Erin Dann

The appellant, who had been detained in psychiatric facilities since 1984, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant was transferred to a new facility where his new treatment team implemented a successful non-pharmacological treatment program.

As no anti-psychotic medication was being proposed or anticipated, the amicus curiae suggested the appeal was moot.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant would suffer no prejudice as the statutory six-month bar for a new review application had expired, and a material change in circumstances would justify leave for a new application regardless.

The appeal was quashed as moot.

The appellants, two drug dealers, were convicted of first-degree murder after killing a customer who had ripped them off.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on constructive first-degree murder, the application of the W. (D.) formula, and the Vetrovec caution.

One appellant also argued the trial judge failed to instruct on the defence of accident and the evidentiary value of an unaccepted guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was unrepresented, pleaded guilty to theft, threatening to use a weapon, and uttering a death threat.

Over his objection, the Crown requested an assessment for criminal responsibility.

The trial judge held a summary hearing, admitted the assessment report, and entered not criminally responsible (NCR) verdicts for the assault and threat charges without informing the appellant of his procedural rights.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to ensure the unrepresented appellant understood his rights to testify, call evidence, or cross-examine the report's author, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

A new trial was ordered.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions permitting community living.

The appellant argued that the Board’s finding of significant risk to the safety of the community was unsupported by the evidence and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the case was close, the evidence of the treating psychiatrist concerning the risk of a return to fire-setting and threatening behaviour supported the Board’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at an apartment where firearms and drugs were found, arguing inadequate disclosure and failure to comply with the Criminal Code requirements for a nighttime search.

The court found the warrant presumptively invalid due to the failure to request a nighttime search under s. 488 of the Criminal Code.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the evidence, concluding the breach was technical, had no practical impact on the applicants' rights, and excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during a drug deal.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made errors in instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal found two significant errors: failing to provide a limiting instruction on the hearsay portion of a witness's police statement, and improperly instructing the jury that post-offence conduct could be considered in determining the appellant's state of mind for murder versus manslaughter.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

In a pair of extradition appeals, the Court held that surrender of Canadian citizens to the United States on terrorism-related charges did not unjustifiably infringe mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court reaffirmed that extradition generally constitutes a marginal limitation on the right to remain in Canada and that ministerial balancing under the established multi-factor framework attracts substantial deference.

It rejected arguments that weak foreign jurisdiction or feasible domestic prosecution should be near-dispositive limits on surrender.

The Court also held that procedural fairness did not require the Minister to obtain and disclose prosecutorial assessments about whether to proceed domestically.

The surrender decisions were found reasonable on the record, and both appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a 2009 finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) to which she had consented.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not establish she failed to appreciate the nature and quality of her acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the applicant failed to adequately explain the nearly four-year delay and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as there was sufficient evidence from the psychiatric assessment and surrounding circumstances to support the NCRMD finding.

The United States sought the extradition of two Aboriginal Canadians to face drug trafficking charges.

The applicants faced significantly harsher sentences in the US than they would in Canada, and the US system does not consider Aboriginal status in sentencing.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding that the Gladue principles were not relevant to their s. 6(1) Charter mobility rights and that surrender would not shock the conscience under s. 7.

The Court of Appeal set aside the surrender orders, holding that the Minister erred in law by failing to properly apply the Gladue principles to the s. 7 analysis and by failing to conduct an independent Cotroni analysis under s. 6(1).

The Court found that surrendering the applicants to face crushing sentences without consideration of their Aboriginal background would violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence to argue his guilty plea was involuntary because a co-accused allegedly threatened to kill him if he did not plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal, finding the appellant's claims lacked credibility and were contradicted by the record, including his own letter of apology and the withdrawal of charges against the co-accused.

The applicant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR), was granted an absolute discharge by the Ontario Review Board.

The Crown appealed, which automatically suspended the absolute discharge under s. 672.75 of the Criminal Code, reverting the applicant to a conditional discharge.

The applicant brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the automatic suspension.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the motion and found that s. 672.75 violates ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter by depriving the NCR accused of liberty without due process and arbitrarily detaining them.

The violations were not saved by s. 1.

The court declared the offending words in s. 672.75 of no force and effect, suspended for 12 months.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that granted the respondent an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the Board failed to properly assess the risk of psychological harm to the public, misapprehended evidence, and exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision that the respondent was not a significant threat to the public was reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and failing to stop for police.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a sentence of 10 months less time in custody.

The sentencing judge purported to accept the joint submission but refused to credit the appellant's 84 days of pre-sentence custody, effectively imposing a longer sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred by rejecting the joint submission without finding that it was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 84 days.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing heroin, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately put the theory of the defence to the jury and erred in responding to a jury request for transcripts of closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal held that the single issue of knowledge was straightforward and the jury understood the defence's position.

Furthermore, although the trial judge initially erred by telling the jury they could not have transcripts without offering to play the audio, he corrected this before taking the verdict, and the jury declined to hear the audio.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of post-offence conduct and in her instructions to the jury regarding its use.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the evidence was relevant and probative, and the jury charge properly alerted the jury to the limited use of the evidence.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition on charges of conspiracy and trafficking in a narcotic.

He argued there was no evidence he was a party to the conspiracy charge, though he did not resist committal on the trafficking charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior relationship among the alleged conspirators and the frequency of transactions provided a sufficient basis for a trier of fact to reasonably infer the appellant was a party to an ongoing conspiracy.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury regarding the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant admitted to causing the victim's death but claimed he lacked the intent for murder due to intoxication and the minimal force used.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to link the 'common sense inference' of intent to the specific manner of death (venal asphyxiation) and by improperly applying the thin skull principle to the issue of intent rather than causation.

These errors compromised the defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition to stand trial on terrorism charges for his alleged role in attempting to purchase weapons for the LTTE.

The appellant appealed his committal order and applied for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code violated his Charter rights to freedom of expression and fundamental justice (overbreadth).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding that the provisions were not unconstitutionally overbroad, the test for committal was met, and the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The Crown appealed the global sentence of seven years imposed on the respondent for attempted murder, threatening death, and breach of probation.

The respondent had a history of domestic violence against the complainant and was on probation at the time of the vicious stabbing attack.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the aggravating factors, including the respondent's failure to accept responsibility.

The appeal was allowed, and the global sentence was increased to nine years (eight and a half years for attempted murder and six months consecutive for breach of probation), less credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed her conviction for the second-degree murder of her partner's two-year-old child.

She argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on expert pathological evidence regarding blunt force trauma and on her post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly and accurately dealt with the expert evidence and properly instructed the jury that if they accepted the appellant's innocent explanation for her post-offence lies, that conduct could not be used as circumstantial evidence of guilt.