David E. Harris

The applicant, who had been granted bail twice but was unable to secure a surety, sought a bail review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code to be released without a surety.

The court considered the applicant's poverty, addiction issues, and the anticipated delay before trial.

Applying the principles from R. v. Myers and R. v. Zora, the court found that the certain cost to the applicant's liberty outweighed the hypothetical risks on the primary and secondary grounds.

The court ordered the applicant's release on his own recognizance without a surety, subject to conditions including reporting to police and seeking addictions counselling.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder following a gang-related mass shooting, applied for bail under section 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that while the Crown's case was not overwhelming, it was not weak, and the proposed release plan with family sureties was insufficient to address the significant public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed and detention was ordered.

The mother brought an urgent motion for access and shared residency of the parties' 10-year-old daughter following their separation.

The mother had limited access to the child since leaving the matrimonial home, and alleged the father was alienating the child.

The father alleged the mother had substance abuse issues and that the child did not feel safe alone with her.

The court found the matter urgent and, noting no safety concerns justifying the mother's exclusion, ordered a graduated access schedule leading to overnight visits, while prohibiting both parents from using marijuana or non-prescription drugs while caring for the child.

The accused stood trial on historic sexual offence charges arising from allegations by his stepdaughter dating back approximately 38 years.

The court found the complainant's evidence unconfirmed, affected by the passage of time, and weakened by concerns about responsiveness, reliability, and the surrounding circumstances of disclosure.

Although the court accepted there were some positive aspects to the evidence and considered the possibility that physical abuse may have occurred, it was not satisfied to the criminal standard that the charged sexual offences were proven.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The father brought an urgent motion for an order that the children live with him in the matrimonial home in Mississauga and attend the local school, after the mother unilaterally moved with the children to Maple and enrolled them in school there.

The court found the mother's move was a unilateral action designed to alter the status quo and was not a reasonable step required by the best interests of the children.

The father's motion was granted, ordering the children to be returned to Mississauga and enrolled in the local school.

The applicant husband brought a motion to supplant a previous consent order that established a process for valuing and buying out or selling the matrimonial home.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was an unjustified attempt to alter a previous agreement.

The respondent wife generously agreed to allow the husband a second opportunity to obtain a proper valuation, which the court ordered to be completed by a set date.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the respondent wife.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit photographs of the defendant, Jordan O’Maly, taken at police stations on matters unrelated to the current charges.

The evidence included stills showing the defendant wearing specific clothing (dark athletic jacket with three stripes, white belt with circular metallic buckle) and having a bandaged hand shortly after the alleged stabbing, and later photographs of scars on his hands.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, finding the evidence highly probative for identification due to the unique combination of clothing and hand injuries, which corroborated other circumstantial evidence like blood DNA and gas station video.

The court determined that any prejudicial effect arising from the defendant's association with police could be mitigated through appropriate limiting instructions to the jury or by editing the evidence.

The motion to admit the evidence was granted.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action on grounds including that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim was discovered in January 2016, based on email correspondence where the plaintiff explicitly articulated his loss, attributed it to the defendant, and indicated an intention to pursue legal action.

As the action was commenced in July 2018, more than two years after the claim's discovery, it was statute-barred.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The plaintiff condominium corporation moved for summary judgment to enforce a lien against the defendant's unit for unpaid repair and legal costs.

The dispute arose from damage caused to a new roof during HVAC unit replacement, which the plaintiff attributed to the defendant's unauthorized actions.

The defendant denied responsibility, asserting her HVAC unit was not strapped down as alleged.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of credibility requiring oral evidence, which could not be resolved on the paper record or through the new fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1) and (2.2).

The court also declined partial summary judgment on a secondary issue regarding lien registration timeliness, reserving all issues for trial.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case to reduce the charge to second-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence of the accused waiting at a restaurant, conducting reconnaissance, ambushing the victim in a washroom, and fleeing together with the murder weapon provided a prima facie case upon which a reasonable jury could find planning and deliberation.

The defendants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision sets their parole ineligibility periods.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a semi-automatic assault rifle, the public nature of the killing, elements of planning, and the criminal record of one offender, as well as prior criminal conduct involving the same firearm.

Mitigating factors included youth and difficult upbringing for one offender, and being a first offender for the other.

The court also addressed the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct under Section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the weight to be given to jury recommendations.

Parole ineligibility was set at 16 years for Shamar Meredith and 12 years for Thulani Chizanga.

