David Friesen

The defendant, an Operator-Refinery at the Royal Canadian Mint, was charged with theft of gold, conveying gold out of the Mint, possession of property obtained by crime, laundering proceeds of crime, and breach of trust by a public official.

The Crown's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The defendant stole gold pucks from the Mint by secreting them on his person and removing them through security checkpoints.

He sold 18 of the stolen pucks to Ottawa Gold Buyers for approximately $138,000 and used the proceeds to fund the purchase of a house in Jamaica and a boat in Florida.

The court found the defendant guilty on all five counts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that a 13-minute delay in obtaining an alcohol screening device violated his right to counsel and that the failure to use a N.I.S.T. thermometer raised a reasonable doubt about the breath test results.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were case-specific, did not raise questions of general importance to the administration of justice, and lacked strong merit.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud and uttering, as well as her sentence, following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

She argued that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of evidence in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal seeking to delete the probation order was also dismissed, with the court noting the appellant failed to apply to the sentencing judge under s. 732.2(3) of the Criminal Code for such relief.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and public mischief arising from a staged two-vehicle collision.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in his assessment of witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was justified by the complexity of the case and caused no serious prejudice.

The Court also held that the trial judge was entitled to accept or reject parts of the evidence and was not required to give himself a Vetrovec warning in a judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a restricted firearm, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to set aside his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.

He claimed he lacked the cognitive capacity to understand the pleas due to medical issues and that he received ineffective assistance from both his original trial counsel and the counsel who brought the application to set aside the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the 'limited cognitive capacity' test and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The respondent pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling-house and committing sexual assault under s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge initially imposed a SOIRA order but later rescinded it, concluding that s. 348(1)(b) was not a designated offence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while s. 348(1)(b) is not listed as a designated offence, the respondent was sentenced under s. 348(1)(d), which is a designated offence.

Therefore, the SOIRA order was mandatory.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault, assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and weapons dangerous arising from an incident in a crack house.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and rendered inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons met the required threshold, adequately addressed credibility, and demonstrated a careful consideration of the evidence for each count.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court, which dismissed an appeal from a sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission on sentence, concluding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, agreeing that the trial judge applied the proper legal test for rejecting a joint submission.

Leave to appeal was denied.

During a criminal fraud trial involving former corporate executives, the Crown sought disclosure of lawyers’ interview notes created while representing two accused during internal corporate investigations.

The defence asserted litigation privilege over handwritten and typed notes taken by counsel and assisting lawyers during interviews conducted by investigators retained by the corporation’s audit committee.

The court held that the notes were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation, including regulatory proceedings and civil actions, and therefore attracted litigation privilege.

None of the recognized exceptions to litigation privilege were established.

The court ruled that the privileged notes were not producible, though counsel-witnesses could review their own notes to refresh memory without waiving privilege.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal raised an issue of mixed fact and law rather than a pure question of law, and did not engage the interest of the general administration of justice.

The court also found that the trial was not unfair, as the appellant had received adequate disclosure, and the trial judge's challenged remark was merely an attempt to assist a self-represented accused.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in granting only 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the appellant was entitled to enhanced 2:1 credit due to the unavailability of parole and his desire to attend a treatment centre.

The appeal was allowed to the extent of granting 14 months and two weeks of pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for perjury and attempt to obstruct justice arising from false testimony given as a proposed surety at a bail hearing.

At trial, the appellant argued he lacked the mens rea to commit perjury, claiming he did not know he had a criminal record due to his limited education, alcoholism, and belief that his record had been wiped clean.

During deliberations, the jury asked questions about whether reasonable doubt could be based on mental capacity, linguistic ability, or a misunderstanding of the law.

The trial judge answered by stating the jury was getting sidetracked, introducing the concept of a not criminally responsible defence, and advising that everyone is presumed to know the law.

The Court of Appeal held that these answers were wrong in law, unresponsive, and effectively deprived the appellant of his defence that he lacked the intent to deceive.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of driving over 80.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge after misapprehending the qualified technician's evidence, erroneously concluding the Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The summary conviction appeal judge allowed the Crown's appeal but remitted the matter to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal court lacked jurisdiction to remit the matter for reconsideration.

Finding that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence amounted to an error of law and that a conviction would have necessarily followed but for the error, the Court of Appeal entered a conviction and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the breath test evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had not had the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Grant and failed to consider the officers' good faith and the minimal intrusiveness of the breath test.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, noting that the relevant legislation had been amended, meaning the case would not provide guidance for future cases.

Furthermore, the court found no need to elaborate on the principles applied by the summary conviction appeal judge under the previous legislation.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which had affirmed the accused's acquittal at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the lower court properly identified the applicable legal principles and that the case turned entirely on its specific facts.

Concluding that the matter raised no broader legal controversy, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood-alcohol content.

The self-represented applicant argued the trial judge erred in relying on statutorily compelled statements.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, noting the issue was not raised below, lacked an evidentiary foundation, and the trial judge made no improper use of the statements.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges related to a fatal accident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in the objective portion of her section 8 Charter analysis by concluding that the only reasonable explanation for the accused going limp was medical, ignoring the evidence of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.