F. Bruce Fitzpatrick

The applicant co-operative sought a writ of possession to evict the respondent, a member with a physical disability, for failing to keep her unit clean, damaging the unit, and allowing an unauthorized person to reside there.

The respondent argued the eviction violated her rights under the Human Rights Code and that the co-operative failed to accommodate her disability.

The court found no prima facie case of discrimination, noting the cleanliness issues stemmed from the respondent's choice to keep pets, not her disability.

The court upheld the eviction but adjourned the final order to allow the respondent time to find suitable alternative housing, imposing interim conditions including the removal of her pets.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice declining jurisdiction to hear a reference under s. 74 of the Firearms Act concerning an alleged revocation of a firearm registration certificate.

The lower court determined that a letter from the Registrar advising that a rifle’s bull‑pup stock was a prohibited device did not constitute a revocation.

The appellant argued that the court erred by deciding jurisdiction without permitting him to call evidence, contrary to s. 75(2) of the Act, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Superior Court held that once the hearing commenced the statute required the judge to hear all relevant evidence from both parties.

Because the lower court made factual findings based only on the Registrar’s evidence while refusing the appellant’s witnesses, the process violated natural justice and constituted an error of law.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.

Sentencing decision following a guilty plea to manslaughter arising from a fatal altercation between two intoxicated individuals in a wooded area.

The victim died from a crush injury to the neck caused by prolonged pressure, resulting in asphyxia.

The court considered extensive Gladue factors, including the offender’s Indigenous background, severe childhood trauma, poverty, substance abuse, cognitive difficulties, and the broader effects of colonialism and residential schools.

Aggravating factors included the violent nature of the death, the vulnerability of the elderly victim, and the offender’s prior record for violent offences.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender’s personal circumstances and prospects for rehabilitation, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

The moving defendants sought an equitable set-off between interim costs orders arising from two unrelated proceedings: a shareholder oppression action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and separate matrimonial litigation.

They argued that costs they owed to five plaintiffs in the corporate dispute should be offset against costs owed by one plaintiff to one defendant in the matrimonial matter.

The court held that equitable set-off requires a close connection between the claims and generally mutuality of parties.

Because the debts arose from entirely different proceedings involving different parties, and lacked any sufficient nexus, the test from Holt v. Telford was not satisfied.

The court also found no procedural authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure to grant such relief on an interim motion.

The applicant, a 79-year-old man charged with trafficking a large quantity of oxycodone, sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing judge found the Justice of the Peace erred in principle by failing to analyze the proposed release plan, allowing for a de novo review.

However, the judge ultimately concluded that detention remained justified on both primary and secondary grounds, citing the applicant's lack of ties to the jurisdiction, his overseas connections, the inadequacy of the proposed surety, and the high risk of continuing criminal activity associated with lucrative drug trafficking.

The accused was charged with making and possessing child pornography.

Police detained the accused for bizarre behavior and subsequently entered his home without a warrant, despite his explicit instructions not to do so, claiming exigent circumstances.

During the search, police discovered child pornography.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence.

The court found that the warrantless search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights, as there was no genuine urgency or threat to public safety justifying the entry.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, concluding that the serious Charter-infringing conduct outweighed the reliability of the evidence.

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion to strike portions of the statement of claim alleging intentional interference with economic relations in a defamation action.

They argued the plaintiffs failed to plead the constituent elements of the tort, including unlawful means directed at a third party and resulting economic loss.

The court held that the pleadings, read generously and together with the particulars provided, sufficiently alleged the elements of the tort, including allegations of intimidation and pressure directed at customers.

It was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail.

The motion to strike was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in law in applying the mens rea principles governing impairment caused by prescription medication.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding warning labels on medications and her awareness of the medications’ effects.

Applying the principles from R. v. King, the court held that the presumption that impairment is voluntarily induced is assessed using an objective test.

The court found the trial judge properly considered the warning labels and the appellant’s acknowledgment that she felt unusually tired before driving.

The findings of fact were reasonably supported by the evidence and disclosed no legal error.

The applicant mother brought a motion to enforce a settlement in a custody and access dispute, alleging she accepted the respondent father's August 9th offer to settle.

The acceptance was faxed at 4:57 p.m. on August 22nd, while the respondent faxed a withdrawal of the offer at 5:05 p.m. the same day.

The court held that under the Family Law Rules, the faxed acceptance after 4:00 p.m. was not effective until the next day, meaning the offer was validly withdrawn before acceptance.

The court also noted it would have exercised its discretion to refuse to enforce the settlement in the best interests of the children, as the parties were not of a common mind and the offer remained open only due to counsel's oversight during mid-trial mediation.

The payor father brought a motion to change a 2004 order, seeking to terminate his spousal and child support obligations after voluntarily leaving his employment to start his own business.

The court treated the matter as a trial at first instance.

Finding that the payor was intentionally under-employed, the court imputed his income at $80,000 based on his previous earnings.

The court ordered the payor to continue paying child support for the remaining eligible child and ongoing spousal support of $750 monthly, while dismissing historical claims for section 7 expenses.

The applicant sought child support, including section 7 expenses, for two special needs children.

One child resided full-time in a group home, while the other resided with the applicant.

