ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MARK WEI-LASSO
Sentencing Judgment
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on February 9, May 6, 14, and 26, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on May 28, 2026
R. Nigam............................................................................................... counsel for the Crown
I. L. Dallas....................................................................................... counsel for M. Wei-Lasso
Introduction
1On February 9, 2026, Mr. Wei-Lasso pleaded guilty to one count of theft of a motor vehicle (Criminal Code section 333.1(1)) and one count of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (Criminal Code section 320.13(1)).
2On May 6, 2026, the parties made their submissions as to an appropriate sentence. I informed them that I was concerned that the proposed sentences were inadequate to reflect the gravity of Mr. Wei-Lasso’s criminal conduct and his degree of personal responsibility. I invited them to make further submissions on a future date and to provide additional information, if possible: see R. v. Nahanee, 2022 SCC 37, at paras. 43-50; R. v. England, 2024 ONCA 360, at para. 82.
3These are my reasons for imposing an alternative sentence.
Facts In Support of the Guilty Pleas
4On June 21, 2024, at 7:40 p.m., Mr. Sardarwali Hotak parked his Nissan Sentra on Wellesley Street in downtown Toronto. He left the car unoccupied but with the engine running. Mr. Wei-Lasso, who was in the area, noticed the car, jumped into the front seat, and drove off.
5Mr. Hotak witnessed the theft and grabbed the vehicle’s side door to stop it. Mr. Wei-Lasso kept driving, dragging Mr. Hotak a short distance. He sustained some physical injuries, including cuts and scrapes. He then let go of his car.
6Mr. Wei-Lasso made a southbound turn onto Sherbourne Street and then commenced a U-turn. He mounted the sidewalk and accelerated. He drove through a TTC bus shelter. He then struck the boarding door of a nearby TTC bus. At least two pedestrians who were present in the area had to dive out of the way of the stolen car and were nearly struck.
7Mr. Wei-Lasso continued driving dangerously. He drove westbound on Wellesley until he abandoned the vehicle, which had sustained considerable damage. He ran into a condominium unit to avoid capture. Officers attended and arrested him.
8The vehicle was determined to be unsalvageable. The TTC bus had extensive damage to its front door and undercarriage.
9Mr. Hotak was released from the hospital the same day, as his injuries did not require extensive treatment.
Background of the Offender
10A pre-sentence report (“PSR”) contained the following information. Mr. Wei-Lasso was born on October 21, 2003. He lived with his parents at birth, but they separated in 2005. Both parents struggled with substance abuse. He was apprehended by a children’s aid society (“CAS”) in 2008, when he was five. His mother had been engaging in highly negative behaviour and could not provide for her children. She was also physically abusive. From 2009, Mr. Wei-Lasso was transferred back and forth between different foster placements and his mother’s care. When he was ten, he was adopted by his current parents, Mr. Wei and Mr. Lasso, who he describes as “amazing people” in a healthy, loving marriage.
11A prior psychological report completed when he was 14 noted that Mr. Wei-Lasso had experienced neglect and instability from his primary caregiver (his mother) during the early years of his life, which had negative implications for his social development and functioning. While he now has a positive relationship with his adoptive fathers, there were difficulties during his teenage years as he adapted to his new family structure. He continued to meet his mother post-adoption, who, unfortunately, abused him and provided him with methamphetamine on one occasion.
12The doctor who authored the report diagnosed Mr. Wei-Lasso with complex trauma and noted that a prior diagnosis of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder by a different physician appeared to have been properly made. At the time of the assessment, Mr. Wei-Lasso was demonstrating noticeable signs of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity.
13In 2017, when he was 13, his parents reported that he was sexually assaulted by two older men – once at the YCMA in a change room, and again a month later by an older man in his apartment building. In 2022, he was the victim of a violent crime and was stabbed multiple times. I did not receive further information about these incidents or what effect, if any, they continue to have on Mr. Wei-Lasso’s mental health, other than that he suffers from anxiety.
