John David McInnes

The appellant appealed his five-year total sentence for bank robbery and attempted bank robbery.

The original sentence included two consecutive one-year terms for imitation firearm offences that the appellant had not actually been charged with.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, deleted the two one-year sentences, and varied the total sentence to three years.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was in a conflict of interest and provided ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine the complainant on a breach of recognizance incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no conflict of interest and concluding that trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine was a reasonable judgment call.

Furthermore, the court found no prejudice to the appellant, as the trial judge disbelieved him based on his own testimony.

The applicant sought release on bail pending trial for an offence involving a fatal stabbing.

Fresh evidence was introduced suggesting the deceased was the aggressor, providing context for the applicant's conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that, given the new information, detention was not justified on the tertiary ground, and the applicant met his onus on the secondary ground due to the availability of sureties to monitor his conduct.

The application for bail was granted.

The respondent was charged with second degree murder after strangling his wife.

At trial, he raised the defence of provocation, and the jury acquitted him of murder, convicting him of manslaughter.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the defence of provocation had an air of reality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding there was some evidence of wrongful acts and insults by the victim from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably find both the objective and subjective components of provocation were met.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The trial judge found that the appellant unlawfully detained the complainant and lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him for causing a disturbance, as the complainant's loud and rude protestations were instigated by the appellant's improper actions.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' conclusions that there was no criminal disturbance and no reasonable grounds for arrest.

The appellants appealed jury convictions for two murders arising from a drug-debt execution theory advanced through accomplice and jailhouse informer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec caution regarding key unsavoury witnesses and also committed several additional reversible errors, including admitting highly prejudicial investigative hearsay, admitting evidence of a co-accused’s manslaughter conviction, excluding exculpatory portions of a recorded statement under the whole statement rule, permitting inadmissible hearsay concerning one appellant’s alleged admission to his girlfriend, and failing to control prejudicial Crown cross-examination and oath-helping evidence.

The court rejected the reasonable apprehension of bias claim and declined to intervene on several discrete evidentiary rulings, but found the cumulative and individual errors too serious for the curative proviso.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a former teacher at a boarding school, appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for eight counts of historical indecent assault involving seven students.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding unreasonable delay, admission of similar fact evidence, application of reasonable doubt, and refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on delay or similar fact evidence, deferring to the credibility findings, and upholding the three-year sentence as fit given the nature of the offences and lack of remorse.

The accused, a retirement home manager, was charged with assaulting several elderly residents.

By the time of trial, four complainants had died and one was incompetent to testify.

The trial judge admitted videotaped statements to the police from two deceased complainants under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying heavily on the striking similarities between the statements, and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal excluded the statements and acquitted the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the hearsay statements were inadmissible.

The Court clarified the principled approach to hearsay, ruling that trial judges may consider corroborative or conflicting evidence when assessing threshold reliability, modifying its previous ruling in R. v. Starr.

However, on the facts, the deceased complainant's statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the dangers of admitting untested hearsay.

The appellant, a bystander not targeted by any police investigation, successfully applied to quash an Ontario search warrant that relied on information obtained in breach of a British Columbia non-dissemination agreement and misrepresented B.C. court proceedings.

The application judge found a serious breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights but refused to award costs, applying the traditional rule that costs in criminal proceedings require serious Crown misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction under s. 784(1) of the Criminal Code to hear the appeal.

The Court further held that the traditional Crown misconduct rule does not apply with equal force to a bystander seeking a s. 24(1) Charter remedy.

Given the appellant's vulnerability, the need to encourage the vindication of Charter rights, and the Crown's decision to staunchly resist the application despite warnings of the warrant's flaws, the Court awarded the appellant $20,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding the Crown's principal witness was inadequate.

The witness, who had a criminal record and received conditional immunity, testified that the appellant shot the deceased.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions properly identified the witness as requiring special scrutiny, highlighted the characteristics bringing his evidence into question, cautioned the jury about relying on his unconfirmed evidence, and appropriately addressed confirmatory evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order quashing authorizations to take DNA samples from two respondents convicted of multiple murders.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 487.055(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which permits DNA sampling for offenders convicted of 'more than one murder committed at different times'.

The Court of Appeal rejected the application judge's 'transaction' analysis but affirmed the result, holding that 'different times' requires the murders to be distinguishable in nature or quality.

Because the murders committed by both respondents occurred in close proximity and were not distinguishable in nature or quality, the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately caution the jury regarding the evidence of an unsavoury witness and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning adequately conveyed the dangers of relying on the witness's testimony, noting the witness's criminal record and drug addiction.

The Court also held that the verdict was not unreasonable, as the witness had a good opportunity to observe the events and his reliability was not challenged.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young offender appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on forensic evidence, opportunity, and prior discreditable conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give an alibi instruction and in her treatment of evidence regarding a prior threat to kill the victim.

The Court of Appeal held that an alibi instruction was not required as the evidence did not provide a complete alibi.

While the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the prior threat evidence, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the circumstantial case against the appellant was overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a nursing home manager, was convicted of assaulting elderly residents.

Two of the complainants died before trial, and the trial judge admitted their videotaped statements to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying on striking similarities between their statements and those of other residents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals.

The majority held that under the Supreme Court's decision in Starr, corroborative evidence from other complainants regarding different events cannot be used to establish threshold reliability when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entirely justified in imposing the sentence given the gravity of the breaches, the appellant's prior record, and the need for the protection of society.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in considering matters relevant to his credibility that did not directly relate to the amount of alcohol consumed.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that evidence may be relevant to credibility even if it does not directly and expressly relate to alcohol consumption.

The appellant appealed his criminal convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her treatment of a prior inconsistent statement, misapplied the burden of proof under R. v. W.(D.), and failed to consider his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately considered the relevant factors, properly applied the burden of proof, and correctly rejected the appellant's evidence as it was inconsistent with the credible evidence.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a lengthy trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of three unsavoury witnesses, including a jailhouse informant.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial recantations by two of these witnesses and argued that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to give an adequate Vetrovec warning and improperly admitting highly prejudicial evidence of a prior manslaughter conviction.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence of one witness's recantation and found that the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning and evidentiary rulings.

The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.

The Crown appealed a youth court judge's refusal to make a DNA data bank order following the young persons' guilty pleas to forcible confinement.

The youth court judge had ruled that forcible confinement was not a primary designated offence under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that forcible confinement is a primary designated offence.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to a different youth court judge to determine whether the orders should be made.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the young person respondent on charges related to a series of car jackings.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding that the police lacked objective reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent, rendering the arrest and subsequent searches unlawful.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the totality of the circumstances, which objectively provided reasonable grounds for the arrest.

Consequently, the arrest and incidental searches were lawful, and the evidence should not have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.