The defence applied to re-open and re-consider an earlier ruling that admitted a Super 8 video from the day before an alleged murder.

The defence offered admissions of fact under Section 650 of the Criminal Code to obviate the need for the video.

The Crown opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the video's unique visual probative value, particularly in demonstrating the accused's familiarity with the firearm and concerted action, extended beyond the offered admissions and justified any additional prejudicial effect.

The defendants brought a motion under Ontario's Anti-SLAPP legislation to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiffs.

The action stemmed from "vicious" online reviews posted by the defendants about the plaintiffs' plumbing business and its principal.

The court determined that the online reviews constituted "expression" on a "matter of public interest." While the plaintiffs' defamation claim was found to have substantial merit and no valid defence, the court ultimately dismissed the action.

It concluded that the minimal harm suffered by the plaintiffs did not outweigh the significant public interest in protecting freedom of expression, even when the expression was offensive and vitriolic.

The court also clarified that the plaintiffs had not properly pleaded the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff obtained default judgment against the corporate defendant and two officers.

One officer, Daniel Brewer, moved to set aside the default judgment against him, arguing he had no actual notice of the proceedings after selling his shares and his counsel's subsequent withdrawal.

The court found that Brewer did not receive notice of crucial steps in the litigation due to an incorrect address used by his former counsel, and that his reliance on counsel and a co-defendant's assurance was reasonable.

The absence of actual notice, not due to Brewer's fault, was deemed a fundamental procedural flaw.

The motion to set aside the default judgment and related orders against Brewer was allowed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to compel the Crown to disclose details regarding police "pointer car" designations, arguing its relevance to a Charter Section 9 arbitrary detention issue.

The applicant was detained solely because he was driving a vehicle designated as a "pointer car" which may have been an outdated and incorrect designation.

The court found the evidence concerning the purpose, implementation, and removal procedures of the pointer car designation system to be "obviously relevant" to assessing the constitutional validity of the detention.

The motion was allowed, and the Crown was ordered to disclose all requested information.

This is a defence bail review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code, appealing a decision to detain the applicant on secondary and tertiary bail grounds.

The applicant proposed a new surety (grandmother), increased surety amount, more stringent house arrest, and GPS electronic monitoring as material changes in circumstances.

The court found a material change based on the new surety, applying a flexible approach to due diligence in bail reviews as per R. v. St. Cloud.

However, the court ultimately found the proposed plan and sureties insufficient to mitigate the significant public safety risk posed by the serious firearms and dangerous driving charges, dismissing the bail review application on secondary grounds.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of a firearms prohibition order.

The court considered a social history report detailing the offender's experiences with poverty and systemic anti-black racism.

Applying the contextual approach from Ipeelee, the court found that these systemic factors significantly reduced the offender's moral blameworthiness.

The offender was sentenced to time served, equivalent to 49 months after applying enhanced credit for pre-trial custody and lockdowns, along with a nominal fine.

This decision addresses a request by counsel for two individuals convicted of second-degree murder, and agreed to by the Crown, to conduct sentencing remotely via video, audio, or written decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the constitutional imperative of the accused's presence for sentencing under Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the requirement for a valid waiver of physical presence, and the public interest, including victims' rights.

The court found that sentencing is part of the trial and that physical presence serves both individual and broader public interests, especially for serious offences.

The court determined the matter was not urgent for appeal purposes and preferred to defer sentencing to early July, hoping for an in-person proceeding if courts reopen, otherwise revisiting the remote sentencing issue.

The individual and corporate accused appealed their sentences for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, involving the failure to safely dispose of PCBs and comply with an environmental protection compliance order.

The sentencing judge had imposed significant fines and an intermittent jail term on the individual.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by relying on a precedent involving a much higher degree of moral culpability and actual harm, whereas the present case involved passive negligence and potential harm.

The appeal court vacated the jail sentence for the individual and reduced the fines for both accused, emphasizing the principle of restraint in regulatory sentencing and the distinction between actual and potential harm.

The applicants, convicted of second-degree murder, sought a mistrial based on the Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Chouhan*, which clarified that former provisions regarding peremptory challenges remained operative during their jury selection.

The trial judge acknowledged the probable reversible error but denied the mistrial application, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict for an error of law, as such remedies are the purview of the Court of Appeal.

The court emphasized that a jury verdict is "sacrosanct" and a trial judge's post-verdict jurisdiction is "extremely limited" applying only to issues concerning the integrity of the deliberative process or the rendering of the verdict itself, not errors of law committed during trial.