Deepak B. Paradkar

Karim Baratov sought judicial interim release pending his extradition hearing to the United States for serious computer hacking offences, including conspiracy with Russian FSB officers to steal information from webmail providers.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the U.S., opposed the application on all three grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code: flight risk, risk of re-offending, and maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that Baratov, a sophisticated hacker with significant financial resources and international connections, posed a substantial flight risk and a high likelihood of re-offending.

The proposed release plan, including electronic monitoring and parental supervision, was deemed insufficient given his skills and past conduct.

The court also concluded that releasing him would undermine public confidence in the justice system due to the gravity of the offences and the strong evidence against him.

The application for judicial interim release was denied.

The defendant, Jacqueline Simone, faced charges including attempting to export cocaine and conspiracy.

During the trial, the defence brought two applications: to exclude telephone records from a co-conspirator's cell phone and to prevent the testimony of an officer regarding retrieved deleted messages from the defendant's phone.

The court dismissed both applications.

The first application was dismissed as the defence failed to establish that the co-conspirator hearsay evidence lacked necessity and reliability, applying the "rare cases" exception from R. v. Mapara.

The second application was dismissed, finding the officer's testimony factual, not expert opinion, and the evidence of deleted messages was probative as post-offence conduct, outweighing any potential prejudice.

The defendant, Jacqueline Simone, was charged with attempting to export cocaine, possession for the purpose of exporting, and conspiracy to export cocaine.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by Ms. Simone to the police following her arrest.

The Defence sought to exclude these statements, alleging violations of Ms. Simone's Charter rights.

The court conducted a blended *voir dire* and ultimately ruled that Ms. Simone's statements were voluntary and admissible, finding no Charter breaches.

This criminal trial concerned a large-scale drug trafficking operation, 'Project Odyssey,' which led to the seizure of significant quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, and GHB.

Six defendants were arraigned, with one passing away during the trial.

The court addressed preliminary motions regarding confidential informant privilege and a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, both of which were dismissed.

The core issues at trial involved proving possession, knowledge, and intent for trafficking and importing charges, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied the principles of reasonable doubt and the Supreme Court's guidance on circumstantial evidence from *R. v. Villaroman*.

Ultimately, four defendants were convicted of trafficking, while one was fully acquitted.

Importing charges against two defendants were dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded as a blended trial and voluntariness voir dire.

The court found the defendant's statements in the breath room to be voluntary.

The defendant's evidence was rejected as implausible, illogical, and inconsistent.

The court found that while the eyewitness identification was unreliable, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the van involved in the collision.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that he intentionally refused to provide a breath sample.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

At a preliminary inquiry into charges of trafficking in cocaine arising from Project Keystorm, the Crown sought to commit the accused to stand trial on two counts: trafficking on March 19, 2015, and trafficking on April 9, 2015.

The accused conceded the evidence for the April 9 charge but contested the March 19 charge.

The central dispute concerned the admissibility and interpretation of an audio probe recording of a conversation between the accused and a co-conspirator in a vehicle.

The court found that the parties had agreed to the accuracy of the transcript and that the conversation, combined with subsequent intercepted communications, provided sufficient evidence for committal on both counts.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

During a traffic stop, a police officer observed what he believed to be marijuana shavings fall from a piece of paper retrieved from the glove compartment.

The officer arrested the accused for simple possession, conducted a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, and located a backpack containing 202 grams of marijuana.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for simple possession based on the observed marijuana shavings, and that the search of the vehicle was lawful.

However, the trial judge acquitted the accused on the trafficking charge, finding that the Crown had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of or was willfully blind to the contents of the backpack.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with possessing cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possessing $13,000 in proceeds of crime, and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused Ward-Jackson faced additional charges of possession of marijuana for trafficking and possession of $120 as proceeds of crime.

Following a search warrant execution at their residence, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish possession.

The trial judge found that while residency and bedroom occupancy could be inferred, the Crown failed to establish knowledge and control of the drugs and money beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge emphasized the critical distinction between evidence and facts, and the necessity of establishing primary facts before drawing further inferences.

The accused were jointly charged with possession of cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possession of $13,000 as proceeds of crime, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused brought a directed verdict motion on the joint counts.

The court found sufficient evidence of possession of the cocaine and cash to proceed to trial, but discharged both accused on the marijuana count due to insufficient evidence.

The court applied the test for directed verdicts and analyzed the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, including residency, bedroom occupancy, and knowledge and control of the drugs and proceeds.

During a criminal jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the defence objected to the Crown calling a police officer as an expert witness on drug trafficking practices.

Following a voir dire, the court considered the admissibility of the proposed opinion evidence under the framework from Mohan.

The court held the officer was qualified through experience in drug investigations and that his proposed testimony regarding common trafficking indicators—such as multiple cell phones, separation of drugs and cash, and possession of large amounts of currency—was relevant and necessary to assist the jury in assessing the accused’s knowledge of the drugs.

The court limited the scope of the expert evidence, ruling the officer could not opine on whether the accused possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking or had knowledge of the cocaine.

The evidence was admitted subject to those restrictions.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application under s. 11(b) of the Charter based on unreasonable delay and further erred in concluding that police had reasonable grounds to make a breath demand.

The court held that approximately nine months of institutional delay did not justify a stay of proceedings and that additional delays were attributable to the inherent time requirements of the case and defence choices during the litigation.

The court also rejected the argument that the breath demand violated s. 8 of the Charter, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge’s credibility assessment of the arresting officer.

The appeal was dismissed.