Jonathon C. George

The appellant, Marnie Affleck, appealed the dismissal of her claim for negligent infliction of nervous shock and defamation against Sunrise Senior Living, Inc., Sunrise of Erin Mills, and several individuals.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings, agreeing that the respondents’ actions were reasonable and that the defamation claim was not pleaded with sufficient specificity.

The court also found no error in the trial judge’s factual findings or costs award, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants, Dorinda Nana Afriyie and Adusei Kwame, appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment and writ of possession in a mortgage action brought by Rume Ezomo.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge’s application of the criteria for setting aside a default judgment, as set out in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen.

The court held that the motion judge properly considered the relevant factors, including promptness, explanation for default, arguable defence, prejudice, and the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Michelle Botosh’s appeal from the order striking out her 2023 action against members of the defence team from her earlier personal injury litigation.

The court found the new action was a collateral attack on the 2013 judgment and an abuse of process.

The court also upheld the motion judge’s findings regarding witness and lawyer immunity, the absence of a privacy claim, and the reasonableness of the costs award.

The appellant, Gaurav Tewari, appealed the decision of the motion judge who permanently stayed his action as a duplicative pleading and an abuse of process.

The motion judge also struck the claim under rules 21.01(3)(c), 21.01(3)(d), and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it contained no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Leave to amend was refused.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge’s decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant, Shiu Yiu Kong, appealed the dismissal of his application for an oppression remedy under the OBCA and CBCA.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge’s consideration of the statutory provisions, legal principles, or factual findings.

The court held that the appellant’s criticisms of the companies’ books and records did not amount to oppressive conduct, especially as the supporting evidence was inadmissible opinion evidence.

The real dispute was over the price and method of share purchase, which did not warrant court intervention.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of P.P. from convictions for assault, sexual assault, uttering threats, unlawful confinement, and attempted extortion, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge made errors by relying on unsupported assumptions about arranged marriages, improperly relying on an evidentiary fact without giving counsel an opportunity to make submissions, and drawing conclusions based on government COVID protocols without evidentiary foundation.

These errors rendered the convictions unsafe.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings granted due to a breach of the respondents’ rights under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed with the trial judge that last-minute offering of earlier trial dates did not require defence counsel to be available, nor did it make any resulting delay attributable to the defence.

The court also found the case was not sufficiently complex to justify an exception to the Jordan framework, and the presence of a Garofoli application did not elevate the case’s complexity.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of appeals by the Attorney General of Ontario, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, the Town of South Bruce Peninsula, Alberta Lemon, and the Estate of Barbara Twining, and the allowance of the cross-appeal by the Attorney General of Canada and His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.

The Court orders the Town and the Families to pay costs to the Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation and the Town to pay costs to Canada, finding the amounts sought reasonable in light of the complexity and significance of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Riley Kostuk’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

Kostuk argued that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated, that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct, and that evidence of his schizophrenia was improperly admitted or not properly limited.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s rulings, holding that the appellant had an operating mind when consulting counsel, that the prior conduct evidence was properly admitted for motive and identity, and that the references to mental health did not prejudice the trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The appellants, Alex and Maryam Furney, appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment to the respondent, Mohammad Ali Rabbani, for debts owed on promissory notes and a mortgage.

The appellants raised over thirty grounds of appeal, primarily alleging unfairness, errors of law and fact, and an improper costs award.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the motion judge's discretion in refusing an adjournment and her finding that there was no genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sought leave to appeal his three-year custodial sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in relying on R. v. A.J.K. as mandating a minimum three-year sentence for penetration, and that she failed to consider relevant R. v. Friesen factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not apply a minimum sentence but rather a fit range, and appropriately considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the seriousness of digital penetration.

The appellant appealed the termination of a conditional sentence for breach of conditions, specifically contacting a prohibited person and engaging in drug trafficking.

The appeal also sought credit for a 13-month delay during which the sentence was suspended but conditions remained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence for the breach and no exceptional circumstances to grant credit for the delay, as most of the delay was attributable to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a six-year sentence for two counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by treating a risk assessment as having no value due to the appellant's alleged dishonesty and by classifying the appellant's mental health issues as "neutral" rather than mitigating.

While upholding the application of the intimate partner aggravating factor, the appellate court re-evaluated the sentence, reducing it from six years to five years concurrent.

The appellant, Starkman Barristers, sought to appeal an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice that referred their accounts for assessment under the Solicitor's Act.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the proposed appeal because the order was interlocutory, not finally determining the real issue between the parties.

The court reiterated that appeals from interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed.

T.J.W. appealed his sentence of five years for two counts of sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to identify his advanced age (76 at sentencing) as a mitigating factor and by giving insufficient weight to other mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was aware of the appellant's age and considered it, and that defence counsel did not present evidence of health conditions or specific impacts of incarceration due to age.

The court concluded that the trial judge gave due weight to all relevant factors, including family support and community contributions, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant, Landi Hanna, appealed a 4-year sentence for two counts of robbery (one causing wounds) and one count of failure to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by not respecting the "jump" principle and by imposing a disproportionate sentence that relegated rehabilitation to a secondary role.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming that the sentencing judge correctly identified denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives for robbery, properly considered aggravating factors including the appellant's criminal record and re-offending while on release, and appropriately applied the "jump" principle given the appellant's pattern of committing serious robberies shortly after being granted bail.

The court also found that the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's rehabilitative potential was low due to his repeated criminal history and lack of serious engagement in addressing his drug addiction.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a physician, appealed his conviction on three counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered grounds including the admission and use of cross-count similar act evidence, the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons, errors in credibility and reliability assessment, and the trial judge's treatment of prior consistent statements and motive to fabricate.

The Court found no errors in the trial judge's handling of similar act evidence, the sufficiency of reasons, or the credibility assessments.

It also found no error in the application of the totality principle in sentencing.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant, S.J., appealed convictions for forcible confinement, failure to provide necessaries of life, assault causing bodily harm, and assault with a weapon, and a two-year less a day sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's reliance on the daughter's police statement (admitted under the principled exception to hearsay) over her recantation, and the dismissal of a s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility findings, finding no error in relying on the police statement and rejecting fresh evidence.

The s. 11(b) application was also properly dismissed due to defence delay.

The sentence was found fit.

The Crown's request to amend the information to conform with the conviction for failure to provide necessaries under s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code was granted.