14He is presently unemployed. He uses cannabis and alcohol, and estimated to the PSR author that he consumes some quantity of alcohol every day. He has been advised by a doctor to abstain from alcohol use, but persists. He spends his free time cooking and playing video games.
15A letter dated September 22, 2025, from the Church Street Junior Public School confirmed that Mr. Wei-Lasso volunteered two to three mornings per week to prepare snacks for children in the recent past.
16Mr. Wei-Lasso completed multiple sessions with Bartimaeus Family Service. The organization offers specialized behavioural support services to individuals experiencing moderate to severe behavioural difficulties due to social, emotional, psychological and/or developmental challenges. These services can be provided in a range of community settings, such as the home, school, or workplace. He is also presently under the care of a physician to assist him with ongoing concerns about anxiety.
17Mr. Wei-Lasso has a three-year-old daughter. The child’s mother has custody of her, and Mr. Wei-Lasso had no meaningful role in his daughter’s life during her first year. Recently, that has begun to change. In their letter of support, his parents stated that they have noticed their son developing a closer relationship with his daughter and that he intends to remain involved in her life, although he has difficulty prioritizing her over himself.
18Regarding the offences, Mr. Wei-Lasso addressed me in court and acknowledged the harm his actions caused. He blamed what occurred on his lack of impulse control. He admitted he was not thinking about the consequences of his actions at the time. He agreed his actions were “dangerous, irresponsible and stupid.” He wants to become a better person and ensure nothing like this happens again.
Statement of Mark Lasso
19Mr. Lasso provided a statement in support of his son. He asked me to consider that his son had a very traumatic childhood, and his behaviour should be considered in that context. He was set back emotionally and developmentally by these difficult early years. He has noticed his son choosing a better path in recent years – one marked by healing, accountability and personal growth. While his conduct cannot be excused, he is moving in a positive direction.
Victim Impact Information
20The offence had a significant psychological impact on Mr. Hotak’s sense of safety, and he is far more vigilant during daily activities.
21The TTC provided receipts showing that Mr. Wei-Lasso caused $3,739.57 in damage to the bus. The City of Toronto incurred $2,005.75 in damage to the bus shelter.
Positions of the Parties
22On behalf of the Crown, Mr. Nigam submits that a suspended sentence and probation are appropriate, with an order requiring Mr. Wei-Lasso to complete 100 hours of community service. He also requested a three-year driving prohibition order.
23Mr. Nigam highlighted the aggravating features of these offences, including the risk to public safety posed by the dangerous driving, the harm caused to Mr. Hotak, and the damage to TTC property. However, he took the position that a custodial sentence was not necessary, given the guilty plea and Mr. Wai-Lasso’s background, as reviewed in the PSR.
24Mr. Dallas submits that the appropriate sentence is a conditional discharge. He did not dispute the imposition of the community service hours or, after hearing my concerns about the need for restitution in this case, the imposition of a free-standing restitution order.
25Mr. Dallas submits that this is not a case where his client stole a car for greed or as part of an organized theft ring. Rather, he stole the car in a moment of “dysregulation”, as his client has had traumatic experiences in the past. A conviction would harm his client’s long-term employment prospects and ability to care for himself and his daughter in the future.
26Mr. Dallas presented me with the following cases in support of his position. In R. v. Kadotchnikov, 2002 SKPC 112, the 23-year-old offender pleaded guilty to failing to stop for police while operating a motor vehicle. He entered an auto-body shop while it was in progress and, while operating a motor vehicle, smashed into several vehicles in the bay. After fleeing, the police observed him driving at high, erratic speeds and pursued him for a relatively short distance, a few city blocks. He caused over $40,000 in damage. By the time of sentencing, he was receiving counselling and making monthly restitution payments. The court imposed a conditional discharge.
