David Friesen

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with the engine on and seatbelt fastened.

He had consumed significant alcohol and provided breath samples showing readings of 210 and 200 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge rejected the respondent's evidence that he had no intention to drive.

The Court of Appeal found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge erred in characterizing the trial judge's findings as palpable and overriding errors and restored the original convictions.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The trial judge found that the constable's demand for a breath sample violated section 8 of the Charter because the constable had not followed three procedures in the OPP manual for the Drager Alcotest 6810 device, and therefore could not have reasonably believed the device was functioning properly.

The trial judge excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no objective basis for the constable's belief that the device was functioning properly, and that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence under section 24(2).

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple fraud and uttering forged document counts, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant had defrauded multiple complainants of over half a million dollars by providing them with forged Bank of Montreal term investment certificates.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in amending the information to include additional complainants; (2) the trial judge erred in applying cross-count reasoning; (3) the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment request; and (4) the trial judge erred in curtailing cross-examination of a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed his conviction for fraud in the amount of approximately $1.9 million and his sentence of three and one-half years imprisonment.

The central issue on the conviction appeal was whether the appellant knew that his purported client did not exist.

The trial judge found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was a knowing participant in the fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversal of the burden of proof and that the inferences drawn by the trial judge were reasonably available on the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding that the additional six months imposed on the appellant compared to his co-accused was justified by his status as a lawyer and the aggravating role that status played in the commission of the offence.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal of his conviction for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault against his minor daughters.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in applying the public confidence test from R. v. Oland and that her decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Chief Justice dismissed the application, finding no material errors of fact or law and that the bail judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offences, the merits of the appeal, and the likelihood of parole were all reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud over $5,000 and two counts of uttering a forged document, arising from his cashing of two stolen bank drafts totalling $847,000 at Ontario casinos in October 2012.

The appellant claimed he received the drafts from a gambler named "Pasquale" as repayment of a loan and did not know they were stolen.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as incapable of belief and applied the doctrine of recent possession to find the appellant guilty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, rejecting three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of honest but mistaken belief, that the trial judge misapprehended the doctrine of recent possession, and that the trial judge improperly relied on the appellant's exculpatory police statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering into a dwelling house contrary to s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on fingerprint evidence linking him to a theft of over $4,000 from a condominium unit where he worked as a concierge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the reliability of the fingerprint evidence; (2) a violation of s. 11(b) Charter rights regarding trial delay; and (3) a violation of s. 7 Charter rights regarding the failure to preserve video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 9 years less 18 months pre-sentence custody for aggravated assault with a weapon.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider whether intent to kill was the only available inference and that the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of proportionality given the mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge carefully balanced the mitigating and aggravating factors and was entitled to consider the appellant's intent to kill as a seriously aggravating factor.

The sentence was found to be fit in the circumstances.

The accused, a Royal Canadian Mint employee of seven years, was convicted after trial of stealing gold from the Mint, conveying gold out of the Mint, possessing property obtained by crime, money laundering, and breach of public trust.

Over approximately five months, the accused stole 22 gold pucks by exploiting security gaps, including camera blind spots and weaknesses in metal detection systems.

He sold 18 pucks to a gold buyer for $130,206.19 and retained four pucks in a safety deposit box.

The stolen gold had a market value between $206,813.93 and $236,358.77.

The accused transferred proceeds to purchase property in Jamaica and a boat in the United States, and made cash withdrawals.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay convictions for theft and possession of property obtained by crime as they shared the same factual and legal nexus with the conveying gold conviction.

The court sentenced the accused to 30 months imprisonment concurrent on three counts, imposed a restitution order of $191,040.96, a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $190,000 with a 30-month consecutive imprisonment term if unpaid, ordered DNA analysis and registration, and imposed a victim fine surcharge of $600.

The defendant, an Operator-Refinery at the Royal Canadian Mint, was charged with theft of gold, conveying gold out of the Mint, possession of property obtained by crime, laundering proceeds of crime, and breach of trust by a public official.

The Crown's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The defendant stole gold pucks from the Mint by secreting them on his person and removing them through security checkpoints.

He sold 18 of the stolen pucks to Ottawa Gold Buyers for approximately $138,000 and used the proceeds to fund the purchase of a house in Jamaica and a boat in Florida.

The court found the defendant guilty on all five counts.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

During a criminal fraud trial involving former corporate executives, the Crown sought disclosure of lawyers’ interview notes created while representing two accused during internal corporate investigations.

The defence asserted litigation privilege over handwritten and typed notes taken by counsel and assisting lawyers during interviews conducted by investigators retained by the corporation’s audit committee.

The court held that the notes were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation, including regulatory proceedings and civil actions, and therefore attracted litigation privilege.

None of the recognized exceptions to litigation privilege were established.

The court ruled that the privileged notes were not producible, though counsel-witnesses could review their own notes to refresh memory without waiving privilege.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.