Charter of Rights

The moving party, Ms. Guillaume, brought a motion to set aside an order of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that dismissed her motion for leave to appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned a judicial review of a decision by the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal and care costs of 41 cats.

Ms. Guillaume failed to file acceptable motion materials despite extensions and notices, and provided no explanation for the delay.

The court dismissed her motion, finding no merit in the proposed appeal and concluding that the justice of the case did not favour setting aside the dismissal order.

The defendant was charged with "Over 80" after a traffic stop and breath tests.

The defence brought a Charter application arguing a breach of the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) due to a language barrier.

The court found that the defendant's comprehension of English was too deficient to understand his rights, and the officers failed to assess "special circumstances" or provide an interpreter.

Applying the Grant criteria, the court deemed the breach serious, excluded the breathalyzer readings, and found the defendant not guilty.

Rudolf Karicka, a Czech citizen of Roma ancestry, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order to the Czech Republic, where he faced a mandatory minimum two-year sentence for theft, violation of domestic freedom, and property damage, having been convicted in absentia.

He argued that surrender would shock the conscience or violate his s. 7 Charter rights due to alleged discrimination against Roma people, egregious delay, harshness of the sentence, and personal circumstances.

The Court of Appeal, applying a reasonableness standard, upheld the Minister's decision, finding no justification to refuse surrender as it was not contrary to the extradition treaty, unjust, oppressive, or a breach of Charter rights.

The court found the Minister reasonably addressed concerns regarding discrimination (noting improvements and lack of evidence of persecution), delay (attributable to the applicant's absconding), sentence severity (not shocking to Canadian conscience given Canadian equivalents), and personal circumstances (accommodations for health, balancing family interests with treaty obligations).

The appellant, Julie Daly, appealed the dismissal of her claim for damages under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other relief against the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and the Crown.

Her claim alleged improper treatment and bias by LTB members during several applications concerning her lease.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the LTB was not a suable entity and the Crown was not vicariously liable for the LTB's actions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the LTB is not a suable entity and that the Crown is immune from vicarious liability for judicial acts of quasi-judicial board members acting in good faith under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Christopher Nigro, brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to challenge the validity of search warrants issued for his residence, vehicle, and electronic devices following a carjacking incident.

The defence argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and that a second warrant application to a different Justice of the Peace after an initial partial refusal constituted "judge-shopping." The court reviewed the ITO under Garofoli principles, finding that the affiant provided full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court affirmed that a second warrant application is permissible and does not constitute "judge-shopping" if the subsequent Justice of the Peace is aware of the prior application and considers the matter de novo.

The court concluded that there were credibly-based probable grounds to issue the warrants, including for electronic devices, based on the totality of the evidence and reasonable inferences regarding post-offence conduct.

The application was dismissed.

This is an appeal from convictions for firearm offences.

The appellants argued Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, 10(b)) and unreasonable verdicts based on misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no Charter breaches, disagreeing with the trial judge's s. 8 finding.

However, it allowed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusion regarding an "exchange of gunfire" was based on a fundamental misapprehension of evidence, and that the use of cellphone photographs to infer possession was improper due to lack of similarity and risk of propensity reasoning.

Ahmed's convictions were quashed and acquittals entered, while Yusuf's convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance with excess alcohol after a rear-end collision.

She brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, arguing her right to counsel (s.10(a) and 10(b)) was infringed because it was not provided earlier during the motor vehicle collision investigation.

The court found that the police officer was credible and was not conducting a drinking and driving investigation until a later point when a stronger odour of alcohol was detected.

The court determined that no detention for Charter purposes occurred until the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand was made, and rights were provided timely thereafter.

Even if a detention occurred earlier, the right to counsel would have been suspended during the preliminary investigation.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the defendant was found guilty.

The accused, Mahmood Ahmad and Salam Fadhil, charged with sexual assault, brought a voir dire application to exclude their statements to police, arguing they were not voluntary due to language comprehension issues.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and found that both accused had sufficient language comprehension in French (for Fadhil) and English (for Ahmad) to understand their rights, including the right to silence and the consequences of speaking to police.

The court dismissed the application, ruling that the statements were voluntary and admissible at trial.

The person sought in an extradition proceeding, Ejiro Efevwerha (a.k.a.

Festus Akpobome), brought a second application for disclosure from Canadian authorities.

He sought information on how American law enforcement obtained his Ontario driver's license photo and accessed his email account, arguing potential s. 8 Charter violations and challenging the quality of identification evidence.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, opposed the application, asserting that an extradition hearing is not a criminal trial and the Revised Record of the Case no longer relied on Canadian-gathered evidence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no 'air of reality' to the Charter claims as the Charter does not apply to foreign law enforcement actions outside Canada, and the requesting state had removed Canadian-gathered evidence from its record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused sought a bail review after a detention order was cancelled by consent.