27In R. v. Boyko, 2003 SKQB 139, the offender pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence, and he appealed, seeking a conditional discharge. The offender was 19 years old and, following a “road rage” incident, drove his car in an attempt to scare another young man, but struck him, mercifully without causing injury. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Boyko enrolled in personal counselling and driver training. He had a supportive family. The summary conviction appeal court granted the appeal.
28In R. v. Elaschuk, 2018 SKQB 312, the offender pleaded guilty to failing to stop at the scene of an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability. He was ordered to pay a $ 1,000 fine and was prohibited from driving for 1 year. He appealed to the summary conviction appeal court.
Fundamental Principles of Sentencing, and Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
29The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. To that end, sanctions for criminal behaviour can denounce criminal conduct, deter it both by deterring the particular offender before the court, and by generally deterring others who might choose to do the same thing, separate the offender from society where necessary, foster rehabilitation and promote a sense of responsibility in offenders: Criminal Code section 718.
30A sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender: Criminal Code section 718.1.
31Regarding the objective gravity of these offences, the aggravating factors in this case stand out:
- The victim in this case, Mr. Hotak, was dragged and suffered physical injuries;
- Mr. Wei-Lasso accelerated along a sidewalk, a place where pedestrians could reasonably be expected to be present at any time;
- He drove the stolen vehicle through a bus shelter, again, where transit riders could easily have been present;
- He struck the front door of a TTC bus, causing damage and endangering the lives and safety of anyone who might have been boarding or exiting the bus at the time;
- At least two pedestrians dove out of the way, nearly being struck by his dangerous driving, and their lives and safety were placed at risk;
- All of this happened in a busy area of downtown Toronto, and;
- The stolen car was so badly damaged from the accidents that it could not be salvaged.
32Where a crime has a significant impact upon a victim, that is an additional aggravating factor: see Criminal Code section 718.2(a)(iii.1). Mr. Hotak suffered physical and emotional harm that was anything but transient or trifling. In addition, I note that all the physical harm and emotional trauma to the victims in this case were entirely reasonably foreseeable. Anyone who steals a car should expect that the owner may respond and try to prevent the theft. A car is an extremely valuable asset and may be essential for getting to and from work and for daily activities. Driving a stolen car in downtown Toronto in such a dangerous manner will inevitably be perilous. Mr. Wei-Lasso was unable to control the car as he tried to escape the scene of the theft, and endangered anyone on the sidewalk, at the bus shelter, or on or near the TTC bus. It is nothing short of a stroke of luck that more serious injuries – or even death – did not occur to a random innocent civilian because of this offence.
33The mitigating factors include that Mr. Wei-Lasso was very young when he committed the offences. The theft appears to have been a crime of opportunity rather than a premeditated decision. He entered a guilty plea, thereby sparing the victims and witnesses from testifying, although the case against him appeared very strong. He has begun to engage with rehabilitative programming and has a strong community support network. He has a young child with whom he is building a relationship, and she would be indirectly harmed if she were deprived of access to him if he were incarcerated.
Auto Theft and Dangerous Driving
34Both of the crimes Mr. Wei-Lasso committed warrant profound condemnation by the court. Auto-theft remains a serious and ongoing problem in this province. Some courts have described it as an epidemic: see R. v. Bello Reyes, 2025 ONCJ 658, at para. 3. Multiple prior decisions of this court have emphasized the need for general deterrence and denunciation when sentencing for this offence, even for first-time offenders: see, for example, R. v. Casseus, 2024 ONCJ 654, at para. 26; and R. v. Nazer, 2026 ONCJ 133, at para. 51.
35In R. v. Augustyniak, 2026 ONSC 1911, Justice Standryk made the following observations about the severity of vehicle theft at para. 19:
The offence in this case also involved Ms. Augustyniak’s use of a stolen vehicle. … vehicle theft is far from a victimless crime. It fuels organized criminal activity, increases insurance costs, undermines community security, and imposes significant financial and emotional burdens on victims.
