Craig Coughlan

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of her 16-year-old daughter, who suffered from severe cerebral palsy.

The Crown alleged the accused smothered the victim and staged a home invasion to cover it up.

The accused testified that two armed intruders entered the home searching for a package, and that one of them remained with the victim while the other searched the house.

The court applied the W.(D.) principles and found that the evidence of the home invasion, while containing some inconsistencies, raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also acquitted the accused of manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence that she was capable of assisting the victim after the intruders left.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicant brought an application to stay proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was over 41 months, which included delay from the COVID-19 pandemic and a 5-month period where preliminary inquiries were vacated due to the Crown's interpretation of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code.

The court found the Bill C-75 delay was a discrete and exceptional event, as the state of the law was briefly in flux.

Deducting this time brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, facing charges of criminal harassment and breach of recognizance, was detained on the secondary ground and later found unfit to stand trial.

After treatment, he was detained in hospital on a keep fit order under s. 672.29 of the Criminal Code.

On a 90-day detention review under s. 525, a preliminary issue arose regarding the Superior Court's jurisdiction to hear the review given the concurrent keep fit order.

The court held that it has jurisdiction to conduct the s. 525 review, but any decision to release under s. 525 would not affect the continuing validity of the separate s. 672.29 detention order.

The court ultimately dismissed the s. 525 review, finding detention continued to be justified.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for the brutal beating of an 82-year-old woman during a home invasion.

The Crown sought 18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background, mental illness, and the jury's recommendation.

The court found the offender posed a significant danger and set the base parole ineligibility at 18 years.

However, the court found that the 27 months the offender spent in administrative segregation constituted a gross violation of his s. 12 Charter rights against cruel and unusual treatment.

As a remedy, the court reduced the parole ineligibility period by 27 months, resulting in a final period of 15 years and 9 months.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling that the recent amendments to the Criminal Code under Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges operated retrospectively.

The accused argued that the right to challenge jurors is a substantive right.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the right to a jury trial is substantive, but the right to peremptorily challenge jurors is procedural.

Following recent jurisprudence, the court held that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not breach the right to a fair trial and applies prospectively to the accused's jury selection.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a home invasion where an 82-year-old woman was beaten to death.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, arguing the jury should only be left with second-degree murder or manslaughter.

The Crown argued first-degree murder could be established through planning and deliberation or constructive murder based on forcible confinement.

The court granted the directed verdict application, finding no evidence to support planning and deliberation, nor evidence of a discrete act of forcible confinement separate from the killing itself.

The jury was directed to return a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder and subsequently convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit a video statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for second-degree murder.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary, alleging his will was overborne by persistent questioning, inducements, and delayed cautions.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, noting the police did not offer inducements, the questioning was not oppressive, and the accused understood his rights.

The statement was ruled admissible subject to editing out specific prejudicial references.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the dock during his trial.

The court balanced the interests of a fair trial and courtroom security.

Given the accused's in-custody status, criminal record, and institutional infractions, along with the critical need for the jury to have an unobstructed view of the accused for identification purposes, the application was dismissed.

The applicants brought a Garofoli application challenging the admissibility of firearms evidence seized during a search of their home.

The search warrant was originally obtained in relation to alleged offences committed by their son.

The applicants argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that the affiant was not full, frank, and fair.

Before the court could rule on the application, the parties reached a resolution, rendering the motion moot.

The court nonetheless cautioned police that search warrants must be based on cogent evidence, not merely suspicion or anecdotal experience.