Erin Dann

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assault, and uttering a threat to cause death against his domestic partner, receiving a global sentence of seven years.

He appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the appellant's silence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by not considering Gladue principles, as fresh evidence showed the appellant had Aboriginal heritage.

However, after conducting its own sentencing analysis applying Gladue principles, the Court concluded the seven-year sentence remained fit given the brutal nature of the domestic violence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not awarding 1.5-to-1 credit for pre-trial custody and challenging a section 161 order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the pre-trial custody ground, finding the reduced credit was justified because the appellant reoffended while on release pending trial.

The court reserved its decision on the section 161 order pending a Supreme Court of Canada ruling on its constitutionality.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault, child luring, and other offences, and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment along with prohibition orders under ss. 161(1)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the parties agreed that the s. 161(1)(c) order must be replaced with the former version of the provision, following the Supreme Court's ruling in R. v. K.R.J. regarding retrospective operation.

The appellant also challenged the fitness of the s. 161(1)(d) order, which imposed a 20-year blanket ban on Internet use and device ownership.

The Court of Appeal found the blanket prohibition demonstrably unfit and overbroad, noting it would unreasonably hinder rehabilitation and employment.

The court varied the order to specifically prohibit accessing illegal content and participating in social networks or chat rooms.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats and failing to comply with probation, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board imposing a detention order with community living privileges.

He argued the ORB applied the wrong legal test and should have granted a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB applied the correct test and reasonably concluded that a detention order was necessary to manage the appellant's risk, ensure medication compliance, and allow for expeditious return to the hospital if his condition decompensated.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that evidence should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The appellant was detained at a store for 40 minutes without being advised of her right to counsel, after which police searched her vehicle, arrested her, and found fentanyl.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in requiring a causal connection for the s. 10(b) breach and found an additional s. 9 breach for arbitrary detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded that the serious police conduct and substantial impact on the appellant's rights warranted exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

He argued the Board failed to inquire into the hospital's diagnostic assessment and erred by not transferring him to a less secure facility closer to his family in the Greater Toronto Area.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no treatment impasse that required inquiry and concluding the Board reasonably found the secure environment at Waypoint was necessary to manage the appellant's risk to public safety.

The applicant sought to set aside a 2008 order dismissing his conviction and sentence appeals as abandoned.

He claimed he never instructed his former appeal counsel to abandon the appeal, while counsel maintained he received clear instructions to do so.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the surrounding circumstances, including telephone records, the applicant's subsequent conduct, and counsel's vague recollection and lack of written confirmation.

The Court concluded the applicant did not instruct counsel to abandon the appeal and that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the appeal.

The appellant, convicted of five counts of robbery, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in admitting a police officer's lay opinion evidence identifying the appellant's shoes in video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal issues straightforward enough to be argued as an inmate appeal and noting that case law permits such lay opinion evidence.

The appellant, who was found unfit to stand trial due to an intellectual disability, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to the public and in failing to impose the least onerous disposition, specifically a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding on significant threat as reasonable, but agreed the Board erred by failing to consider whether a conditional discharge could ensure public safety.

The matter was remitted to the Review Board to consider a conditional discharge.

The appellant, a 21-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle accident.

He appealed his convictions and his four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her conclusion that the appellant's driving constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence for a youthful first offender, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant was convicted of personation and obstructing a peace officer after fleeing a traffic stop where he presented another person's expired driver's licence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize the police officer's eyewitness identification and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

He also appealed his 12-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments were sound, and the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record and prior related convictions.

The appellant appealed her fraud conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The appellant, a bookkeeper, admitted to cashing company cheques and making electronic transfers to herself, but claimed she did so at the complainant's behest and gave him the cash.

A credible defence witness testified to seeing the appellant hand cash to the complainant after cashing a cheque.

The trial judge failed to address this critical exculpatory evidence in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal held this failure constituted a misapprehension of evidence amounting to an error in law, rendering the verdict unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her first-degree murder convictions for the deaths of her two young daughters.

At trial, she raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, arguing she believed killing her children was an altruistic act to save them.

The jury rejected the defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the concept of 'moral wrongfulness' and in his treatment of the expert psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding the instructions properly focused on the appellant's capacity to know her acts were morally wrong by societal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought an interlocutory appeal under s. 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act challenging the trial judge's orders under s. 37 and s. 37.3 regarding the disclosure of information and the conduct of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that evidentiary rulings are properly made by trial judges and that s. 37 orders target disclosure of specific information, often to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The matter was remitted to the trial court for the continuation of the trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal and appealed a summary conviction appeal decision upholding a finding that he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the record supported the order directing an NCR assessment under ss. 672.11(b) and 672.12(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, leave should not be granted on that issue.

Leave was granted on the issue of the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons for the NCR finding.

Applying the framework for adequacy of reasons in criminal cases, the court concluded the reasons did not disclose whether the trial judge found incapacity under the relevant branch of s. 16 or how the mental disorder rendered the appellant incapable of knowing the breach was wrong.

The NCR finding was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

He argued that he was arbitrarily detained, that identification evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and that the trial judge erred in assessing police identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, and that the identification evidence was properly assessed.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, increasing the pre-trial custody credit from 1.5:1 to 2:1 because the offences preceded the Criminal Code amendments limiting such credit, resulting in a reduced net sentence.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to extend the suspension of a declaration of invalidity to September 30, 2014.

The extension was requested because legislation responding to the court's previous decision was still proceeding through parliament.

As the request was reasonable and consented to by all parties and the amicus curiae, the Court of Appeal granted the motion.

The Crown appealed sentence in a criminal matter involving serious conduct in a domestic context.

The Court of Appeal held that substantial deference was owed to the sentencing judge and rejected submissions that denunciation and deterrence had been insufficiently emphasized or that rehabilitation had been overemphasized.

The court further held that the sentence, while perhaps at the low end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition.

The appellant challenged findings related to the index offences and the driving prohibition contained in the Board’s current order.

The Court of Appeal held it had no authority on this appeal to revisit the facts underlying the index offences and found the driving prohibition appropriate in light of the offence circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had been detained in psychiatric facilities since 1984, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant was transferred to a new facility where his new treatment team implemented a successful non-pharmacological treatment program.

As no anti-psychotic medication was being proposed or anticipated, the amicus curiae suggested the appeal was moot.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant would suffer no prejudice as the statutory six-month bar for a new review application had expired, and a material change in circumstances would justify leave for a new application regardless.

The appeal was quashed as moot.