36Similarly, in R. v. Bello Reyes, at para. 1, Justice Bhachu described the human cost associated with this crime as follows:
One of the most vital assets anyone living in Canada owns in current times is their vehicle. We use our vehicles to accomplish daily tasks such as groceries, going to the bank or going to appointments. The fact is, owning a vehicle is necessary and relied upon by almost everyone. After a house, a vehicle is the next biggest purchase one can make. Many purchase vehicles for every day use, others purchase vehicles as a hobby, many purchase vehicles only after they are able to save enough money to make such a purchase.
37Justice Bhachu noted that the case law on auto-theft in Ontario has been developing in recent years and that an upward trend in sentencing (meaning more punitive dispositions) has been observed: see para. 43; Casseus at para. 35.
38The sentences imposed in many recent cases illustrate this trend. In Casseus, the offender pleaded guilty to attempting to steal an SUV from a driveway at a residential address. A resident was awakened, located the thieves attempting to steal his family’s vehicle, and ran outside as the thieves fled. Ms. Casseus, who was 23 and without a prior criminal record, pleaded guilty to one count of auto theft. Justice Latimer (as he then was) rejected a joint submission for a suspended sentence and instead imposed an 8-month CSO due to the offender’s “unique circumstances”: see para. 37. However, Justice Latimer noted that, normally, even the attempted theft of a motor vehicle would call for a jail sentence of three to six months: see para. 34.
39In Nazer, the offender was a party to a residential break-and-enter and the theft of a luxury vehicle from the homeowner’s driveway. Justice Chamberlain was presented with statistical evidence showing “a significant increase in auto thefts in the province and Toronto, with numbers more than doubling from 2020 to 2023”: see para. 12. His Honour imposed a two-year, less a day, conditional sentence. The offender was 23 years old and had no prior criminal record. His moral culpability was somewhat reduced by his difficult personal circumstances, as he was coping with “extreme trauma”: see para. 45. Justice Chamberlain concluded that he had promising rehabilitative prospects and strong community support.
40In Augustyniak, the offender was found in a stolen motor vehicle with a quantity of fentanyl. The offender was found guilty after a jury trial of several offences, including possession of property obtained by crime, less than $5000. The offender was sentenced to a conditional sentence, which was held to be an “exceptional case”, and she was a single mother to two young children whom she supported: see paras. 64-8. Even with that assessment, Justice Standryk sentenced the offender to a 90-day conditional sentence for merely possessing a motor vehicle (that is, not actively stealing it).
41In R. v. Mughal, 2025 ONCJ 386, the offender pleaded guilty to one count of auto-theft. He was 30 years old and had no prior criminal record. The police located a stolen vehicle in a shipping container, and Mr. Mughal admitted he played a role in its theft. He admitted he had a daily drinking problem but was able to hold down a job as an apprentice electrician.
42Justice Brown reviewed extensive statistical evidence regarding the trends in auto theft in the GTA and concluded the crime had become tantamount to an “epidemic”. She held that “the problem of vehicle theft has become an epidemic…, one which has resulted in huge property losses suffered by the community…” see para. 39. Justice Brown accepted a joint submission for a six-month CSO followed by a two-year probation order due to the significant mitigating factors surrounding the offender’s background.
43At the more severe end of the auto-theft sentencing range lie cases such as Bello Reyes. Two offenders pleaded guilty to 10 counts, including possession of stolen property, theft of motor vehicles, and breach of release orders. They were involved in a sophisticated plan to locate, steal, and reprogram vehicles for personal gain. The offenders were 30 and 21 years of age, with no prior criminal records. They showed insight into their criminal behaviour and acknowledged the harm their actions caused. Nevertheless, they received penitentiary sentences of 3 years and 5 months and 2.5 years, respectively: see paras. 44-5.
