Deepak B. Paradkar

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and voluntariness voir dire.

The court found the defendant's statements in the breath room to be voluntary.

The defendant's evidence was rejected as implausible, illogical, and inconsistent.

The court found that while the eyewitness identification was unreliable, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the van involved in the collision.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that he intentionally refused to provide a breath sample.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

At a preliminary inquiry into charges of trafficking in cocaine arising from Project Keystorm, the Crown sought to commit the accused to stand trial on two counts: trafficking on March 19, 2015, and trafficking on April 9, 2015.

The accused conceded the evidence for the April 9 charge but contested the March 19 charge.

The central dispute concerned the admissibility and interpretation of an audio probe recording of a conversation between the accused and a co-conspirator in a vehicle.

The court found that the parties had agreed to the accuracy of the transcript and that the conversation, combined with subsequent intercepted communications, provided sufficient evidence for committal on both counts.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s decision granting judicial interim release to the accused on serious drug and firearms conspiracy charges.

The Crown argued the justice of the peace misapprehended the seriousness of the offences, underestimated the risk of reoffending, and improperly accepted a proposed surety.

Applying the standard from R. v. St. Cloud, the court held that a reviewing judge may intervene only if the decision contains an error of law, fresh evidence, or is clearly inappropriate.

The court found no such error and held the justice of the peace reasonably assessed the secondary and tertiary grounds and the proposed plan of release.

The bail review application was therefore dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

During a traffic stop, a police officer observed what he believed to be marijuana shavings fall from a piece of paper retrieved from the glove compartment.

The officer arrested the accused for simple possession, conducted a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, and located a backpack containing 202 grams of marijuana.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for simple possession based on the observed marijuana shavings, and that the search of the vehicle was lawful.

However, the trial judge acquitted the accused on the trafficking charge, finding that the Crown had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of or was willfully blind to the contents of the backpack.

During a trial for conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, the Crown sought to introduce ten recorded conversations obtained via a room probe.

The accused opposed the admission of the evidence, arguing the audio quality was too poor to be reliable.

Following a voir dire, the court found that eight of the recordings were largely inaudible and lacked sufficient context to permit a fair and reliable assessment of their substance.

Portions of two recordings were found to be sufficiently clear to meet the threshold test for admissibility, subject to the Crown satisfying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule at trial.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with possessing cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possessing $13,000 in proceeds of crime, and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused Ward-Jackson faced additional charges of possession of marijuana for trafficking and possession of $120 as proceeds of crime.

Following a search warrant execution at their residence, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish possession.

The trial judge found that while residency and bedroom occupancy could be inferred, the Crown failed to establish knowledge and control of the drugs and money beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge emphasized the critical distinction between evidence and facts, and the necessity of establishing primary facts before drawing further inferences.

The accused were jointly charged with possession of cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possession of $13,000 as proceeds of crime, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion on the joint counts.

The court found sufficient evidence of possession of the cocaine and cash to proceed to trial, but discharged both accused on the marijuana count due to insufficient evidence.

The court applied the test for directed verdicts and analyzed the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including residency, bedroom occupancy, and knowledge and control of the drugs and proceeds.

During a criminal jury trial involving allegations including kidnapping and extortion, the Crown sought to introduce oral statements attributed to one accused that differed from the version summarized in an earlier pre‑trial ruling on voluntariness.

The updated police testimony suggested that the accused named co‑accused as involved in the offence.

The trial judge held that the credibility of the differing versions of the statement was a matter for the jury and that the earlier ruling on voluntariness could not be revisited mid‑trial based on a changed evidentiary landscape.

Applying the discretionary exclusionary framework for prejudicial evidence, the court concluded that the probative value of the “new” version was not outweighed by prejudice to the co‑accused.

The statement would therefore be admitted without editing, with appropriate limiting instructions to the jury that it could only be used against the declarant accused.

During a criminal jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the defence objected to the Crown calling a police officer as an expert witness on drug trafficking practices.

Following a voir dire, the court considered the admissibility of the proposed opinion evidence under the framework from Mohan.

The court held the officer was qualified through experience in drug investigations and that his proposed testimony regarding common trafficking indicators—such as multiple cell phones, separation of drugs and cash, and possession of large amounts of currency—was relevant and necessary to assist the jury in assessing the accused’s knowledge of the drugs.

