Jonathan Dawe

The appellants appealed their convictions for first degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness identification, including testimony from unsavoury witnesses.

The appellants argued that the verdict against one of them was unreasonable, and that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the assessment of a witness's credibility, the application of the 'might reasonably be true' test, and the definition of reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable given the confirmatory evidence available.

The Court also held that the trial judge's jury instructions, while not perfect in light of subsequent jurisprudence, did not constitute reversible error.

The appeals were dismissed.

The accused were charged with multiple offences related to a cocaine-trafficking ring.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence obtained via an ex parte authorization supported by a lengthy police affidavit.

At trial, cross-examination revealed errors in the affidavit regarding confidential sources, leading the trial judge to reject the entire affidavit, exclude the wiretap evidence, and acquit the accused.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, clarifying that the investigative necessity requirement for wiretaps means there must be no other reasonable alternative method of investigation.

The Court held that the affidavit met this standard and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of review by globally rejecting the affidavit instead of excising the erroneous information and considering whether sufficient reliable information remained to support the authorization.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence from a custodial sentence of 15 months followed by 18 months probation.

The court was not persuaded that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle and held the sentence was entirely fit.

However, on the Crown's concession, the court varied the probation term requiring residence on a specified First Nations reserve and substituted a condition requiring residence at a residence approved by the probation officer.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted to give effect to that variation, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Crown sought an extension of time to serve and file a motion for leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judgment that had set aside a sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The proposed appeal concerned the application of s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code to a psychiatrist’s records of joint counselling sessions involving the complainant and the accused.

The court held that, although the Crown’s diligence in locating and serving the respondent before the filing deadline was open to criticism, the Crown had formed an intention to appeal within time, no undue prejudice was shown, and the proposed appeal was arguable.

Given the significance of the legal issue and the interests of justice, the extension was granted.

The appellants, Suzack and Pennett, were convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Constable Joe MacDonald during a routine traffic stop.

Both appellants advanced cut-throat defences at trial, each blaming the other for firing the fatal shots.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge erred in refusing a change of venue, refusing to sever their trials, and misdirecting the jury on propensity evidence and after-the-fact conduct.

Suzack also challenged the constitutionality of s. 635(2) of the Criminal Code regarding the order of peremptory challenges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or jury instructions, and upholding the constitutionality of the jury selection provisions.