Jonathan Dawe

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question about whether they should decide each charge strictly on the evidence presented for that charge, or if disbelief of one incident should influence their decision on another.

The trial judge restricted his answer to the question of evidence, instructing the jury not to use evidence from one charge on another, without addressing the issue of credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's answer was not responsive and may have misled the jury into thinking they could not apply a credibility assessment across counts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault after the trial judge found he was in a state of non-mental disorder automatism (sexsomnia) at the time of the offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the condition should have been classified as a mental disorder leading to a not criminally responsible (NCR) verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the legal standard for disease of the mind by failing to properly consider the risk of recurrence and the internal causes of the condition.

Concluding it lacked jurisdiction to substitute an NCR verdict on an appeal from an acquittal, the Court ordered a new trial limited to determining whether the automatism should result in an acquittal or an NCR verdict.

The respondent entrusted $5,000 to a courier who attempted to take $50,000 out of Canada without reporting it, leading to the seizure of the funds.

The respondent applied for a declaration that his interest in the funds was not affected by the seizure under s. 33 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

The application judge granted the declaration, finding the respondent exercised all reasonable care.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent failed to make necessary inquiries about legal restrictions or steps taken by the courier to comply, and thus did not exercise all reasonable care.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

The police officer asked the accused for identification, ran a CPIC check, and discovered an outstanding bail curfew condition.

The accused was arrested and searched, revealing cocaine.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that while the request for identification violated s. 8, there were no breaches of ss. 9 or 10(b).

The Court concluded the evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer could have lawfully obtained the identification by ticketing the accused for a seatbelt violation.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, an 18-year-old, was stopped by three police officers on the street and asked if he had anything he shouldn't.

He admitted to possessing marijuana and a loaded revolver.

At trial, he argued his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated and sought to exclude the firearm under s. 24(2).

The trial judge found no detention or search and convicted him.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant was arbitrarily detained (s. 9 breach) but that the questioning did not constitute a search (no s. 8 breach).

Applying the Collins/Stillman framework, the Court concluded that although the firearm was conscriptive real evidence, its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the reliability of the evidence, the good faith of the police, and the seriousness of the offence.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a violent bank robbery.

During the investigation, police used a self-styled spiritualist and Obeah practitioner as an agent to elicit a confession from the appellant.

The appellant argued the resulting statement was inadmissible as the product of a 'dirty trick' and protected by religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the relationship between the appellant and the spiritualist was a corrupt criminal relationship aimed at evading police, not a genuine religious confession.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on expert evidence, challenge for cause, and co-conspirator utterances.

The appellant appealed her convictions for confinement and failing to provide the necessaries of life, arguing that the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments and findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge adequately explained his reasons for accepting the Crown witnesses over the defence witnesses and that his factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The Court noted it is not its role to retry the case.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding his committal for trial on a charge of first degree murder.

The appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he knew the victim's death was likely as a result of the assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's admissions to his girlfriend, combined with the nature of the assault, provided a basis upon which a reasonable jury could infer the requisite knowledge for murder.

The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on charges of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault.

The Crown successfully brought a certiorari application to quash the discharge, and the application judge committed the accused for trial.

The accused appealed the committal order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a superior court judge on a certiorari application does not have jurisdiction to commit an accused for trial.

The appropriate remedy is to quash the discharge and remit the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge for further consideration.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for poisoning her estranged husband with antifreeze-laced wine.

On appeal, she argued the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and sought disclosure of confidential informer information as well as the admission of fresh evidence regarding a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, upholding the confidential informer privilege, and rejecting the fresh evidence as inadmissible and unreliable under the Palmer test.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application for a judge-alone trial without Crown consent, and that the jury instructions regarding extreme intoxication and the standard of proof were flawed.

He also argued the trial judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on the Charter application, jury instructions, or the application of Gladue principles to the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay criminal charges against the respondent based on abuse of process and section 7 Charter breaches due to disclosure failings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's characterization of the prosecution's disclosure approach as disorganized, haphazard, and indifferent was supported by the evidence, and the decision to order a stay was not clearly wrong.

The Crown obtained an ex parte order for a judicial investigative hearing under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code in relation to the Air India bombings.

The application judge ordered the hearing to be held in camera and kept secret.

A newspaper reporter discovered the proceedings and sought access.

The hearing judge dismissed the application for access.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the newspaper's appeal in part, holding that the open court principle applies to s. 83.28 hearings.

While the initial ex parte application was properly held in camera, the existence of the order and the constitutional challenge should have been public.

The investigative hearing itself must be presumptively open, subject to the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans or in camera orders.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the identification evidence.

The appellant was identified as the driver of a vehicle used in a drug transaction based largely on in-dock identification and a single photograph that was subsequently lost by police.

The trial judge also accepted that the vehicle was used in the transaction despite evidence from its registered owner that it had not been loaned out.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons revealed misapprehensions of the evidence, particularly regarding the strength and timing of the identification, which rendered the verdict unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound after shooting the complainant in the neck.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on his post-offence conduct and failed to properly instruct the jury on the defence of accident.

He also appealed his 8-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the post-offence conduct was relevant to intent and the jury instructions were adequate given the lack of evidence supporting an accident.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the acceptable range.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting the victim in the back of the head outside a courthouse.

At trial, the appellant claimed he acted in self-defence, fearing the victim would attack him due to previous gang-related shootings.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury and excluded expert psychological evidence regarding post-traumatic stress disorder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no air of reality to the defence of self-defence because there was no evidence of an imminent or reasonably apprehended attack at the time of the shooting.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence and dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the 8-year imprisonment term.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that ordered a new trial and the production of joint counselling records in a sexual assault case.

The summary conviction appeal judge held that the Criminal Code's third-party records provisions did not apply to counselling sessions attended by both the accused and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the provisions do apply, as the complainant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in therapeutic records despite the accused's presence.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the order for a new trial on the alternative ground that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence regarding the complainant's statements during the alleged assault.

The appellant appealed jury convictions arising from a multiple shooting in a drug-trafficking setting, advancing Charter, evidentiary, jury-instruction, inconsistent-verdict, and sentence grounds.

The court held that the police did not deny reasonable access for obtaining blood or urine samples from the accused in custody, and rejected the argument that the state forced the accused to surrender privacy or self-incrimination protections as a condition of obtaining samples.

Although the court concluded that evidence of a prior violent stabbing by the deceased should have been admitted on the self-defence issue, it found the error harmless because the excluded evidence would not have affected the jury’s rejection of self-defence.

The court further found substantial compliance with the Lifchus principles, no misdirection on self-defence, no true inconsistency in the verdicts, and no basis to interfere with the life sentence for attempted murder.

The appellant, a black man, was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder of two white police officers.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in limiting his challenge for cause regarding racial bias to a single 'rolled-up' question, rather than allowing multiple questions about racial attitudes.

He also argued the trial judge erred in excusing a prospective juror when the triers could not agree, that the Crown improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, and that evidence of his immigration status and criminal record should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion during jury selection or in the admission of evidence.

The Court held that the peremptory challenge issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal.