Dirk Derstine

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of discharging a firearm with intent, arising from a shooting outside a Toronto nightclub.

The Crown sought 20 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families and the community, the aggravating factor of using a loaded handgun in a crowded public place, and the mitigating factors of the offender's youth and lack of a prior criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 20 years for the murders, and concurrent seven-year sentences for the other offences.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after a retrial.

He appealed his conviction on three grounds: the application judge erred by dismissing the application to admit hearsay for a third-party suspect, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient corrective instruction regarding the Crown’s prejudicial closing argument, and the trial judge erred by charging the jury on party liability without factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's hearsay ruling, the trial judge's handling of the Crown's closing, or the party liability instruction, which was found to have an evidentiary basis and was akin to co-principal liability.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the party liability issue, arguing insufficient evidentiary foundation and inadequate jury instructions.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for his role in a fatal shooting.

The court found that the offender was aware of the presence of a firearm and was a party to the offence under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, against mitigating factors, such as harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and rehabilitative potential, the court determined an appropriate sentence of 113.5 months.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, the offender was sentenced to 58 months' imprisonment.

The defendant brought a motion for directions on where and before whom he could bring a bail application.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld his convictions but overturned his dangerous offender designation, directing a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.

Because no judge had yet been assigned to the new sentencing hearing, the defendant sought clarity on bail jurisdiction.

The Superior Court held that under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, since the defendant was currently being tried before 'a court' but no specific judge was conducting the trial, jurisdiction for the bail application rested with the Superior Court of Justice generally until a specific judge was assigned.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused applied for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and security video, to place the accused at the scene of the shooting or assisting the shooters.

The court dismissed the directed verdict applications, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court also ruled on several jury charge issues, declining to instruct the jury on co-principal liability, abetting, or the common unlawful purpose doctrine for second degree murder, and opting to provide an expanded instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their trial.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing for the traditional placement in the dock due to security concerns and to allow the jury a better view for identification purposes.

The court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and concluded that there is no presumption regarding an accused's placement.

Applying a case-by-case analysis based on fair trial interests and courtroom security, the court found that sitting at counsel table enhances communication with counsel and avoids the risk of prejudice associated with the dock.

Given the accused's good behaviour during prior court appearances and the lack of specific security risks, the motion was granted.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, applied to sever their trial from a co-accused who had recently been extradited to Canada and was unready for the scheduled trial.

The applicants had been awaiting trial for nearly 30 months and had caused no delay.

The Crown opposed severance, citing the societal interest in a joint trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicants' right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter outweighed the public interest in a joint trial, especially given the Crown's duty to mitigate delay caused by discrete events like extradition.

Michael MacKinnon was found guilty of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a knife, the victims being unarmed, the severe loss to the deceased's family, and the life-threatening injuries to the aggravated assault victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's pro-social life for 20 years, strong family support, and a diagnosis of PTSD stemming from childhood trauma and a past shooting incident.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that the dated criminal record was an aggravating factor and that the mental health issues should be given limited weight.

A total sentence of 9 years imprisonment was imposed, with 3 years concurrent for aggravated assault, after accounting for 69 months (5 years and 9 months) credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 39 months (3 years and 3 months) remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The appellant, Pierre Aragon, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possessing a weapon, and uttering a threat, and his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The convictions stemmed from a 2012 beating of Fernando Fernandes, a Loners Motorcycle Club associate, by members of a rival group.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the recognition evidence and extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, concluding that the sentencing judge erred in identifying aggravating factors and failed to provide sufficient reasons for several rulings, including the decision to recall witnesses and the constitutional challenge.

The sentence was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered before a different judge.

In a mid-trial ruling during a murder jury trial, the court permitted the Crown to expand its cross-examination of the accused after finding a material change in circumstances from an earlier pre-trial admissibility ruling.

The accused's testimony introduced a new issue by minimizing his possession of a revolver allegedly used in the homicide and claiming only temporary, reluctant possession on behalf of his brother.

Applying the principles governing cross-examination of an accused, the court held that questioning about the second handgun and cash depicted in edited cell phone photographs was directly relevant to testing the truthfulness of that account and had substantial probative value.

The court found the resulting prejudice manageable through a strong limiting instruction, but prohibited use of the photographs themselves before the jury.

During a trial for murder and attempted murder, the Crown and defence brought evidentiary applications.

The Crown sought to admit hearsay statements made by the surviving victim to first responders shortly after being stabbed.