The court found that the parties' 2006 Separation Agreement contained 'special provisions' that benefited the children, allowing a deviation from the Child Support Guidelines.

The respondent was ordered to pay $600 monthly and 50% of section 7 expenses as per the agreement.

The court declined to order contribution for stem cell treatments outside Canada, finding them medically unsupported and financially unreasonable for the parties.

The respondent's claim for property sale proceeds was dismissed as statute-barred.

The applicant brought a motion for a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 against thirteen properties alleged to be proceeds of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking and money laundering.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing there were no reasonable and probable grounds, that the applicant failed to make full and frank disclosure on the initial ex parte motion, and that continuation of the order was not in the interests of justice.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds to believe that eight of the properties were acquired with proceeds of crime due to unexplained funding gaps, but discharged the order for five properties where legitimate funding sources were demonstrated.

The court dismissed the non-disclosure arguments and found that continuing the preservation order for the eight properties was not clearly against the interests of justice.

The applicant proceeded by way of an uncontested family law trial seeking divorce, spousal support, child support for an adult child, equalization of net family property, and sale of the matrimonial home.

The court attributed annual income of $125,000 to the respondent based on partial financial disclosure.

The court held that the parties’ adult child, who struggled with drug addiction, was not a “child of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act because the evidence did not establish that his condition prevented him from withdrawing from parental charge or obtaining the necessaries of life.

Spousal support was awarded at $2,313 per month retroactive to October 2011, and equalization of $124,622.50 was ordered through division of the respondent’s pension.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold with the respondent’s share charged for spousal support arrears.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice, along with several additional forms of relief including declarations regarding prior procedural rulings, removal of opposing counsel, and dismissal of cost orders.

The court held that several requested remedies were outside its jurisdiction or unsupported in fact or law.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate either a conflicting authority or a serious doubt about the correctness of the underlying order.

The authorities cited by the moving party were largely irrelevant to the narrow test governing leave to appeal interlocutory orders.

Leave to appeal was refused and the motion dismissed with costs.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and breaches of probation following an incident in an apartment building.

The court relied on video surveillance, 911 call recordings, and witness testimony to assess credibility under the W.(D.) framework.

The court found the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and failing to keep the peace, but acquitted him of sexual assault and consuming alcohol due to reasonable doubt arising from the complainant's intoxication and lack of corroboration.

The defendants brought a motion challenging the continuation of an injunction that had been granted on an ex parte basis prohibiting them from soliciting or doing business with the plaintiff company's customers.

The court considered whether the plaintiffs satisfied their duty of full and frank disclosure required on ex parte motions under Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found material non‑disclosure, including failure to disclose that the parties had previously merged their businesses and operated together for approximately two years, failure to explain material terms of an employment agreement containing restrictive covenants that had expired, and failure to disclose key details contained in an attached witness statement.

The court held that merely attaching exhibits without highlighting their material contents in the affidavit did not satisfy the disclosure obligation.

Because the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, the injunction previously granted was dissolved.

The moving party sought to vary a prior spousal support order by terminating or reducing his ongoing support obligation.

The court considered the parties’ litigation history, the recipient spouse’s employment efforts, medical evidence relating to fibromyalgia, and the objectives of spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The court found that the recipient spouse had made minimal and insufficiently diligent efforts to become self‑sufficient and had unreasonably restricted the scope of her job search.

Income was imputed to the recipient spouse and the payor’s income was fixed based on his employment earnings.

Spousal support was reduced to $1,081 per month effective January 1, 2013, and ordered to terminate on December 31, 2014.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault and common assault arising from four alleged incidents involving a former intimate partner.

The complainant testified that the assaults occurred in 2006 and were reported to police in 2011 after a custody dispute began.

Applying the credibility framework from W.(D.), the court found reasonable doubt regarding the first three alleged incidents due to inconsistencies and the delayed reporting despite earlier contact with police about another assault.

However, the court accepted the complainant’s testimony regarding a fourth incident involving sexual assault and a threat to cause bodily harm.

The accused was acquitted on the first five counts but convicted on counts relating to the final incident.

The defendant moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiffs were non-residents of Ontario and allegedly lacked assets in the jurisdiction.

The court found the claim—alleging an improvident sale of property at auction for substantially less than a prior offer and appraised value—was not frivolous or vexatious.

Although the plaintiffs asserted that assets in Texas owned through a corporation were sufficient to satisfy any costs award, the court concluded that enforcement against those assets would not be straightforward because the property was owned by a non-resident corporation rather than the plaintiffs directly.

The court therefore ordered security for costs with conditions designed to preserve the corporate shares and underlying property as potential security for any future costs award.

The accused applied for a review of a detention order under section 520 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with instructing a criminal organization and drug trafficking offences, with the Crown's case relying heavily on evidence obtained from an encrypted mobile device.

The reviewing judge found the Justice of the Peace committed errors in principle by making logically inconsistent findings between the primary and secondary grounds, and by failing to adequately consider the impact of a section 8 Charter argument on the strength of the Crown's case.

Furthermore, late disclosure revealing that police searched the device without a warrant and failed to obtain an extension for its detention constituted a material change in circumstances.

The detention order was vacated and the accused was released on strict conditions with substantial sureties.