Jessica Carrie Smith Joy

The appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to ten years' incarceration, appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on claims of ineffective trial counsel, including failures in cross-examination, calling witnesses, eliciting expert opinion, and exploring photo tampering, as well as suggestions of improper discussions and conflict of interest.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and in identifying primary sentencing objectives inconsistent with Gladue factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis for incompetence and noting the strong Crown case supported by forensic evidence.

It also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that even if the trial judge erred regarding remorse, it had no impact given other serious aggravating factors, and that deterrence and denunciation were appropriate objectives.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped interview without a Prosper warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant had not asserted his right to counsel, thereby negating the requirement for a Prosper warning.

The appellant, Jasfa Brown, appealed his convictions for firearm and drug offences and the imposed sentence.

He challenged the validity of his guilty plea and the amount of enhanced credit for harsh presentence custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the guilty plea.

Regarding the sentence, the court upheld the sentencing judge's discretion in awarding four months of Duncan credit, despite acknowledging it was at the lower end compared to recent case law concerning conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

However, leave to appeal the sentence was granted, and the $600 victim fine surcharge was set aside in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant, G.W., appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences, arguing that his work schedule and other commitments precluded him from being alone with the child victims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this defence, noting that the trial judge had found the appellant's credibility undermined by his attempts to minimize opportunities and that ample opportunity for the offences existed.

The appellate court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings, which were thoroughly grounded in the evidence and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on identity evidence grounds.

The trial judge had found the complainant's identification of the appellant to be reliable despite a minor discrepancy regarding facial hair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of identity evidence.

The trial judge had properly considered corroborative evidence, including a witness who confirmed details of the assailant's clothing, and had not placed undue weight on the complainant's confidence in her identification.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine following his third trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in treating a pre-trial agreement regarding the admission of trucking logs as governed by section 655 of the Criminal Code; (2) whether the trial judge erred in admitting an out-of-court statement by Mr. Jackson; and (3) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to provide a Bosley credit in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge correctly identified the appropriate range as four to six years, the imposition of a six-year sentence at the absolute top of the range was too harsh.

Considering significant mitigating factors including a history of sexual assault trauma and the appellant's limited prior criminal record, the court reduced the sentence to five years and set aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on multiple offences including theft, threatening, fail to stop, and break and enter.

The sentencing judge accepted the defence range of 18-24 months and imposed a sentence of 21 months after deducting pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge made a mathematical error in calculating the sentence and failed to expressly consider the appellant's Indigenous background.

The court reduced the total sentence to 17 months, including five months credit for pre-sentence custody, by reducing the sentences for theft and threats by four months on each count.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death.

The sentencing judge imposed a 10-year driving prohibition commencing on the date of sentencing rather than at the end of the period of imprisonment, which constituted an error under R. v. Lacasse.

The Court of Appeal corrected this error by applying the Lacasse formula: subtracting the 5-year term of imprisonment from the 10-year prohibition, leaving a 5-year prohibition to commence upon release.

However, the court exercised discretion to reduce the credit for the presentence driving prohibition period due to the appellant's breach of that condition, resulting in a final 3-year driving prohibition following release.

The victim surcharge was also set aside on consent.

The appellant appealed his sentence for human trafficking, procuring, and intimidation of a justice system participant.

The global sentence was nine years minus 1.5 years for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to account for a change in the sentencing range that occurred after the offences were committed, from two to seven years to four to eight years due to the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant contended that using the earlier range would have resulted in a one-year reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that regardless of the range used as a starting point, the ultimate sentence was fit given the egregious facts, including the long duration of offences, complete domination and control of the victim, high moral blameworthiness, use of physical violence, and serious psychological impact.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and breaking and entering in the context of a home invasion.

He received seven and a half years: four and a half years for robbery, four and a half years concurrent for break and enter, and three years consecutive for use of an imitation firearm, which was also consecutive to four remaining years from a prior bank robbery conviction.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that sentences should be concurrent, that mitigating factors were not credited, that the parity principle was not applied with co-accused, and a constitutional challenge that was not pursued.

The court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning or sentencing.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on firearms offences and a verbal threat charge.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the facts underlying the firearms offences were less serious than those in comparable cases establishing a 7 to 11 year sentencing range.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 7-year sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for the firearms and threat offences from 7 years to 6 years, resulting in a global sentence of 7 years.

Two appellants were convicted of sexual assault and related offences following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellants appealed their convictions on two grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in finding that text messages and photographs had not been properly authenticated and thus had no probative value, and (2) the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to photographs upon which one complainant was cross-examined.

The appellants sought to adduce fresh evidence from a computer forensic examiner regarding the authenticity and integrity of the electronic documents and from trial counsel regarding due diligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied an overly stringent authentication standard, misapprehended material evidence, and that the fresh evidence satisfied the conditions for admission on appeal.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a jury on June 17, 2016.

The grounds of appeal raised only questions of fact as found by the jury, with no questions of law raised.

The appellate court found that there was evidence to support the jury's verdict and identified no grounds that would justify appellate intervention.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed on June 10, 2015 by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that a SOIRA order was improperly made.

The appellant abandoned his appeal on all other grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to the extent of removing the SOIRA order.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sentenced to 36 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on Charter grounds and contested the trial judge's findings regarding his status as a person in authority, the sexual purpose of the conduct, and alleged collusion among complainants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the custodial sentence.

However, the sentence appeal was partially allowed, with the court setting aside a ten-year weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge that were inconsistent with the trial judge's findings.

A lifetime SOIRA order was upheld as appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement arising from an altercation with his domestic partner.

The appellant had pled guilty to other related charges.

The trial judge conducted a judge-alone trial and found the appellant guilty on both counts, imposing a global sentence of 3 years and 9 months, less 3 months for pre-sentence bail conditions.

The appellant appealed on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge provided detailed and comprehensive reasons addressing all concerns raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as fit, except the victim fine surcharge was set aside as unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence of two years' imprisonment plus one year of probation.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant abandoned his sentence appeal and focused on the conviction appeal.

The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in finding that he was a person in a position of trust within the meaning of s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, arguing that if this finding was incorrect, the complainant could have consented to the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the complainant's clear and uncontradicted testimony established a long-standing relationship of trust and dependency, which the appellant abused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a 17-year parole ineligibility period imposed upon his conviction for second degree murder.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to properly consider that authorities had removed him from medication that was helpful to him, which contributed to his anti-social attitude culminating in the murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge expressly addressed this issue and concluded that the mitigating factors were greatly outweighed by numerous and serious aggravating factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to bring a section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The adjournment request was made on the sentencing date, approximately three months after conviction, without supporting evidence or documentation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decision to deny the adjournment, concluding that the proposed application appeared designed to further delay proceedings.

The trial judge's reasons demonstrated consideration of the delay issue and a finding that any delay was attributable to the appellant with no resulting prejudice.