N. Gorham

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and failing to comply with a breath demand.

He argued that the trial judge's verdicts were unreasonable, that the trial judge erred in his assessment of the evidence, and that his Charter rights were violated.

The summary conviction appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact, including the identification of the appellant as the driver.

The court also held that a separate voir dire on the voluntariness of the appellant's statements was not required given the blended trial procedure and the defence's reliance on the statements.

Finally, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that the police fulfilled their informational and implementational duties under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was stopped by police who claimed to be conducting a random sobriety check.

During the stop, officers smelled burnt cannabis and informed the occupants they would be searched under the Cannabis Control Act.

The accused then fled in his vehicle, striking an officer, and was arrested shortly after.

A loaded handgun, drugs, and ammunition were recovered.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights, and seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found that the initial stop was an unlawful pretext stop violating s. 9, and that his s. 10(b) rights were briefly violated.

However, the court upheld the constitutionality of the warrantless search provisions under s. 12 of the Cannabis Control Act and rejected allegations of racial profiling.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) given the serious nature of the offences and the limited impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests due to his flight.

The accused was charged with assaulting three of his young children with a belt and a wire/cable, assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement.

The charges arose amidst a highly acrimonious custody dispute with the children's mother.

The defence sought to introduce the children's prior statements from an unrelated, unfounded sexual assault investigation to argue they were prone to collusion and influence.

The court admitted the statements but gave them little weight.

Relying on the children's video-recorded police statements, their trial testimony, and corroborating medical evidence of patterned injuries, the court found the accused guilty of the assault charges.

The court acquitted the accused of forcible confinement due to reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of the child's delayed disclosure.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The statements primarily concerned the accused's anger towards the deceased and the accused allegedly stealing the deceased's apartment keys.

The court applied the framework from Bradshaw and Khelawon to assess substantive reliability, using corroborative evidence where appropriate.

The court admitted the statements made to the deceased's sister, a close friend, the building superintendent, and the property manager, finding them reliable.

However, statements made to the deceased's boyfriend and another friend were excluded due to reliability concerns and unclear declarant identity.

During a trial for first degree murder, the defence applied to exclude utterances made by one co-accused to a friend, arguing they were more prejudicial than probative to the other co-accused.

The Crown also sought to admit text messages extracted from the co-accused's phone.

The court ruled that the utterances were admissible, as their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and juries are presumed to follow instructions limiting the use of such evidence against a co-accused.

The court also ruled that the text messages were admissible, finding that the Crown had met the modest threshold for authentication under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act through direct and circumstantial evidence.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, the applicant co-accused brought a pre-trial motion to adduce evidence of the respondent co-accused's prior discreditable conduct through Crown witnesses.

The applicant sought to introduce this evidence to support a cutthroat defence and explain her state of mind.

The court reviewed various proposed items of evidence, ruling some admissible (such as prior violence towards the applicant and possession of a firearm) and others inadmissible (such as drug use, out-of-court statements, and speculative intimidation) based on relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included the accused's prior possession of a firearm, threats made against the deceased, and participation in a prior shooting incident.

The court found that the evidence was relevant and material to the issues of identity, animus, and motive.

Applying the framework for prior discreditable conduct, the court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the evidence admissible with certain edits.