John David McInnes

The appellant appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentence imposed by the trial judge that would justify appellate intervention.

The accused was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after the victim identified him as the attacker.

At trial, the lead investigating police officer testified for the Crown, providing a narrative of the investigation that included hearsay and his personal opinion that the accused was guilty.

The trial judge failed to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding the permissible use of this investigative hearsay and opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions due to this error.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, it was harmless in the context of the trial and caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, who was nearly 18 at the time of the offence, was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal killing of an elderly neighbour during a planned robbery.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant as an adult to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for seven years, finding that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold him accountable or protect the public.

The appellant appealed the adult sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized the seriousness of the offence and failed to recognize the similar lengths of youth and adult sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly balanced all statutory factors and correctly recognized that an adult sentence provides necessary life-long state supervision.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault on the basis that the trial judge met privately with counsel during the complainant's cross-examination while the appellant was absent and no record was made.

The Court of Appeal held that the in-chambers discussion formed part of the trial because the judge expressed views on witness credibility and raised the effect of the accused testifying, matters engaging the accused's vital interests.

The appellant's absence affected his ability to make full answer and defence because the discussion influenced the decision not to testify.

The court declined to apply the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv), holding that the procedure also had the potential to undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for fraud.

They argued that a statement made during a vehicle stop should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 10(a) breach but found the statement admissible under s. 24(2), noting the breach was not serious and the officer acted in good faith.

The court also found no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches.

The statement was admissible against the co-accused as an adoptive admission by silence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the court agreed a conditional sentence was unwarranted but reduced the custodial sentences to six months imprisonment to better reflect specific deterrence and rehabilitation.

Restitution orders were maintained but clarified as joint and several.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, appealed his 11-year sentence for two robberies involving a loaded firearm and extreme gratuitous violence.

The Court of Appeal noted his youth, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitation efforts while in custody.

Finding the original sentence excessive compared to similar cases, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to eight years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for enticing a person under 14 years of age and his subsequent designation as a dangerous offender.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, specifically regarding the element of 'enticing' and the subjective intent to deprive a parent of possession.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant challenged the finding that the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence, the admission of evidence regarding prior acquitted conduct, and the dangerous offender designation over a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, the application of the legal elements, or the conclusion that the appellant's psychopathy and pedophilia posed an ongoing danger requiring an indeterminate sentence.

The appellants, two brothers, were convicted of second degree murder following a joint trial.

The evidence against them included out-of-court statements made to an accomplice.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning by allowing the jury to use statements admissible against only one accused to bolster the accomplice's credibility against the other.

They also argued the trial judge erred by giving a Duncan instruction, suggesting inculpatory statements carry more weight than exculpatory ones.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, finding the Vetrovec warning was proper and contained adequate cautions.

While the Court held that the Duncan instruction should not be adopted by Canadian trial courts, it concluded the instruction did not mislead the jury in the context of the charge as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal altercation outside a bar where the victim was struck with a baseball bat.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge made several errors in the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by instructing the jury they could use a witness's prior videotaped statement for the truth of its contents without proper adoption, failing to give a Vetrovec warning for a key Crown witness with credibility issues, improperly dismissing the intoxication defence, and failing to correct the Crown's breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision ordering a new trial after an acquittal.

The trial judge had excluded the complainant's cross-examination when assessing the admissibility of his disclosure to his mother under the necessity inquiry.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred, as the cross-examination was relevant to the necessity inquiry.

While disagreeing with the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge that the evidence should necessarily have been admitted, the Court of Appeal declined to apply the proviso to sustain the acquittal, as the excluded evidence may have affected the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after a third trial, the first two having resulted in hung juries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the lead police investigator's testimony, which included hearsay and personal opinions on the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the failure to provide a limiting instruction was a fatal error that could have led the jury to believe the police possessed undisclosed inculpatory evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso given the prior hung juries, and entered a stay of proceedings rather than ordering a fourth trial.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offences, arguing unjustifiable disparity with his co-accused's 11-year sentence and that his firearms sentences should have been concurrent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity fully justified by the appellant's extensive criminal record, age, and parole status at the time of the offences.

The court also held that the sentencing judge was entitled to impose consecutive sentences for the firearms offences to reflect the invasion of different legally protected interests.

The youth appellants were convicted of armed robbery and related offences.

At trial, the judge admitted hearsay statements from a victim and a co-accused under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reliability analysis for the hearsay statements.

However, the sentence appeals were allowed.

The trial judge erred by considering general deterrence, which is not a principle of youth sentencing.

Given the passage of time and fresh evidence of the appellants' successful rehabilitation, the court reduced their sentences to periods of open custody and community supervision.

The appellant's criminal charges were stayed on the eve of trial due to delay and disclosure issues, and the trial judge awarded costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of the costs award, finding that while the 16-month delay triggered a s. 11(b) inquiry, the Crown's conduct did not amount to the marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards required to justify a costs award.

The appellant pleaded guilty to carrying a weapon, unlawful confinement, and assault against his former girlfriend.

He was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have been permitted to serve it in the community.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in assigning sole responsibility for delay to the appellant and in treating his initial minimization of the offence as an aggravating factor, the refusal of a conditional sentence was ultimately correct given the planned nature of the offence, the use of a weapon, and the significant psychological harm to the victim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for possession of child pornography found on a shared household computer.

The court held that criminal possession requires knowledge of the nature of the material and a measure of control over it, and that control means power or authority whether exercised or not.

Although there was no finding that the appellant downloaded or viewed the videos, his admitted knowledge of their presence for several months and his direction that they be deleted before police examination established sufficient control.

The court rejected any characterization of the conduct as innocent possession for immediate destruction and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a pre-trial ruling dismissing his motion for the return of a tractor-trailer seized by police following a collision.

The vehicle had been stored at a towing compound and subsequently disposed of to recover storage costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that since the Crown no longer possessed the vehicle, it could not be ordered returned.

The appellant's claim for restitution of the vehicle's value was a civil matter over which the criminal trial judge had no jurisdiction.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual exploitation involving teenage complainants, arguing the trial judge misdirected himself on the meaning of a position of trust and improperly relied on evidence said to be tainted by collusion and police pressure.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge correctly applied the governing authorities under s. 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and was entitled to find a relationship of trust based on the appellant's close involvement with the family and the entrusted care of the young persons.

The court also held that the trial judge was not required to reject all impugned evidence and that the convictions rested largely on unchallenged evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an assault involving stomping on an unconscious complainant's face.

The trial judge had found that an independent witness's testimony regarding the stomping was uncontradicted.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider the contradictory testimony of the appellant's brother.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a sending order made under s. 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The application judge had found that the search warrant was facially overbroad and that the seizure exceeded the terms of the warrant, but concluded he had the discretion to send the requesting state the materials that could properly have been seized under a valid warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge did not err in his interpretation of s. 15 and properly exercised his discretion in making the sending order despite the defective warrant.