Jessica Carrie Smith Joy

The appellant appealed his conviction for discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence of 7 years 4 months imprisonment.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of evidence that the appellant possessed a handgun at the time of arrest, three days after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the evidence of the handgun was highly relevant as it could connect the appellant to the shooting and corroborate witness testimony, and that there was no realistic possibility the jury engaged in improper propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following a guilty plea to possession of a prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had described an accidental blast from a sawed-off shotgun as narrowly missing the complainant as an aggravating factor, despite the appellant's qualification of the facts during his guilty plea that the blast was accidental.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give effect to the appellant's factual qualification and that this mis-description factored into the sentence imposed.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence on the possession of a prohibited firearm charge was reduced from five years and thirty-four days to four years, seven months and four days.

The balance of the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's decision not to formally self-instruct in accordance with the Vetrovec warning regarding the credibility of a co-accused who testified.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to conclude the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion.

The trial judge had properly considered the co-accused's status and motivation to fabricate, found her evidence honest and supported by corroborating evidence, and provided ample reasons for rejecting the defence theory of evidence planting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault following a jury trial.

The offences involved two separate incidents with the appellant's stepdaughter when she was 13 years old and approximately 18 months later.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that evidence concerning one incident could not be used to support a finding of guilt on charges relating to the other incident.

The jury charge was deficient and confusing, creating a risk of propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered, and an acquittal was entered on the sexual exploitation count as the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal and a stay of a six-year driving prohibition following conviction and sentencing to six months imprisonment plus two years probation.

The Crown opposed on the ground that the appeal was frivolous.

The motion judge found that while most grounds were frivolous, one alleged error of law regarding the trial judge's use of the appellant's failure to comment on a van in front of him to the 911 operator could not be characterized as frivolous at that stage.

The Crown did not rely on other grounds to oppose bail or the stay.

Bail and the stay were granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon (a hunting knife) contrary to s. 90 of the Criminal Code.

The knife was found under the front seat of his pickup truck during a search incident to arrest for an unrelated matter.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: that the verdict was unreasonable, that the trial judge failed to adequately warn the jury about circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge erred in answering a jury question about concealment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the verdict was reasonable, the jury instructions on circumstantial evidence were adequate, and the trial judge's response to the jury's question on concealment was proper and implicit in the overall jury charge.

The appellant was convicted of firearm-related offences for importing three guns into Canada in her vehicle.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on wilful blindness, concluding she deliberately chose not to inquire about the contents of her vehicle despite having her suspicion aroused.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the wilful blindness doctrine.

The court clarified that wilful blindness does not require knowledge of the specific nature of the contraband (guns versus other criminal items), only that the accused's suspicion was aroused and she deliberately chose not to inquire.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding no basis to interfere with the two-year less a day custodial sentence imposed.

Appeal from conviction for arson and possession of incendiary material.

The appellant, an unrepresented accused in custody, was convicted after a two-day trial.

The appeal raised issues concerning the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused and the trial judge's duty to assist such an accused.

The Crown failed to ensure the appellant received a substantial disclosure package of over 500 pages containing witness statement transcripts and fire investigation photographs, which was couriered to the custodial institution but not properly communicated to the appellant.

The trial judge failed to adequately inquire into disclosure issues when they became apparent during trial.

The court found both a breach of the right to disclosure and inadequate judicial assistance, resulting in impairment of the right to make full answer and defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's reliance on the complainant's willingness to undergo a sexual assault examination and prophylactic medications, the finding of painful intercourse, and alleged reversal of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, his consideration of medical evidence corroborating the complainant's account, or his application of the burden of proof.

The trial judge properly considered the complainant's physical injuries, demeanor, identification of the perpetrator, and the appellant's exclusive opportunity to commit the assault.

The Crown appealed a decision by Justice Maranger dismissing an application for certiorari and mandamus relating to a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling discharging the respondent on count five of an information.