44These cases demonstrate that even youthful, first-time offenders, often with difficult personal circumstances, are being sentenced to custodial terms. It is important to remember that in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the frequency of certain crimes in a region can be a relevant factor for a sentencing court to consider: see para. 91. Auto-theft in all its forms remains a plague on the residents of the GTA. I echo the sentiments expressed by my fellow judges in each of these decisions, noting the need for courts to respond to the prevalence of this crime in our communities.
45Dangerous driving also typically demands significant punishment. The crime of dangerous driving was the subject of extensive commentary from Justice Molloy of the Superior Court of Justice in a relatively recent sentencing decision, R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 5922. I reproduce some of Justice Molloy’s legal analysis in my decision, which was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. Georgopoulos, 2026 ONCA 27:[1]
24I wish to be very clear on this point. Dangerous driving is a criminal offence that is extremely serious, particularly when it causes bodily harm or death, which is all too frequently the case. For far too many years, we have failed to appreciate the gravity of this offence.
26In 2018, Parliament enacted legislation demonstrating that it considered dangerous driving to be an offence that should be treated as equivalent in severity to impaired driving. … The first two points listed in the Preamble of Bill C-46 (which brought in the amendments) state:
Whereas dangerous driving and impaired driving injure or kill thousands of people in Canada every year;
Whereas dangerous driving and impaired driving are unacceptable at all times and in all circumstances;
27At the same time, Parliament added a highly unusual provision immediately prior to the dangerous driving provisions, under the heading “Recognition and Declaration,” which states (in part):
320.12 It is recognized and declared that
(a) operating a conveyance is a privilege that is subject to certain limits in the interests of public safety that include licensing, the observance of rules and sobriety;
28Not only does this enactment signal Parliament’s view that sentences for dangerous driving had previously been too lenient, it also demonstrates the clear direction of Parliament to the courts that the gravity of this offence must be recognized.
29Parliament has emphasized that operating a vehicle is a privilege. It is licensed by law, as is the possession of guns. If somebody deliberately operates a car in a manner that is dangerous to the public, that person is just as deserving of punishment as somebody who randomly discharges a firearm, reckless as to the life or safety of another person.
46Mr. Wei-Lasso could have killed someone when he committed these offences. While he cannot be punished for something that did not occur, the objective seriousness of the offences and his moral culpability for them are to be measured, in part, by his risk-taking when committing them. He was well-aware of the actual or reasonably foreseeable harms flowing from his conduct, and that in turn must be considered when fashioning an appropriate sentence: see R. v. C.K., 2023 BCCA 468, at para. 71; R. v. O'Leary, 2017 ONCA 71, at para. 33.
47Denunciation and deterrence are normally the primary goals in sentencing for dangerous driving: see R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, at para. 65. Indeed, the need for general deterrence in this case is paramount. Other, like-minded persons to Mr. Wai-Lesso must receive the message that “irresponsible use of a motor vehicle on our highways will not be countenanced”: see R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, at para. 33.
Youthful First-Time Offenders and Family Separation Concerns
48Mr. Wei-Lasso is a young man without a prior record. He was 20 years old at the time of these offences. His rehabilitative prospects should still be given considerable weight, and the need for general deterrence should not be overstated, although specific deterrence should be emphasized: see R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 152; R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, at para. 31. Furthermore, I must consider “all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims and the community”: Criminal Code section 718.2(e). If I were to impose a custodial sentence, it should be guided by the principle of restraint, which is of increased importance when sentencing a first-time youthful offender: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville, 2025 SCC 33, at para. 96.
49In Habib, the Court of Appeal further noted that the impact of a lengthy custodial sentence on an offender’s family must be considered. The consequences of family separation are to be taken seriously by sentencing courts. While Mr. Wei-Lasso is not the primary caregiver to his daughter, he is in the process of developing a relationship with her. That is a factor worthy of some consideration, as to separate him from his daughter would harm her healthy development as well as damage his long-term rehabilitative potential. So too is the close relationship he has with his fathers, who I am certain will ensure Mr. Wei-Lasso remains under close supervision if he is permitted to serve a community-based sentence.