The court admitted the statements under the spontaneous utterance exception.

The defence sought to admit evidence of the deceased victim's disposition to instigate confrontations when intoxicated, pursuant to Scopelliti.

The court admitted the disposition evidence, finding it relevant to the issue of who instigated the confrontation, but also permitted the Crown to adduce evidence of the accused's prior robbery conviction in response.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing incident outside a bar.

The accused raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder, arguing he experienced a dissociative episode triggered by post-traumatic stress disorder after hearing a threat to shoot.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding the accused's evidence of dissociation and lack of memory lacked credibility, particularly given his organized post-offence conduct.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the specific intent required for murder and attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the suddenness of the attack, the single stab wounds, and the accused's intoxication and PTSD.

The accused was found not guilty of the charged offences but guilty of the included offences of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit recently disclosed wiretap intercepts as post-offence conduct.

The intercepts allegedly captured the accused attempting to influence co-accused and witnesses to testify under the protection of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the evidence had probative value regarding consciousness of guilt, it was outweighed by significant prejudicial effects, including the need for complex jury instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception, the Canada Evidence Act, solicitor-client privilege, and bad character reasoning.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

Following a wiretap prosecution involving multiple accused, the court considered conspiracy, firearms trafficking by offer, drug trafficking conspiracy, robbery conspiracy, and criminal organization allegations arising from intercepted jail and street communications.

The court acquitted on the firearm conspiracy counts after finding a reasonable doubt whether one accused merely pretended to agree, but convicted that accused of offering to transfer a firearm because he made a genuine-looking offer perceived as such by the recipient.

A co-accused's guilty plea to conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance was narrowed on the facts to cocaine rather than heroin.

The court rejected the robbery conspiracy and criminal organization allegations, holding the evidence showed loosely connected criminal conduct and friendship networks rather than the structure, continuity, and cohesion required for a criminal organization.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias, unconscious bias, and attitudes toward illegal firearms possession.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan, the court revised its jury selection procedures, determining that the trial judge would ask the challenge questions and pre-instruct the panel.

The court permitted revised questions on racial and unconscious bias, and allowed a narrow question regarding the jurors' ability to follow limiting instructions on the accused's admitted prior possession of illegal firearms.

However, the court rejected proposed questions inquiring into jurors' beliefs about crime rates among Black men.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving and failing to stop for police after a vehicle registered to him fled from officers following a nearby shooting.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance footage showing the accused driving a vehicle away from the shooting scene shortly before the police pursuit.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and found that the evidentiary gaps, including unknown timelines and the possibility of a driver switch, left room for reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial for the respondent, who had been convicted of first degree murder after jury selection proceeded without peremptory challenges on the day Bill C-75 came into force.

The majority held that the statutory amendments abolishing peremptory challenges are constitutional because they do not infringe ss. 11(d) or 11(f) of the Charter, as the accused has no right to any particular jury selection procedure and adequate safeguards remain in place through challenges for cause, jury instructions, and the enhanced stand-aside power.

The majority further held that abolition of peremptory challenges is purely procedural and therefore applies retrospectively to all jury selections commencing on or after September 19, 2019.

Abella J. dissented in part, concluding that while the amendments are constitutional, they should apply only prospectively because they affect the accused's substantive right to meaningfully participate in jury selection.

Côté J. dissented in full, finding the abolition of peremptory challenges unconstitutional under s. 11(f) of the Charter as it substantially diminishes the core jury characteristics of impartiality, representativeness, and competence.

The appellants, Derek Oppong and Akido Thomas, appealed their convictions and sentences for kidnapping-related offences with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal organization.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on gang activity, claiming it was unnecessary and biased, and in refusing to reconsider its admissibility after proposed factual admissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's discretion in admitting expert evidence for contextual understanding and finding no material change in circumstances that would warrant its exclusion.

The court also upheld Mr. Oppong's sentence, finding evidence supported his leadership role in the offence.

The accused, on trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder during the COVID-19 pandemic, brought a motion requesting that civilian witnesses testify without masks so their demeanour could be assessed.

The trial judge applied the framework from R. v. S. (N.) to balance the accused's fair trial rights against the public health interest in limiting virus transmission.

The court held that requiring witnesses to remain masked did not create a serious risk to trial fairness, as demeanour is not determinative of credibility.

The court further noted that testimony by videoconference was a reasonable alternative that accommodated both interests.

The motion was dismissed, and witnesses were directed to remain masked.