The Crown had subsequently preferred a six-count indictment with count six being identical to the discharged count five.

The respondent's counsel conceded in oral argument that the indictment was properly preferred under s. 574.1(b) and indicated no intention to challenge it at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot but commented on the merits, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider all evidence relevant to the amended count five, which alleged a continuing sexual assault over a three-year period in Ontario and Quebec.

The offender was convicted of assault, threatening, and use of an imitation firearm while threatening passengers on a streetcar.

The Crown sought 18 months' custody, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 1 year.

The court considered the offender's youth, lack of prior record, mental health struggles, and background as a refugee from Rwanda.

The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 1 year in custody, less 8.5 months of pre-sentence credit, followed by 2 years of probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of physical and sexual abuse against his common-law wife, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and the reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly distinguished between counts where medical evidence did not support the allegations and the two counts where a witness's evidence confirmed the complainant's injuries.

The acceptance of this confirmatory evidence provided a reasoned explanation for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The accused was charged with assault, threatening, and use of an imitation firearm while threatening, stemming from incidents on two streetcars.

The accused harassed female passengers, elbowed one, spat at a male passenger, and brandished what appeared to be a gun.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming accidental contact, showing a cell phone holster instead of a weapon, and arguing self-defense.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony, finding it lacked an air of reality, and credited the corroborating civilian witnesses and security video.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

In a youth criminal appeal from convictions for historical sexual offences against a child relative, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third branch of W. (D.) in a case turning on credibility and reliability.

The court held that the trial judge did not adequately resolve significant inconsistencies between the complainant’s evidence, the mother’s evidence, and prior statements, and also failed to sufficiently explain important inferential findings central to guilt.

Although the court rejected the argument that expert evidence was required before the trial judge could refer to the complainant’s childhood behaviour as part of the credibility assessment, the cumulative deficiencies in the reasons constituted reversible error.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, misapprehended evidence, and improperly relied on the complainant's demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself on credibility, correctly concluded the appellant knew the complainant was not consenting, and made no reversible errors in assessing the evidence or demeanour.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the Court of Appeal previously quashed one of his two convictions for attempted possession of a firearm.

The appellant sought a reduction of his sentence to time served and a reduction of the victim fine surcharge.

The Crown agreed to the surcharge reduction but opposed reducing the three-year probation term.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge treated the attempt to possess two guns as an aggravating feature for the entire sentence, not just the custodial portion.

Consequently, the court varied the sentence for the remaining conviction by reducing the probation period from three years to two years and the victim fine surcharge from $400 to $200.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court of Justice decision granting certiorari, which quashed the appellant's discharge previously ordered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing entirely with the conclusion and analysis of the reviewing judge.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 76 months for robbery, dangerous driving, and other offences, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his mental health issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the length of the sentence, noting the horrific circumstances of the home invasion robbery and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to recalculate pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio and to vary a non-communication order, permitting the appellant to communicate with his co-accused partner upon her written consent after her sentence expires.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of attempting to possess a firearm without a licence.

The convictions were based entirely on text messages exchanged with a co-worker who was found smuggling firearms.

The Court of Appeal found that while one text message supported a reasonable inference of a prior agreement to obtain a firearm, the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's responses of 'Ok ok' to price quotes constituted agreements to purchase two specific firearms was unreasonable, especially since those specific firearms were not found in the co-worker's possession.

The appeal was allowed in part, and one of the two convictions was quashed.

The defense applied for a mistrial due to a mid-trial breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship between the accused and his former counsel, Uma Kancharla.

The breakdown stemmed from counsel's application for a psychiatric assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial, which the accused opposed.

The defense argued that counsel's actions prejudiced the accused and constituted a breach of privilege, effectively depriving him of counsel.

The court found that counsel acted properly in raising the fitness issue, disclosed minimal privileged information, and that the accused's rights were protected.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed, emphasizing that such declarations are a last resort.