Analysis and Conclusion
50I acknowledge Mr. Wei-Lasso’s very difficult childhood and the disadvantages he faced. He has experienced abuse and suffered a highly traumatic incident in 2022 when he was stabbed. He continues to struggle with anxiety. The psychological assessment completed in 2014 noted that he experienced trauma (such as mistreatment by his mother) and has struggled with focus and controlling his impulsivity. But I did not receive any evidence that illuminates how any of these prior events in his life, as tragic as they were, explain his decision to commit the current criminal offences when he was 20 years of age. Mr. Wei-Lassi is now a grown man, and he will be held to adult standards of responsibility.
51Mr. Wei-Lasso’s moral culpability for these offences is very high. He stole the victim’s car, believing it was running and that he would simply get away with it. He was wrong. He drove off, and rather than stopping when the victim grabbed the vehicle, he accelerated. That was a choice, one that further augments his moral culpability and reflects his known risk-taking at the time. The victim was injured. Every second he was in the car, driving as dangerously as he did, he could have slowed down, stopped, and exited. Yet he did the opposite, causing severe damage to the vehicle and TTC property, all while menacing every member of the public who was unfortunate enough to be in his immediate vicinity. Two innocent souls had to leap to their safety out of fear that they would otherwise be struck.
52His efforts at rehabilitation since his arrest are of limited weight. He volunteers and has sought help through Bartimaeus Family Service. He has the love and support of his parents, whom I can only describe as incredibly compassionate human beings who have done everything possible to give their son a loving, supportive home life since they adopted him. All of this demonstrates that Mr. Wei-Lasso has strong community support to rely on, which will continue to promote his long-term rehabilitation and provide an added layer of protection to the public.
53Overall, I find his rehabilitative prospects to be moderate, but I conclude that he is not sufficiently motivated to truly move his life forward. He is unmotivated to obtain employment, vocational training, or further education. The excuse I was given by Mr. Dallas is that, due to the accumulation of yet more criminal charges, Mr. Wei-Lasso was placed on house arrest last year. Evidently, one effort was made to obtain a bail variation to permit him to be outside for employment last fall, shortly after the house arrest condition was imposed on August 19, 2025. I received no other evidence of efforts to become employed or to have the bail varied. When Mr. Wei-Lasso exercised his right of allocution on May 14, 2026, he stated that he was committed to participating in job training. This is a good first step, but nothing more. Word are not enough. He must take concrete action, and it is long past time he did so.
54The test for a conditional discharge requires the court to consider if it would be in the best interests of the accused, and not contrary to the public interest: see Criminal Code s. 730(1). A discharge is typically reserved for cases where the offence is minor and the circumstances surrounding it are sufficiently mitigating. In R. v. Taylor, 1975 1147, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a discharge is appropriate when an offence seems “out of character” or that the offender was struggling with “mental turmoil or some unusual disturbance in his life’s routine”: see p. 552.
55The evidence in this case does not support such a conclusion. The theft of the motor vehicle may have initially been a crime of opportunity, but it quickly became a case of wanton disregard for public safety. There is no escaping the extraordinarily dangerous features of Mr. Wei-Lasso’s conduct and the risk he presented to the community that day. The more serious an offence, the less likely it is that a court will determine a discharge is an appropriate disposition: see R. v. Sanchez-Pino, 1973 794 (Ont. C.A.)
56Regarding the cases Mr. Dallas provided in support of a discharge, each was decided in another province, well before the enactment of Bill C-46 in 2018 and the current concerns noted by various courts about the rise of auto thefts in the GTA. Respectfully, I find they are of little assistance to me: see R. v. Gomez, 2026 ONCA 330, at para. 9. Furthermore, unlike in some of these decisions, Mr. Wei-Lasso did not merely cause property damage. To restate the most pertinent facts of this case, he chose to steal a car, in the process causing physical harm to its rightful owner, then endangered his life and the lives of everyone else in his path by driving dangerously in a busy area of downtown Toronto while striking a TTC bus. He must bear responsibility for the decisions he made when he committed these offences.
