Glenn D. Krelove

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving from Provincial Offences Court.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing an adjournment to obtain disclosure; (2) there was a breach of the right to a fair trial due to non-disclosure; and (3) the prosecution failed to establish all elements of careless driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the adjournment was properly refused, the trial was fair despite disclosure issues, and the circumstantial evidence supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while crowded contrary to section 162 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from an incident where a small chihuahua dog jumped from the appellant's mother's lap onto the driver's seat and neck area while the appellant was driving on a four-lane highway with heavy traffic.

The trial justice convicted the appellant, finding he should have pulled over immediately.

On appeal, the court found the trial justice erred in failing to consider the appellant's evidence that he intended to pull over as soon as it was safely possible given the heavy traffic conditions and his position in the middle lane.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The defendant brought a third party records application seeking production of police misconduct records relating to three Ontario Provincial Police officers.

The court initially found the threshold of "likely relevant" had been met and ordered the OPP to produce the complaint and misconduct files for judicial inspection.

Upon review of the files, the court determined they were clearly irrelevant to the trial issues, including credibility and investigation quality.

The application was dismissed and the files were sealed pending any appeal period, after which they would be returned to the OPP.

The defendant brought applications for disclosure of police complaint and misconduct files relating to three Ontario Provincial Police officers who were to testify regarding the admissibility of a statement made by the defendant.

The applications were brought on two bases: first, as a McNeil records application seeking disclosure from the Crown; and second, as a third-party records application seeking production from the OPP.

The Crown advised that McNeil Reports had been reviewed and there was nothing to disclose.

The court found that the Crown had fulfilled its disclosure obligations under McNeil and dismissed the McNeil application.

However, the court found that the defendant had established "likely relevance" for the third-party records application and ordered the OPP to produce all complaint and misconduct files for judicial review.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding 75 kilometres per hour in a 50 kilometres per hour zone.

The trial judge rejected evidence from the police officer regarding the margin of error (plus or minus two kilometres per hour) of the laser speed measuring device, ruling that such evidence constituted hearsay and that the officer was not qualified as an expert.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in rejecting this evidence, as the manufacturer's manual information was part of the officer's training and did not require expert qualification.

However, the appeal court upheld the conviction on the basis that the prosecutor need only establish that speeding occurred, with the excess speed being relevant only to penalty.

The sentence was varied to reflect the lower excess speed of 23 kilometres per hour rather than 25 kilometres per hour.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two charges under the Consumer Protection Act relating to a swimming pool contract.

The charges alleged failure to deliver a direct agreement containing required information and engaging in unfair practices by making false representations about completion timelines.

The trial proceeded ex parte as the appellant did not attend.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge's reasons inadequate and identified significant evidentiary gaps, including discrepancies regarding the contract date, uncertainty about the identity of the business entity, and insufficient evidence linking the appellant to the transaction.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.