Erin Dann

The appellant, convicted of five counts of robbery, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in admitting a police officer's lay opinion evidence identifying the appellant's shoes in video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal issues straightforward enough to be argued as an inmate appeal and noting that case law permits such lay opinion evidence.

The appellant, who was found unfit to stand trial due to an intellectual disability, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to the public and in failing to impose the least onerous disposition, specifically a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding on significant threat as reasonable, but agreed the Board erred by failing to consider whether a conditional discharge could ensure public safety.

The matter was remitted to the Review Board to consider a conditional discharge.

The appellant, a 21-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle accident.

He appealed his convictions and his four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her conclusion that the appellant's driving constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence for a youthful first offender, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant was convicted of personation and obstructing a peace officer after fleeing a traffic stop where he presented another person's expired driver's licence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize the police officer's eyewitness identification and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

He also appealed his 12-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments were sound, and the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record and prior related convictions.

The appellant appealed her fraud conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The appellant, a bookkeeper, admitted to cashing company cheques and making electronic transfers to herself, but claimed she did so at the complainant's behest and gave him the cash.

A credible defence witness testified to seeing the appellant hand cash to the complainant after cashing a cheque.

The trial judge failed to address this critical exculpatory evidence in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal held this failure constituted a misapprehension of evidence amounting to an error in law, rendering the verdict unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her first-degree murder convictions for the deaths of her two young daughters.

At trial, she raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, arguing she believed killing her children was an altruistic act to save them.

The jury rejected the defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the concept of 'moral wrongfulness' and in his treatment of the expert psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding the instructions properly focused on the appellant's capacity to know her acts were morally wrong by societal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought an interlocutory appeal under s. 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act challenging the trial judge's orders under s. 37 and s. 37.3 regarding the disclosure of information and the conduct of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that evidentiary rulings are properly made by trial judges and that s. 37 orders target disclosure of specific information, often to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The matter was remitted to the trial court for the continuation of the trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

He argued that he was arbitrarily detained, that identification evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and that the trial judge erred in assessing police identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, and that the identification evidence was properly assessed.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, increasing the pre-trial custody credit from 1.5:1 to 2:1 because the offences preceded the Criminal Code amendments limiting such credit, resulting in a reduced net sentence.

The appellants, two drug dealers, were convicted of first-degree murder after killing a customer who had ripped them off.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on constructive first-degree murder, the application of the W. (D.) formula, and the Vetrovec caution.

One appellant also argued the trial judge failed to instruct on the defence of accident and the evidentiary value of an unaccepted guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was unrepresented, pleaded guilty to theft, threatening to use a weapon, and uttering a death threat.

Over his objection, the Crown requested an assessment for criminal responsibility.

The trial judge held a summary hearing, admitted the assessment report, and entered not criminally responsible (NCR) verdicts for the assault and threat charges without informing the appellant of his procedural rights.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to ensure the unrepresented appellant understood his rights to testify, call evidence, or cross-examine the report's author, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

A new trial was ordered.

The applicants challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at an apartment where firearms and drugs were found, arguing inadequate disclosure and failure to comply with the Criminal Code requirements for a nighttime search.

The court found the warrant presumptively invalid due to the failure to request a nighttime search under s. 488 of the Criminal Code.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the evidence, concluding the breach was technical, had no practical impact on the applicants' rights, and excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during a drug deal.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made errors in instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal found two significant errors: failing to provide a limiting instruction on the hearsay portion of a witness's police statement, and improperly instructing the jury that post-offence conduct could be considered in determining the appellant's state of mind for murder versus manslaughter.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

In a pair of extradition appeals, the Court held that surrender of Canadian citizens to the United States on terrorism-related charges did not unjustifiably infringe mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court reaffirmed that extradition generally constitutes a marginal limitation on the right to remain in Canada and that ministerial balancing under the established multi-factor framework attracts substantial deference.

It rejected arguments that weak foreign jurisdiction or feasible domestic prosecution should be near-dispositive limits on surrender.

The Court also held that procedural fairness did not require the Minister to obtain and disclose prosecutorial assessments about whether to proceed domestically.

The surrender decisions were found reasonable on the record, and both appeals were dismissed.