57A discharge would be manifestly unfit in these circumstances. It is entirely contrary to the public interest to grant one.
58I find that, after weighing the appropriate sentencing principles, Mr. Wei-Lasso's crimes demand a custodial sentence. Even the Crown’s position for a suspended sentence would fail to reflect the objective gravity of what occurred in this case and would be discordant with the prior reported authorities on auto theft and dangerous driving that I have reviewed.
59Whether Mr. Wai-Lasso should receive a conditional sentence order (“CSO”) instead of a jail sentence is a more challenging dilemma. Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code lists the criteria a court must consider before imposing a conditional sentence order (“CSO”). These include the requirement that the term of imprisonment be less than two years, that the offender's presence in the community not endanger community safety, and that a conditional sentence be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
60Mr. Wei-Lasso meets the criteria for a CSO. Given the time elapsed since these offences occurred, I am satisfied that it would not endanger the community to allow him to serve his sentence at home. The principles of restraint and rehabilitation lean towards this disposition. Furthermore, jails are notoriously difficult environments, and the state of our provincial jails has been the subject of ongoing condemnation in the jurisprudence of this court and the Superior Court of Justice. I need not repeat those observations here. Suffice it to say that, by allowing our jails to fall into such disarray, the provincial government has made these decisions even more challenging.
61I note that the Court of Appeal has recently been clear that sentencing courts must consider not just the quantum of any possible jail sentence, but the “qualitative experience of custody” as well. In R. v. Oryia, 2026 ONCA 166, Chief Justice Tulloch wrote that sentencing courts must specifically recognize “the comparatively harsher impact of imprisonment on… youthful adults and those with mental health vulnerabilities”: see at para. 19.
62However, the need to emphasize general deterrence and denunciation strongly pulls me toward a jail sentence. The citizens of this city must know that those who would steal a car and recklessly endanger the lives and safety of the community through brazen attempts to escape capture will face significant consequences for their behaviour. Those who might be tempted to commit such offences must also know that they will face significant periods of incarceration if arrested and subsequently convicted. While a strict CSO can serve as a deterrent, it will never be as powerful as a jail sentence.
63This is a borderline case. Ultimately, I have concluded that a CSO is sufficient to hold Mr. Wei-Lasso accountable for his offending behaviour, given his status as a youthful first-time offender who pleaded guilty. The sentence, however, will impose significant restrictions on his liberty and require him to give back to the community and make reasonable efforts to secure employment. If he should breach any of the terms of this order, he will be presumptively facing reincarceration.
Sentencing Terms and Conditions
64On the count of theft of a motor vehicle, I impose a four-month CSO.
65On the count of dangerous driving, I impose an eight-month CSO, consecutive.
66In light of the fact that Mr. Wei-Lasso was subject to a house arrest bail for the last nine months without a breach, I will afford him some Downes credit. I reduce the overall sentence by three months, resulting in a nine-month CSO.
67Following the CSO, I impose two years' probation.
68Mr. Wei-Lasso will complete 100 hours of community service between the two orders.
69He is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle for three years, pursuant to Criminal Code section 320.24(5)(c).
70I impose free-standing restitution orders pursuant to Criminal Code section 738 to the TTC and the City of Toronto. I have considered that, at present, Mr. Wai-Lasso is unable to pay them himself. Mr. Dallas informed during the sentencing hearing that he has already secured the funds to meet these orders through the generosity of his parents. I will grant Mr. Wei-Lasso one year to pay the orders out of an abundance of caution: see R. v. Oguntoyinboniss, 2026 ONCA 320, at paras. 23-5; Criminal Code s. 739.2.
71The victim fine surcharges will be imposed, but I will grant him one year to pay them.
Released: May 28, 2026
Signed: Justice Brock Jones
1My emphasis added, in italics.