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 517 does not permit partial bans, and while the court has common law jurisdiction to vary the ban, doing so would likely cause more harm than good.

The court held that the accused's fair trial rights would be adequately protected by existing safeguards, including the passage of time, challenge for cause, and jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the fatal shooting of a victim inside a bar.

The critical evidence was security camera footage showing two men in a stairwell moments before the shooting.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was one of the men and was holding a gun.

The trial judge opined in his jury charge that the dark object appeared to be a gun, despite the Crown's earlier concession that the object was not clearly identifiable as a gun.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's opinion compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial by improperly intervening on a critical factual issue and emboldening the Crown to withdraw its concession.

The court also addressed issues regarding identification evidence and improper Crown speculation about a disabled security monitor.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the dock during his trial.

The court balanced the interests of a fair trial and courtroom security.

Given the accused's in-custody status, criminal record, and institutional infractions, along with the critical need for the jury to have an unobstructed view of the accused for identification purposes, the application was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter to exclude the evidence of a Crown witness, arguing that the police's failure to properly record and preserve evidence from group meetings with witnesses breached his rights under ss. 7 and 11(d).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police did not deliberately fail to make a record to avoid production, and that the imperfect note-taking and group interviews did not render the trial unfair given the extensive disclosure available to the defence for cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving from Provincial Offences Court.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing an adjournment to obtain disclosure; (2) there was a breach of the right to a fair trial due to non-disclosure; and (3) the prosecution failed to establish all elements of careless driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the adjournment was properly refused, the trial was fair despite disclosure issues, and the circumstantial evidence supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Brian Caskenette, president of the Cornwall Minor Hockey Association (CMHA), was charged with fraud over $5,000 for personal use of a CMHA Visa card and cash advances.

He also brought a Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to missing financial records.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no actual prejudice as other evidence provided similar information.

The court found the accused guilty of fraud over $5,000, concluding he knowingly and dishonestly deprived the CMHA of $12,831 through undeclared personal purchases and cash advances, and that his assertions of reimbursement were not credible or recorded.

During pre-trial motions for a murder trial, the accused sought an order to have his leg shackles removed while in the courtroom.

The Crown opposed the request for security reasons, citing alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident in the cells, and staffing pressures.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused posed a flight or safety risk to justify the continued use of shackles, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered the shackles removed.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to sit at counsel table, to have leg shackles removed, and to have hot meals provided by counsel during the trial.

The court dismissed the application to sit at counsel table, finding that security concerns regarding two of the accused necessitated their placement in the dock, and that treating the co-accused differently could cause prejudice.

The court ordered that the accused wear minimally intrusive leg belt restraints rather than handcuffs or leg irons.

The request for hot meals provided by counsel was denied due to security concerns, but the court ordered the custodial authorities to provide two sandwiches and a beverage for lunch.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of subsections 278.3(5) and 278.4(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued that requiring notice to a witness of an application for third party records (specifically, police occurrence reports regarding the complainant's boyfriend) would undermine cross-examination and violate sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada had already upheld the constitutionality of the Mills regime, which includes the impugned notice provisions, and that this regime applies to extrinsic police occurrence reports.

The applicant, charged with importing cocaine, brought a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel after his Legal Aid certificate was cancelled due to his income level.

The court reviewed his financial circumstances and found he was not indigent, as he was fully employed and had discretionary income.

Furthermore, the court determined the case was straightforward, involving a short border investigation and a single issue of knowledge, meaning counsel was not essential for a fair trial.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his jury trial.

The accused argued that sitting in the dock would prejudice his right to a fair trial, erode the presumption of innocence, and limit his ability to instruct counsel.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security, sight-lines, and the lack of exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, applying the principles from R. v. Gervais, and found that the accused failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances necessitating a departure from the customary practice of sitting in the dock.

Michael Oduh, charged with serious drug trafficking offences, applied for a stay of proceedings pending state-funded counsel (a Rowbotham application) after being denied Legal Aid Ontario coverage.

