3 total
Mortgages held in trust are not garnishable debts and privileged law firm records cannot be compelled.
Judgment creditors brought a motion seeking production of a law firm’s books, trust records, bank statements, and documents relating to mortgages held in trust for the debtor, and asserted that the mortgage interests themselves were garnishable debts.
The court considered whether mortgage interests held in trust constituted “debts payable” under r. 60.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and whether the requested records could be compelled under r. 60.18(6).
The court held that a mortgage interest in land is not a liquidated money demand and therefore not a debt subject to garnishment until converted into money.
It further held that the broad documentary disclosure sought would breach solicitor-client privilege and no recognized exception justified disclosure.
The motion was dismissed.
Appeal to add defendants dismissed as statute-barred because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the claim years earlier.
The appellant sought to add the respondents as defendants to an action arising from a 2009 oil spill.
The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was statute-barred.
On appeal, the appellant argued she only discovered the specific conduct giving rise to the claim during a 2013 examination for discovery.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant's insurer had put the respondents on notice of a potential claim related to renovations as early as July 2010.
Therefore, the limitation period began to run no later than July 2010, and the 2014 motion to add them as defendants was statute-barred.
Extension of time to appeal granted; motion judge erred in rejecting solicitor's hearsay affidavit.
The moving parties sought a review of a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in rejecting hearsay evidence from the moving parties' solicitor regarding their intention to appeal.
Given the short delay, the lack of prejudice to the respondent, and the arguable merit of the proposed appeal, the Court set aside the motion judge's order and granted the extension of time.
