John David McInnes

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for a retroactive DNA data bank authorization under s. 487.055(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The application was dismissed because the respondent's sentence for his predicate sexual offences had expired, although he was still serving a consecutive sentence for breach of probation.

The Crown argued that s. 139(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act merged the sentences, making the application timely.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sentence merger under the CCRA is for administrative purposes like parole eligibility and does not extend the duration of a sentence for a specific offence for the purpose of DNA authorizations.

The appellants, young offenders, were convicted of aggravated assault after jointly attacking the victim, resulting in severe head injuries.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence on causation, failed to draw an adverse inference from the victim not testifying, and erred in finding they acted jointly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of causation or joint liability.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal for one appellant, reducing the disposition from one year to six months of secure custody followed by probation, citing the spontaneous nature of the violence and the appellant's positive antecedents.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of arson.

He was arrested and held in police custody for 16 hours before being interviewed and giving a statement.

The Crown failed to account for this 16-hour period or explain why the appellant was not brought before a justice of the peace.

The trial judge admitted the statement, finding that the appellant's consultation with counsel cured any concerns about the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the burden of proof for voluntariness.

Proof of access to counsel is not a proxy for proof of voluntariness, and the Crown was required to account for the lengthy period of custody.

The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction and applied to introduce fresh evidence, including new DNA test results and factual evidence regarding scabs on his hands.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and found that the fresh DNA evidence, which excluded the appellant and pointed to an alternative suspect, could reasonably be expected to have affected the result at trial.

The fresh factual evidence regarding the source of the appellant's hand injuries was also admitted.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought a review of a decision denying him bail pending trial under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal confirmed the detention order, finding that the applicant failed to show his detention was not justified on the primary ground.

The court noted his significant criminal record, history of breaching court orders, recent misconduct in jail, and an inadequate release plan.

The appellant Fraser and two co-accused were tried for second-degree murder following a street fight.

Fraser admitted to stabbing the victim but raised defences of intoxication.

The co-accused were acquitted, while Fraser was convicted.

Fraser appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and intent.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the co-accused, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could not be convicted of manslaughter if Fraser was convicted of murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed Fraser's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to use evidence of Fraser's flight from the scene.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed because, although the trial judge erred in law regarding party liability for manslaughter, the Crown failed to show the error may well have affected the verdicts for the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 8-year sentence for robbery and related offences arising from a home invasion.

He argued the Crown improperly invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from his failure to call alibi witnesses disclosed for the first time during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the undisclosed alibi actually benefitted the appellant.

The Court substituted a conviction for simple assault on one count.

The sentence appeal was allowed, reducing the sentence to 7 years, as the trial judge erred in principle by denying pre-trial custody credit to punish the appellant for advancing a perjurious defence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of explosive substances with intent to endanger life or cause serious damage to property, and conspiracy to commit the same offence.

The main issue at trial was whether the appellant possessed the pipe bombs.

The trial judge instructed the jury on actual possession but failed to adequately explain the elements of constructive possession, particularly the requirement of control, in response to a jury question.

The Court of Appeal held that this omission was a fatal error, as constructive possession was a live issue.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by a summary conviction appeal court on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The respondent had been stopped for erratic driving, admitted to being high on drugs, and gave an ambiguous response when advised of his right to counsel.

He subsequently failed a roadside screening device test and a breathalyzer test.

The Court of Appeal restored the trial judge's conviction on the over 80 charge, finding no breach of the respondent's right to counsel, and conditionally stayed the impaired driving charge under the Kienapple principle.

The four appellants were convicted for their roles in the $3.1 million robbery of a Loomis armed truck.

The robbery was an 'inside job' masterminded by a Loomis guard and a police officer.

The Crown's case relied heavily on accomplice testimony, wiretap evidence, and cellular phone records.

On appeal, the appellants raised several issues, including the validity of wiretap authorizations, the failure to give a Carter instruction, and the impermissible use of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of three of the appellants against conviction, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias in the wiretap authorizations and no error in the omission of the Carter instruction due to defence counsel's tactical decisions.

However, the court allowed the appeal of one appellant, finding that the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to use a co-accused's hearsay statement to bolster an accomplice's credibility against him, and ordered a new trial for that appellant.

The court also reduced one appellant's sentence to account for pre-trial custody but upheld the compensation orders for the unrecovered stolen funds.

The appellant was convicted of distribution and possession of child pornography and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both the convictions and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, particularly given the lack of objections at trial.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, substituting a 14-month conditional sentence.

The Court noted the appellant's lack of prior record, his steady employment, the devastating impact the proceedings already had on his family, and the Supreme Court's guidance in Proulx that conditional sentences can achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The CAW filed displacement applications for bargaining units at three hospitals currently represented by SEIU.

SEIU objected that the applications were untimely under section 7(4) of the Labour Relations Act, arguing the collective agreements were for a term of less than three years because their effective date was determined by the date of an interest arbitration award under the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act (HLDAA).

The Board dismissed the objection, finding that the parties had agreed to a six-year term, which prevailed over the default terms in HLDAA.

Therefore, section 7(5) of the Act applied, and the applications were timely.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and threatening serious bodily harm arising from an encounter in which consent was the central issue.

The court held that similar fact evidence from a former partner should not have been admitted because its probative value was limited, the possibility of collusion or tainting materially weakened it, and its prejudicial effect was grave.

The court further held that the jury should have received a limiting instruction on other discreditable conduct evidence, and it identified error in the charge on prior consistent statements.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for widespread internet distribution of child pornography.

The sentencing judge had imposed a 90-day custodial term, substantially below the range he identified, primarily to avoid disrupting the respondent's academic progress.

Fresh evidence established that the sentencing judge had been materially misled about the respondent's university enrolment, academic achievements, and standing.

The Court of Appeal held there was no basis to depart from the 12- to 15-month range identified at first instance and varied the sentence to 12 months, crediting time already served.

The Crown appealed sentence for a very serious violent offence committed by a young first offender.

The Court of Appeal held that the six-month custodial sentence followed by probation was clearly inadequate and that appellate intervention was warranted.

Considering the respondent's completed incarceration, fragile psychological state, remorse, first-offender status, and the absence of any demonstrated ongoing danger to the community, the court concluded that a penitentiary term was not fit.

The sentence was varied to an 18-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, with probation to follow.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge wrongly excluded post-arrest utterances that were capable of supporting defence psychiatric evidence on cocaine intoxication and cocaine psychosis, and also erred in refusing to leave provocation with the jury because there was some evidence on which a properly instructed jury could find the partial defence.

The court rejected the argument that a later hospital statement was admissible to rebut recent fabrication, found no reversible error in the intoxication charge, and declined to interfere on motive.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered, making it unnecessary to address sentence.