S.A.Q. Akhtar

The applicant, facing charges of fraud over $5000 for allegedly defrauding victims of $20 million, sought a bail review after being detained on primary and tertiary grounds.

He argued the initial justice erred in relying on his unwillingness to surrender from Indonesia and that new Charter applications and an enhanced release plan constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error in the initial decision and concluding that the new evidence and reshuffled sureties did not amount to a material change in circumstances.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from his conviction for assault with a weapon, entered following a guilty plea.

He argued his plea was uninformed regarding potential deportation consequences.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found the applicant lacked a bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed time, failed to properly account for the delay, and his counsel did not act diligently.

Furthermore, the court found the applicant's claims regarding his lack of knowledge of immigration consequences lacked credibility and contradicted the record from the plea hearing.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges.

The trial judge had excluded all evidence, including pre-arrest observations by a civilian and police, under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) breaches.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the pre-arrest observations were 'obtained in a manner' that violated the Charter, as they were temporally and contextually distinct from the subsequent breaches.

A new trial was ordered.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal killing of a vulnerable 75-year-old woman in her apartment.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18-20 years, while the defence argued for 12-15 years.

The court considered the horrific nature of the attack, the vulnerability of the victim, the offender's lack of prior record, and his mental health issues.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 17 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter application to exclude his police interview, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The arresting officer initially informed the accused he was arrested for unrelated offences, delaying mention of the homicide investigation for seven minutes to avoid upsetting the accused's family.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach as the accused was subsequently informed of his true jeopardy and provided his right to counsel multiple times, constituting a 'fresh start'.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, and would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and preferred the line of cases holding that the dock is the customary position for an accused.

The court found that seating the accused in the dock does not infringe the presumption of innocence, avoids the prejudice of having multiple security officers surrounding the accused at counsel table, and ensures the accused remains visible to the jury.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to appeal a 2015 finding that he was not criminally responsible (NCR) for several offences.

The applicant had previously launched and abandoned an appeal in 2017.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal, finding that the applicant lacked a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time frame, failed to adequately explain the seven-year delay, and presented an appeal with doubtful merit.

The application for leave to extend time was dismissed.

The Crown applied to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of the accused's deceased mother under s. 715 of the Criminal Code or the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The defence opposed, arguing the subpoena compelling her attendance at the preliminary inquiry was invalid because it was issued by a Superior Court judge rather than an Ontario Court of Justice judge.

The court held that under s. 5 of the Justices of the Peace Act, a Superior Court judge has the powers of a justice of the peace and can issue such subpoenas.

Furthermore, the witness testified under oath and was subject to cross-examination, satisfying the requirements of s. 715 and the procedural reliability threshold of the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The application was granted.

The Crown applied for an order permitting six witnesses to testify by videoconference at the accused's fraud trial.

Three witnesses resided in the United States and three resided in Canada outside Ontario.

The accused opposed the application for one US witness on the basis of solicitor-client privilege, and opposed the Canadian witnesses on the basis of credibility and memory issues.

The court granted the application, finding that privilege issues should be dealt with separately and that credibility issues could be assessed equally well over video.

The court concluded the statutory tests under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code were met.

The offenders were convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police found nearly half a kilogram of cocaine and over $5,000 in cash in their vehicle.

The Crown sought 4 to 5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought conditional sentences or 8 to 12 months imprisonment.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for commercial drug trafficking and sentenced both offenders to 3.5 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, driving while prohibited, failing to comply with a recognizance, and failing to stop after an accident.

At trial, the appellant relied on an alibi defence, which the trial judge rejected in favour of the Crown's evidence identifying the appellant as the driver who fled the scene of an altercation and subsequently caused a collision.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) test and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and provided adequate reasons grounded in the evidence.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 50 months.

The court deducted periods of delay attributable to the defence, the COVID-19 pandemic, a discrete event involving late disclosure of a co-accused's statement, and a preliminary inquiry overrun.

After deductions, the net delay was calculated at approximately 23 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order of certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of aggravated assault and sexual assault.

The charges arose after the applicant engaged in consensual sex with a sex trade worker, then choked her to unconsciousness and robbed her.

The court dismissed the application regarding aggravated assault, finding that choking to unconsciousness provided some evidence of endangering life.

However, the court granted the application to quash the sexual assault committal, ruling that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by finding the subsequent robbery vitiated the complainant's consent to the preceding sexual activity.

The accused, charged with conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, applied for bail.

The charges arose from a shooting in an alleyway where the accused allegedly handed a firearm to an unknown suspect who then shot the victim in the face.

The court found that while the proposed release plan with sureties and electronic monitoring might satisfy the secondary ground, detention was required under the tertiary ground.

The court emphasized the strength of the Crown's circumstantial case, the gravity of the offence, the use of a firearm, and the accused's prior criminal record involving firearms.

Bail was denied.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing a head-on collision and sentenced to a six-month conditional sentence and a three-year driving prohibition.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by sentencing him remotely while he was in the hospital with COVID-19 instead of granting an adjournment.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the appeal under s. 685 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the Crown's application, finding the appeal was frivolous and bound to fail, as the trial judge exercised proper discretion in proceeding with the sentencing and the sentence imposed was not demonstrably unfit.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police discovered over 470 grams of cocaine and significant cash in their vehicle.

The Crown relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the location of the drugs, the large amount of cash in plain view, and the accused's behaviour during the police stop.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that both accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and money.

Both accused were found guilty on all counts.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that he was unaware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and that he was unfit to stand trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was aware of the immigration consequences, the delay was unexplained, and the proposed appeal lacked merit as he had been properly found fit to stand trial and a conditional discharge was disproportionate to the offence.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine and heroin, and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and heroin.

During a police raid, the offender was found hiding in a bathtub, refused to comply with police directions, and was tasered, resulting in facial injuries.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the significant quantity of drugs and a lengthy criminal record, against mitigating factors such as mental health issues and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) analysis, misapprehended his evidence, and erred in assessing the complainant's reliability given her intoxication and memory gaps.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the credibility assessment principles, correctly understood the appellant's evidence as untruthful rather than a mistaken belief, and appropriately evaluated the complainant's reliability against the totality of the evidence.

The applicant, charged with possession of controlled substances and assaulting a police officer, brought Charter motions alleging breaches of his s. 7 and s. 8 rights during the execution of a search warrant.

The court found that the police use of force, including a Conducted Energy Weapon, was reasonable given the applicant's resistance and the belief he might be armed, dismissing the s. 7 claim.

While the court found a s. 8 breach occurred when an officer searched the applicant's jacket for identification after a safety pat-down, the evidence of drugs was admitted under s. 24(2) as the officer acted in good faith to assist the applicant.