The application was heard via teleconference during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered new evidence, including proposed sureties and electronic monitoring, as material changes in circumstances, allowing for a de novo hearing.

The court found no primary ground concerns (flight risk).

However, on secondary grounds, the court found a substantial likelihood that the accused would commit further offences or interfere with justice, given an extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the serious nature of the current drug and firearm charges.

On tertiary grounds, considering the strength of the prosecution's case, the objective gravity of the offences, and the accused's personal circumstances, the court concluded that continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The impact of the pandemic on correctional facilities and trial delays was considered but not found to be a sufficient basis for release in this specific case.

The application for bail review was denied.

The accused, B.W.S., was tried for 12 criminal offences including sexual assault, assault, threatening, theft of a motor vehicle, and breach of probation.

The accused represented himself.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant and other Crown witnesses against the accused's denials.

The court found the accused guilty on most counts, stayed the theft charge due to the Kienapple principle (prior conviction for possession of stolen property), and found him not guilty of attempting to obstruct justice.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of text messages extracted from the accused's cell phone during a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the texts were irrelevant and constituted impermissible disposition evidence.

The Crown sought to admit them to corroborate the credibility and reliability of statements made by the accused to undercover officers, particularly regarding his lifestyle and interests.

The court found the majority of the texts relevant for supporting the officers' testimony, concluding their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded texts referring to violent consensual sex, masturbation, and a nude photograph, deeming them either too prejudicial or irrelevant.

The court considered an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights to exclude evidence (drugs and proceeds of crime) seized from an apartment.

In a prior decision, the police were found to have breached the accused's s. 8 Charter rights by entering and searching the apartment without reasonable and probable grounds.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the state conduct to be careless and serious, the impact on the accused's privacy interests in their home to be significant, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the seized evidence was excluded from trial.

The accused, Brodie Young, was charged with possession of crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He sought to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Police conducted a warrantless search of his Airbnb rental, discovering drugs.

The court found that the police exceeded their common-law powers, and the "plain view" doctrine did not apply as the discovery was not inadvertent and involved an exploratory search.

The Charter violation was deemed serious, with a significant impact on the accused's privacy interests in his residence.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

The accused, Anthony McCalla, sought to exclude evidence obtained during his arrest and apartment search, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Charter.

The court found that police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that the search warrants were validly issued.

While the initial warrantless entry to secure the apartment was justified by exigent circumstances, the police's subsequent five-hour occupation of the apartment while awaiting the warrant constituted a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

However, the court found no breach of s. 9 (arbitrary detention) or s. 10(a) (right to be promptly informed of reasons for arrest).

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that admitting the evidence, despite the s. 8 breach, would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the good faith of the officers, the reliability of the evidence, and its importance to the Crown's case.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by excluding Intoxilyzer test results.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter violation due to police failure to ensure the respondent received legal advice despite diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in assessing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on Charter interests, or society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court affirmed that the police's prior compliant conduct did not mitigate the breach and that the right to counsel has intrinsic value beyond discoverability.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of audio and video statements made to police following his arrest for murder.

The court considered the cumulative effect of persistent police questioning despite multiple assertions of the right to silence, elements of the "Reid Technique" used in interrogation, and the accused's emotional state.

The court found that these factors, taken together, raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statements, rendering them inadmissible.

The court also stated that it would have exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

Taylor Griffith, charged with firearm and drug trafficking offenses, applied to exclude evidence seized during his arrest, alleging violations of his s. 8, s. 9, and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found the arrest and incidental search lawful, with objectively reasonable grounds based on police surveillance and observed hand-to-hand transactions.

However, a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) occurred due to a delay in facilitating contact with a lawyer until after search warrants were executed.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that while the police conduct in delaying counsel was serious, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was minimal as the evidence (loaded firearm and drugs) was seized prior to the breach and was real, reliable, and crucial.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The York Regional Police and the Crown brought a certiorari application to quash five defence subpoenas issued for a preliminary hearing.

The subpoenas sought to compel police officers to attend for discovery and to produce documents related to the policy of not audio recording booking areas.

The court held that while discovery is a legitimate ancillary purpose of a preliminary hearing, subpoenas cannot be used as a disguised attempt to obtain disclosure, circumventing the Stinchcombe/O’Connor regime.

The court quashed the subpoenas as they pertained to the production of documents but ordered that four police witnesses attend for discovery purposes, subject to the preliminary hearing justice's discretion to limit unreasonable discovery.