John David McInnes

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on various firearms charges relating to his possession of an airgun.

The trial judge, relying on previous jurisprudence, held that the Crown had to prove the airgun was a 'weapon' (used or intended to be used to cause injury or intimidate) before it could be classified as a 'firearm'.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, overruling its previous decision in McManus.

The Court held that any barrelled object capable of causing serious bodily injury or death meets the definition of a 'firearm' and is automatically deemed a 'weapon' under the Criminal Code, regardless of the possessor's intent.

A preliminary inquiry into charges of second degree murder and careless use of a firearm arising from the death of Eric Osawe during a dynamic police entry.

The Crown alleged that the accused officer deliberately fired his MP5 submachine gun during a struggle with the deceased.

The court found no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer intentional discharge, and further found that the officer's conduct was consistent with professional standards.

The accused was discharged on all counts.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The respondent was convicted of seven counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a high-speed collision.

The trial judge suspended the passing of sentence and imposed two years' probation and a two-year driving prohibition, relying heavily on the parity principle due to the lenient sentence received by the other driver involved.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle and failed to adequately reflect general deterrence and denunciation.

A nine-month custodial sentence and a five-year driving prohibition were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The appellant focused on a six-month delay during the preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the delay was neutral and that the prejudice experienced by the appellant was not significant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to sever his trial from his co-accused and in his jury instructions on hearsay evidence.

The appellant sought severance to call his co-accused as a witness to support his defence that the killing was not planned and deliberate, but rather the result of an intermittent explosive disorder triggered by taunting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal to sever, as the co-accused's evidence would not have realistically affected the verdict.

The court also found no error in the hearsay instructions, concluding the appellant had a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the Crown improperly cross-examined and argued about the complainant's motive to fabricate, and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with an acquittal on an incest charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave a proper curative instruction regarding the Crown's conduct and that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as it was open to the jury to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts.

The self-represented appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence regarding the condition of a brake system was fabricated, that evidence of prior audits was improperly admitted, and that evidence from an MTO investigation was improperly obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably rejected the fabrication claims, the prior audits were admissible to show a pattern of conduct, and the appellant could not raise Charter issues for the first time on appeal after failing to bring an application at trial.

The Crown appealed a youth justice court decision declaring sections 487.051(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as they apply to young offenders.

The sentencing judge had refused to make mandatory and presumptive DNA collection orders for three young offenders who pled guilty to designated offences, finding the provisions violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for two of the youths (quashing the third for jurisdictional reasons), holding that the provisions are reasonable and constitutional.

The Court found that the legislative safeguards protecting the privacy of young offenders, including the mandatory destruction of DNA records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, appropriately balance the state's interest in law enforcement with the youths' privacy interests.

The accused appealed convictions arising from historical allegations of physical and sexual abuse against two complainants, and the Crown appealed sentence.

The court held that the trial judge's rejection of the accused's evidence rested on speculative reasoning, including unsupported findings about anger, alcohol-related memory impairment, and an impermissible assumption that the accused had a motive to lie to avoid criminal liability.

The court further held that the reasons failed to grapple with a significant contradiction between the complainants on a key issue.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

In light of that disposition, the sentence appeal was not addressed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellant and an accomplice went to a drug dealer's home to purchase marijuana, both armed with handguns.

During a struggle, the dealer was fatally shot.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, the recklessness component of murder under s. 229(a)(ii), and the failure to give a W. (D.) instruction.

The appellant also argued his absence from a preliminary pre-charge conference in the judge's chambers violated his right to be present at his trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions and concluding that the procedural error of the appellant's absence from the chambers discussion was cured by s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants, Gavra and Karl Largie, were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on private communications intercepted with the consent of an informant under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that s. 184.2 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it does not require the state to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that s. 184.2 satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of s. 8 and is not unconstitutional despite the absence of an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court also dismissed several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused after finding him guilty of sexual assault and sexual touching.

The trial judge had granted the stay on the basis that lost police audiotapes and notes from a 1994 investigation prejudiced the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Crown had satisfactorily explained the loss of the audiotapes and that the lost evidence was not so prejudicial as to warrant a stay, given the availability of other records and evidence to challenge the complainants' credibility.

The Court set aside the stay and ordered a new trial rather than reinstating the guilty verdicts, as the trial judge had failed to factor the lost evidence into his assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, holding that the appellant's arguments focused on factual findings and alleged misapprehensions of evidence.

The court concluded that the appellant failed to raise a question of law of importance beyond the individual case.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence from Dr. Gojer on appeal to argue he was unfit to stand trial, Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD), or should be designated a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not alter the appellant's fitness under the Taylor test, failed to establish he was incapable of knowing his acts were morally wrong under the Oommen test, and did not demonstrate he could be safely managed in the community.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting at a bar.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a witness who had since moved to Ukraine, claiming he lacked full opportunity to cross-examine due to late disclosure of a potential 'bail for testimony' deal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'full opportunity' requirement under s. 715 of the Criminal Code is not defeated by an accused's ignorance of potentially useful information, and that the admission did not render the trial fairness.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's decision not to give a Vetrovec warning, as defence counsel had not requested one and the jury was adequately cautioned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting a loaded handgun and a statement into evidence following alleged breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal expressed reservations about the trial judge's finding of a s. 8 breach regarding the search warrant.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court held that even if a breach occurred, it was not serious, the police acted in good faith, and the reliable evidence was needed to prove a serious crime.

The Court also upheld the admission of the appellant's statement despite a s. 10(b) breach.

The appeal was dismissed.