N. Golwalla

The applicant sought an order of certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of aggravated assault and sexual assault.

The charges arose after the applicant engaged in consensual sex with a sex trade worker, then choked her to unconsciousness and robbed her.

The court dismissed the application regarding aggravated assault, finding that choking to unconsciousness provided some evidence of endangering life.

However, the court granted the application to quash the sexual assault committal, ruling that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by finding the subsequent robbery vitiated the complainant's consent to the preceding sexual activity.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of criminal harassment.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent because he was not satisfied that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the respondent was watching and besetting his ex-wife's house.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify what the other reasonable inferences were.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a trial judge is not required to identify specific alternative inferences to acquit, but only to determine whether the Crown has proven the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant brought a certiorari application to quash her committal to trial on charges of robbery, forcible confinement, and aggravated assault arising from a home invasion.

She argued there was no evidence she aided or abetted the robbery, as she left the scene before it occurred.

The reviewing judge found that while there was no evidence she aided the robbery, her prior agreement to participate and her act of travelling to the scene provided some evidence upon which a jury could find she abetted the perpetrators.

The application to quash the committal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding impairment by alcohol, relying on the toxicologist's evidence, and dismissing his Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her Charter rulings, concluding that the appellant was not detained prior to arrest and that the breath demand was made as soon as practicable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons.

The conviction was based on an incident in a grocery store checkout line, where the complainant alleged the appellant touched her inappropriately.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to address three material inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and the store security video.

Because the trial judge did not provide cogent reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite these contradictions, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to nine counts of fraud and was sentenced to an 18-month conditional sentence.

He later discovered this was an illegal sentence, as the maximum for a summary conviction under s. 380(1)(b) of the Criminal Code is six months, and it carried unanticipated immigration consequences.

On consent, the court extended the time to appeal and varied the sentence to nine consecutive two-month conditional sentences.

The court also corrected the trial judge's concurrent victim fine surcharges, imposing a $100 surcharge on each count but extending the time to pay until 2050 due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography and possession of methamphetamine.

The child pornography collection was of moderate size and mostly in the middle range of severity.

The offender was a 52-year-old first-time offender with health issues.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 15 months' imprisonment for the child pornography charge and time served concurrently for the drug charge, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders including a 10-year section 161 prohibition.

The accused was charged with possession, making, and making available child pornography, as well as possession of methamphetamine.

Following a search of his apartment, police seized hard drives and CDs containing child pornography, along with a small amount of crystal meth.

The court found the accused guilty of possessing the CDs containing child pornography and the methamphetamine.

However, the court acquitted the accused of making child pornography, holding that the Crown failed to prove he copied the files, and further ruling that merely copying child pornography does not constitute 'making' it under section 163.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, sexual touching, and uttering death threats against his seven-year-old nephew.

The complainant provided delayed and incremental disclosure of the abuse, culminating in a traumatic seizure-like episode where he spontaneously uttered fears about his uncle.

The court admitted expert evidence on child sexual abuse disclosure patterns and trauma symptoms.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's blanket denial and defence theories of fabrication.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

In a trial for child sexual abuse, both the Crown and the defence brought applications to introduce expert testimony.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence from a clinical psychologist regarding delayed disclosure and the relationship between sexual abuse and non-epileptic seizures.

The defence sought to introduce evidence from a cognitive psychologist on similar topics, as well as the effect of questioning techniques on children.

The court applied the Mohan test and ruled that both experts could testify on delayed disclosure and non-epileptic seizures, as this information was outside the normal experience of the trier of fact.

However, the court excluded the defence expert's proposed testimony on questioning techniques, finding it unnecessary as assessing credibility is within the court's expertise.