The court found that Oduh lacked the financial means to retain private counsel for a complex, lengthy trial and that counsel was essential for him to receive a fair trial, given the seriousness of the charges, the potential for a lengthy jail term, and his lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system.

The application was allowed, and proceedings were stayed until state-funded counsel was provided.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for inordinate and inexcusable delay, spanning 22 years.

The litigation arose from a business partnership dissolution and minority shareholder dispute from 1993, involving allegations of oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent manipulation of accounts.

The court applied the Langenecker v. Sauvé test under Rule 24.01, finding the delay inordinate and inexcusable, particularly due to the plaintiffs' failure to advance the case and the loss of their entire file, including critical financial documentation and the death of the primary plaintiff and key accountants.

The court concluded that a fair trial was no longer possible due to both presumed and actual prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed for delay.

The defense applied for a mistrial due to a mid-trial breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship between the accused and his former counsel, Uma Kancharla.

The breakdown stemmed from counsel's application for a psychiatric assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial, which the accused opposed.

The defense argued that counsel's actions prejudiced the accused and constituted a breach of privilege, effectively depriving him of counsel.

The court found that counsel acted properly in raising the fitness issue, disclosed minimal privileged information, and that the accused's rights were protected.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed, emphasizing that such declarations are a last resort.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man charged with sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings due to a heart condition, arguing that continued prosecution violated his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) and constituted an abuse of process.

The court reviewed medical evidence, which indicated that while the applicant had serious health issues, his condition had stabilized, and he was physically able to attend trial with appropriate accommodations.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate a substantial risk to his health or that the trial process would seriously imperil it.

Applying the tests from R. v. Hillier, R. v. Magomadova, and R. v. Babos, the court concluded that this was not one of the "clearest of cases" warranting a stay, especially considering the public interest in adjudicating serious offences involving child harm.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, Mark Smich, sought a mistrial during a joint murder trial, alleging that co-accused Dellen Millard's counsel improperly introduced highly prejudicial propensity and bad character evidence, including violent rap lyrics, beyond the scope of a Pollock and Morrisson application.

The Crown and co-accused Millard opposed the application, arguing the evidence was within the scope of cross-examination for antagonistic defenses and that timely limiting instructions had been provided.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while one specific rap lyric reference exceeded the permitted scope, it was probative to a live issue (firearm ownership) and that any potential prejudice could be cured by jury instructions, not warranting the "last resort" remedy of a mistrial.

In a criminal appeal as of right based on a dissent, the appellant argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel and resulting unfair trial.

The Court applied the two-part test requiring proof of counsel incompetence and a resulting miscarriage of justice.

It held that, although the dissent identified critical deficiencies, the reasons did not establish how those deficiencies caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court was not persuaded that any form of miscarriage of justice occurred and dismissed the appeal.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel and a conditional stay of proceedings under ss. 7, 11(d), and 24(1) of the Charter on the basis that he could not afford counsel and required representation to make full answer and defence in a complex criminal prosecution involving 21 counts, including criminal organization and drug trafficking offences.

The court accepted that the charges were serious and involved some complexity but found significant deficiencies in the evidentiary record supporting the claim of financial inability.

Evidence suggested the accused had assets, income, and potential access to seized funds, and had prioritized maintaining property interests over funding his defence.

The court held the accused had not demonstrated he exhausted all reasonable avenues to retain counsel.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and breach of probation arising from an incident in which he briefly touched a young complainant’s wrist while speaking with two elementary school students outside a school.

Because the complainants were under 18, counsel had been appointed under s. 486.3(1) of the Criminal Code to conduct cross-examination on behalf of the self-represented accused.

The appellant argued that the appointed counsel failed to pursue a critical defence theory that the complainants fabricated the allegation to avoid trouble with their parents for speaking with a stranger.

The court held that counsel appointed under s. 486.3 must pursue relevant and proper lines of inquiry requested by the accused, even if counsel might otherwise decline on tactical grounds.

The failure to pursue the proposed line of cross-examination deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

Rather than ordering a new trial, the court substituted findings of guilt but replaced the sentence with a conditional discharge and probation already completed.