Gloria J. Epstein

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences based primarily on recognition evidence from a former romantic partner who identified him from a wanted poster.

The trial judge accepted this evidence while dismissing conflicting eyewitness descriptions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to critically analyze the problematic aspects of the recognition evidence and by ignoring exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The Court concluded the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment declaring that the franchise disclosure document they provided to the respondents was materially deficient, entitling the respondents to rescind the franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that summary judgment was appropriate and that the disclosure document's failure to include properly verified financial statements, a compliant certificate, and information about ongoing litigation amounted to a material deficiency equivalent to no disclosure at all.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and breach of trust.

He had used police resources to obtain information about the complainant and her boyfriend to facilitate his harassment of her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework to the appellant's inculpatory statement to the police.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach regarding the search warrant, and that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and held that the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant being the only man living in the apartment where the drugs were found in men's pants, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants agreed to purchase a home from the respondent for $2.9 million, but the transaction failed to close.

The trial judge found that the appellants repudiated the agreement and forfeited their $75,000 deposit, declining to grant relief from forfeiture despite the property later selling for more.

On appeal, the appellants argued the respondent had repudiated the contract by failing to close on the required date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the contract remained alive until the appellants chose not to proceed, and that retaining the deposit was not unconscionable.

The appellant sought to add the respondents as defendants to an action arising from a 2009 oil spill.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued she only discovered the specific conduct giving rise to the claim during a 2013 examination for discovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant's insurer had put the respondents on notice of a potential claim related to renovations as early as July 2010.

Therefore, the limitation period began to run no later than July 2010, and the 2014 motion to add them as defendants was statute-barred.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his housemate, who subsequently died of a heart attack due to severe underlying heart disease.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury's finding on causation was unreasonable because the medical expert could not definitively state the stab wounds contributed to the death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to consider non-medical evidence, including the circumstances of the altercation, which reasonably linked the extreme stress and blood loss from the attack to the victim's death.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault.

The trial judge had erred by failing to apply the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Despite this error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the sentence.

The Court noted the respondent's youth, the co-offender's sentence, and fresh evidence demonstrating substantial rehabilitative gains during his time in the reformatory system.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order recognizing and enforcing a $3,000,000 California judgment against him in Ontario.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal to argue the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence inadmissible as it did not meet the Palmer test and the motion judge's prior order refusing the evidence was not appealed.

The court found no reason to interfere with the motion judge's application of the Beals v. Saldanha test for recognizing foreign judgments.

The appellant pleaded guilty to production of marijuana and received an absolute discharge.

No mandatory firearms prohibition order was made, but police refused to return his firearms.

The appellant appealed to set aside his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown erroneously elected to proceed summarily on an exclusively indictable offence, and the trial judge failed to put the appellant to his election for mode of trial.

This failure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, which could not be cured on appeal.

The Court also clarified that a mandatory firearms prohibition does not take effect without a judicial order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant purchased a pre-construction commercial condominium unit and later discovered a large concrete pillar bisecting the glass storefront.

He refused to close and sought rescission, arguing the pillar was an undisclosed material change under the Condominium Act because the draft plans depicted the storefront as a straight line.

The trial judge found no material change, as the straight line did not represent construction materials.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the plans were schematic and not intended to provide structural details.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike the pleadings against CIBC for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a weapon and assaulting his adult son, and was sentenced to 25 days in jail.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were equivocal, involuntary, and uninformed due to stress, lack of sleep, and a misunderstanding of the appeal process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a proper plea comprehension inquiry, the appellant made unequivocal admissions of guilt, and his ability to make a conscious choice was not impaired.

The appellants' action was administratively dismissed for delay after their solicitors failed to receive a status notice sent to the wrong address.

The motion judge refused to set aside the dismissal, finding the appellants failed to adequately explain the delay or prove a lack of prejudice to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the action, holding that the motion judge failed to give sufficient weight to the non-receipt of the status notice and erred in his assessment of prejudice by ignoring the respondent's own passivity in the litigation.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her insurer for caregiver benefits and extra-contractual damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding it was statute-barred because it was commenced more than two years after the insurer's clear refusal to pay benefits.

The trial judge also found the appellant failed to establish entitlement to caregiver benefits beyond the 104-week period and dismissed her claims for bad faith and mental distress.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, including his evidentiary ruling that medical reports in a document brief not referred to by witnesses were inadmissible for the truth of their contents.

The appellant franchisor appealed a declaration that a clause in its franchise agreements requiring a general release as a condition of assignment was void and unenforceable under s. 11 of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the clause was not void ab initio, it was unenforceable because it required a release of statutory claims.

The Court declined to apply notional severance to read down the clause to apply only to non-statutory claims, finding that doing so would subvert the protective purpose of the Act and invite franchisors to draft overly broad releases.

The moving parties, comprising approximately 175 lenders, brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed motion for leave to appeal.

The original motion for leave was brought by the appellants regarding an Ontario Securities Commission decision that found they traded securities without registration and ordered disgorgement.

The lenders argued they were not given notice of the leave motion and had a right to be heard on the disgorgement remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to reopen, finding the lenders were not 'affected' by the order dismissing leave under rule 27.14, as the regulatory proceedings were not civil proceedings designed to compensate them directly.

Following the dismissal of the moving parties' motion for a rehearing of an appeal, the responding party sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $13,094.

The moving parties argued no costs should be awarded as the motion raised a novel issue that clarified the law.

The Court of Appeal held that costs should follow the event and awarded the responding party costs fixed at $4,000 all inclusive.

The appellant sub-tenant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $18,060.42 in realty tax arrears to the respondent Township.

The appellant argued that the sublease did not permit retroactive tax collection, that the Township lacked authority to sue for the arrears, and that the claim was barred by the doctrine of laches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sublease clearly made the appellant responsible for all applicable realty taxes, the Township sued properly under the contract, and the delay in assessment was caused by the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation rather than the Township.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from a 2009 fire.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the statement of claim was issued in September 2013, outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the discoverability principle did not assist the appellant as he was aware of his psychological difficulties by July 2011.