I. Loui Dallas

This decision clarifies the interpretation of "at trial" under section 25(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), holding that a young person is considered "at trial" from the moment they decide to contest charges, including during the pre-trial or case management phase, without requiring formal arraignment or plea.

The court emphasized the broad statutory right to counsel throughout all stages of proceedings, consistent with Parliament’s intent and international law commitments such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The decision also recommends procedural reforms to allow YCJA section 25(4) applications to be submitted electronically and decided without formal hearings when uncontested, to conserve judicial resources and reduce burdens on vulnerable youth.

The court sentenced Pal Pintyi for manslaughter in the death of his brother-in-law, Robert Racz.

The trial judge considered the turbulent relationship between the men, the history of threats and violence, and the provocation by the deceased.

The Crown sought eight years’ imprisonment; the defence sought five.

The court imposed a sentence of five years plus one day (time served), taking into account harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, provocation, and mitigating factors such as Pintyi’s background, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court found Pal Pintyi guilty of manslaughter, not murder, in the death of his brother-in-law, Robert Racz.

The decision turned on whether the Crown had proven the intent required for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court accepted that Pintyi acted out of fear and anger after years of abuse and threats from Racz, culminating in a confrontation where Pintyi struck Racz with a steel pipe and kicked him.

The evidence did not establish the necessary intent for murder, and the court found a reasonable inference that Pintyi acted impulsively in response to provocation.

The partial defence of provocation was not considered necessary, as the intent for murder was not proven.

The applicant, charged with numerous human trafficking and sexual assault offences, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 48 to 50 months.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including delay caused by the withdrawal of previous counsel and waiver of delay.

The court also deducted the entire two-year period of the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional circumstance, noting the suspension of jury trials.

After deductions, the net delay fell well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the court found the delay was not otherwise unreasonable.

The application was dismissed.

The court considered an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights to exclude evidence (drugs and proceeds of crime) seized from an apartment.

In a prior decision, the police were found to have breached the accused's s. 8 Charter rights by entering and searching the apartment without reasonable and probable grounds.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the state conduct to be careless and serious, the impact on the accused's privacy interests in their home to be significant, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, the seized evidence was excluded from trial.

The accused, charged with possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, challenged the validity of search warrants executed at their residences under section 8 of the Charter.

The warrants were based heavily on information from two confidential informants, which was substantially redacted in the Information to Obtain (ITO) to protect informer privilege.

Applying the Garofoli Step 6 procedure and the Debot inquiries, the court found that the redacted ITO, even with Crown summaries, lacked sufficient reliable and compelling evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The police surveillance failed to meaningfully corroborate the informants' tips regarding the presence of drugs at the target address.

Consequently, the court ruled the warrants invalid and the subsequent searches and arrests unlawful.

Following jury convictions for participation in a criminal organization involved in trafficking firearms from Windsor to Toronto, the court imposed significant custodial sentences.

The organization coordinated the acquisition, transport, and distribution of numerous illegal firearms, some recovered through police surveillance and search warrants.

The accused participated at different levels of responsibility, with one acting as the leader organizing firearm transfers and others assisting as couriers and custodians.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for firearm trafficking and organized criminal activity, the court imposed consecutive sentences pursuant to s. 467.14 of the Criminal Code.

The leader received a total sentence of 12 years less credit for pre‑trial custody, while the courier received 6 years less credit.