The court limited the scope of the expert evidence, ruling the officer could not opine on whether the accused possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking or had knowledge of the cocaine.

The evidence was admitted subject to those restrictions.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Six days before the scheduled trial, the defence brought a Charter application seeking to exclude the drugs and money seized, but failed to file an Application Record or Book of Authorities as required by the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The Crown brought an application to dismiss the defence's Charter application under Rule 34.03.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the defence's non-compliance with the rules was serious and prejudicial to the Crown, the history of the proceedings showed numerous missed opportunities to bring the application, and the Charter application itself had little to no merit.

Following a jury conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, a document was discovered in the jury room containing excerpts from an online article criticizing a high-profile acquittal and model jury instructions from the Canadian Judicial Council.

The accused sought a mistrial or stay of proceedings, alleging juror misconduct and a violation of their Charter rights after it appeared that at least one juror had consulted external legal materials contrary to the trial judge’s instructions.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant a mistrial or stay after the jury had been discharged, as the trial judge was functus officio except in narrow circumstances not present here.

However, relying on appellate authority recognizing the ability to create an evidentiary record for appeal, the court concluded it retained jurisdiction to conduct a limited post-verdict inquiry into extrinsic influences affecting the jury.

Because the document suggested independent legal research and potential dissemination among jurors, an inquiry was ordered while preserving the jury secrecy rule.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application under s. 11(b) of the Charter based on unreasonable delay and further erred in concluding that police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand.

The court held that approximately nine months of institutional delay did not justify a stay of proceedings and that additional delays were attributable to the inherent time requirements of the case and defence choices during the litigation.

The court also rejected the argument that the breath demand violated s. 8 of the Charter, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge’s credibility assessment of the arresting officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Mechelle Rogers, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found 1.5 kg of cocaine in the trunk of a vehicle in which she was a passenger.

At the close of the Crown's case, she brought a motion for a directed verdict.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict based on circumstantial evidence and the law of constructive possession.

The court found that while there was evidence she knew illegal activity was taking place, there was no evidence she knew the substance was cocaine or had any control over it.

The motion was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was entered.

The police responded to a 911 call reporting individuals with handguns in a strip club parking lot.

Officers set up a roadblock at the exit and stopped the first vehicle to leave.

The occupants, who matched the general description of the suspects, were asked to exit the vehicle.

One occupant fled, was apprehended, and found to possess a loaded handgun.

The other occupant was subsequently searched, and a loaded handgun was also found on him.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, but the Court of Appeal excluded it, finding violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the initial detention and subsequent searches were justified under the common law police powers and did not violate the Charter.

The police received a 911 call about black men with handguns outside a strip club and set up a roadblock to stop all vehicles leaving the parking lot.

The appellants, who did not match the descriptions provided, were stopped, detained, and searched, leading to the discovery of loaded handguns.

The Court of Appeal held that the roadblock stop was an unconstitutional exercise of ancillary police powers, resulting in arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The handguns were excluded from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the seriousness of the breaches and systemic police training failures, and acquittals were entered.

The applicant sought an adjournment of his arbitration hearing regarding weekly benefits.

The applicant and his newly retained counsel had not prepared for the hearing and requested a three-month adjournment.

The arbitrator denied the request, noting the lack of preparation over the 11 months since the application was filed and the failure to show extenuating circumstances.

After the adjournment was denied, the applicant's counsel withdrew, and the unrepresented applicant declined to present evidence.

The arbitrator dismissed the applicant's claim for weekly benefits due to a lack of evidence, but also declined to hear the insurer's claim for repayment of overpaid benefits, directing the insurer to pursue that remedy in court.

The applicant, a taxi driver, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until the insurer terminated them.

The applicant sought arbitration to reinstate the benefits and increase the weekly rate.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had a significant pre-existing back condition (ankylosing spondylitis) which he had concealed from medical examiners.

Due to inconsistencies and false evidence regarding his post-accident employment and pre-accident income, the arbitrator concluded the applicant failed to prove a substantial inability to perform his essential tasks.

The claim for further benefits was dismissed, the weekly rate was maintained at the statutory minimum, and no costs were awarded to either party.