Jonathon C. George

The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms (JCCF) appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay $156,461.99 in costs following an unsuccessful interlocutory injunction motion brought by students against Seneca College's COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Court of Appeal found the costs order fundamentally flawed because the motion judge failed to determine if the litigation was public interest litigation and did not apply the correct legal tests for awarding costs against a non-party (the "person of straw" test or abuse of process).

The Court clarified that fundraising or promoting a case on a website does not constitute abuse of process.

The Court also stated that JCCF's refusal to disclose whether it was indemnifying the students was a relevant consideration for costs.

The appeal was allowed, the costs order set aside, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for a fresh determination.

The appellant, Payman Khanlari, appealed a summary judgment order that found him liable for unjust enrichment.

He argued that he was treated unfairly as a self-represented litigant and that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment due to credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument regarding unfair treatment, noting the appellant's familiarity with legal proceedings.

However, the court found that the motion judge erred in quantifying the unjust enrichment by not accounting for payments admittedly made by the appellant to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed to vary the judgment amount.

The appellants sought orders under sections 134 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging various incidents and an ongoing failure by the respondents to reasonably respond to inquiries.

The appeal court was asked to overturn findings of fact made by the application judge.

The court found that all of the application judge's findings were reasonably open on the record and, therefore, dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.

The appellant, Jaswant Singh Kooner, appealed a trial judgment that found he owed his lawyer, Peter Verbeek, outstanding legal fees.

The trial judge had found an oral retainer agreement for fees and disbursements, not a contingent fee, and awarded Verbeek $59,342.42 plus $22,500 in costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings regarding the oral retainer agreement or the reasonableness of the fees.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her application for parenting orders, retroactive and ongoing child support, and s. 7 expenses under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the application due to an existing divorce judgment from Michigan that already contained parenting and child support orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of legal principles or exercise of discretion, noting that there was little else in dispute beyond child support.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking their statement of claim in its entirety without leave to amend, in a product liability action concerning an implanted medical device (Essure).

The Court of Appeal set aside the order, granting leave to amend the statement of claim.

The court clarified that leave to amend should only be denied in the clearest of cases and that, in product liability claims, identifying a specific manufacturing or design defect is not always required at the pleading stage to disclose a cause of action.

The appellant, Ahmad Mohammad (also known as Ahmad Yousef), brought three appeals from Superior Court orders dismissing his actions under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal considered dismissing the appeals and revoking the appellant's fee waivers under the Administration of Justice Act.

The court found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, lacking intelligible grounds or causes of action.

The panel review motions for two appeals (McMaster University and Chaimowitz) were dismissed under r. 2.1.02, and the third appeal (Google) was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 for failure to perfect.

The court also revoked the appellant's fee waivers and prohibited further fee waiver requests without judicial permission.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on two grounds: the constitutionality of the amended s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code regarding provocation, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge on the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The Court of Appeal declined to rule on the constitutional question, finding it was raised tactically for the first time on appeal and lacked an air of reality.

The court also found no reversible error in the NCR instructions, clarifying that the jury was properly guided on the disjunctive nature of the s. 16 test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his action against the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The original action alleged deliberate power cuts to his cell and sought damages and an order for an extension cord.

The Superior Court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting jurisdictional issues and a lack of cause of action, and ruled against the admissibility of the appellant's affidavit evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no clear error or misdirection by the motion judge, and affirmed that Rule 2.1.01 is intended for summary dismissal of such claims, precluding the need for affidavit evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action, assigned from a bankrupt estate, alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by the former bankruptcy trustee and its representative.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by reversing the onus of proof regarding discoverability and by failing to consider s. 12 of the Limitations Act, which applies to assigned claims in bankruptcy.

The court held that the limitation period analysis must account for the dual roles of the creditor as an inspector and the need to obtain court orders (s. 38 and s. 215 BIA) before commencing action against a trustee.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal set aside, and the limitation period issue was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant, Timothy Rodger, appealed an order dismissing his action for delay under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, a negligence claim against London Hydro Inc., had seen no steps taken for over four years after examinations for discovery.

The motion judge dismissed the action, citing the passage of over five years since commencement, the lack of an affidavit explaining the delay, and the presumption of prejudice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the exercise of discretion to dismiss the action and deny a further adjournment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Robert Collette, appealed a motion judge's order that, while striking out most claims under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, allowed a claim for harassment and intentional infliction of emotional harm to proceed.

The core issue on appeal was whether a successful s. 137.1 motion requires dismissal of the entire action or permits dismissal of only specific claims.

The Court of Appeal found that, based on the motion judge's finding that the entire action was motivated to silence public interest expression, the entire action should have been dismissed.

The appeal was allowed, and the entire action was dismissed.

The respondent, Nordik Windows Inc., brought a motion to quash an appeal by the appellants, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada et al., arguing the underlying order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Aviva contended the order was final as it determined a limitation period issue.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge's order was interlocutory, as it did not finally determine the limitation period defence, but rather dismissed the motion without a final conclusion on that issue.

The appeal was therefore quashed.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and contradictions with other evidence, including her mother's testimony and forensic findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that it was for the jury to assess credibility and weigh evidence, especially considering the complainant's age.

The court found that the trial judge's post-verdict factual findings for sentencing (limiting the proven facts to a single incident of touching) did not render the jury's initial verdict unreasonable, as there was no demonstrable deliberate lie by the complainant.

The Business Development Bank of Canada (the bank) brought a motion to quash an appeal initiated by 170 Willowdale Investments Corp. (the appellant).

The appellant subsequently abandoned its appeal.

The court found that a contractual term between the parties entitled the bank to full indemnity costs.

Consequently, the bank was awarded its costs of the abandoned appeal in the amount of $19,791.95.

The appellant, Bon-Star Inc., appealed an order declaring its mortgage a closed mortgage with no prepayment privileges and requiring compensation for lost interest upon prepayment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the declarations to clarify that prepayment privileges were absent in favour of the mortgagor and that compensation for lost interest was required for the specific transaction where the "Due on Sale" clause was not invoked.

The court found the application judge erred in making a broad declaration regarding prepayment without compensation, as specific mortgage terms like the "Due on Sale" clause could alter prepayment conditions.

The court also upheld the application judge's discretionary decisions regarding adjournments and counsel appointment.

The appellant, Rene Hamouth, appealed convictions for multiple firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The appeal challenged the lawfulness of the search warrant (Garofoli issue), the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the exclusion of firearms and ammunition, and the finding of possession of firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, except for one count related to a non-restricted firearm (Winchester shotgun), which was substituted from s. 95(1) to s. 92(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court upheld the trial judge's Garofoli analysis, his s. 24(2) analysis (including the consideration of the Crown's concession to exclude incriminating statements and the lack of causal connection between the Charter breaches and the discovery of firearms), and the finding of possession.

The appellant, Michael Smith, appealed his seven-year global sentence for firearm and drug-related offences, arguing a calculation error in pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found an inadvertent denial of procedural fairness due to the sentencing judge's initial comments regarding a 2:1 equivalency for pre-sentence custody credit, which was not fully applied in the final sentence.

The Court increased the "Duncan credit" for harsh custodial conditions from four to nine months, resulting in a reduced net sentence for the appellant.

The appellant, M.L., appealed convictions for four counts, including exercising control for exploitation, receiving financial benefit from exploitation, receiving financial benefit from prostitution, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown's case relied primarily on K.G.B. statements provided by the complainant, who later recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admissibility analysis of these statements or in his assessment of their reliability.

The trial judge's approach of seeking corroborative evidence, effectively treating the complainant as a Vetrovec witness, was upheld.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.