David E. Harris

The applicant, Safeer Ahmad, sought a second bail release under Section 522 of the Criminal Code, having been charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

The application was based on a change of circumstances, specifically the addition of new sureties (his mother and a cousin) to supplement previously proposed sureties.

The court, reading the reasons together with the previous ruling, found the allegations exceedingly serious, involving a gang-related shooting that resulted in one death and multiple injuries.

While acknowledging the new sureties slightly improved supervision, the court deemed their value marginal given the gravity of the offence and the strength of the Crown's case.

The application was dismissed on both the secondary ground (risk to public safety) and the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice), emphasizing the high onus on the applicant in such serious cases and the growing public intolerance for gun violence.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder alongside a co-accused, applied for severance under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a joint trial would violate his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time, as the co-accused's counsel was unavailable until six months past the Jordan ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the strong public interest in joint trials for co-accused alleged to have acted in concert outweighed the anticipated delay, which was partially justified by the complexity of a multi-accused trial and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicants, charged with serious firearms and gaming offences, experienced a 12-day delay before their special bail hearing was held.

They brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay violated their s. 11(e) rights and constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach and acknowledged systemic issues in scheduling lengthy bail hearings in Brampton.

The court found that the systemic and ongoing nature of the bail delays severely compromised the integrity of the justice system.

Despite the seriousness of the charges, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy to address the persistent institutional failure.

The accused, charged with sexual and simple assault against his ex-wife, brought a Stage 1 application under s. 278.93(4) of the Criminal Code to admit the complainant's medical records and evidence of prior consensual sexual activity.

The court found that the complainant's signed police release form did not constitute a valid waiver of her reasonable expectation of privacy, meaning the medical records remained subject to the s. 278 regime.

The court also held that evidence of post-separation consensual sexual activity was capable of being admissible to show ongoing association, rather than relying on twin-myth reasoning.

Both the medical records and sexual activity evidence were permitted to proceed to a Stage 2 hearing.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to significant trial delay and the introduction of new, more vigilant sureties (the applicant's sister and grandmother).

On the secondary ground, despite the seriousness of the charges (robbery with a firearm, arson, mischief) and rising gun violence, the court was satisfied the applicant discharged his onus, considering his lack of prior violent convictions, physical disability from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, and the strict house arrest plan.

On the tertiary ground, the court weighed the applicant's positive COVID-19 diagnosis amidst an outbreak at the detention centre, along with his youth, lack of convictions, physical disability, and the prospect of pre-trial custody approaching a potential sentence, concluding that public confidence would not be undermined by his release.

Bail was granted with stringent conditions, and the court explicitly removed "keep the peace and be of good behaviour" and "follow rules of the home" conditions, citing R. v. Zora on principles of restraint and judicial oversight of bail terms.

Mr. Amiri applied for certiorari to quash an information charging him with failing to comply with a bail order.

He argued that cc'ing his wife on emails to her lawyer, sent for the purpose of discussing settlement of a family matter, constituted communication "in the presence of legal counsel" and thus did not violate his bail condition.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the laying of the information did not constitute legal or jurisdictional error, and that the issue was a trial matter.

The court also noted the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. Zora on the subjective intent required for bail breaches and the "over criminalization" of such charges, suggesting the case might be appropriate for a judicial referral hearing under s. 523.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge a young person on charges of robbery and pointing a firearm related to a carjacking.

The reviewing judge found that while the preliminary inquiry judge erred in concluding there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to commit the accused to trial, this error was not jurisdictional in nature.

Because the preliminary inquiry judge considered the whole of the evidence and did not act arbitrarily, the erroneous weighing of inferences did not deprive him of jurisdiction.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of second-degree murder.

He argued that inconsistencies between two key witnesses regarding the shooter's identity precluded committal, relying on principles from eyewitness identification cases.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that the Crown's case was circumstantial, not based on direct eyewitness identification.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the whole of the evidence and that a reasonable inference was available that the applicant shot the deceased.

The applicant moved to amend a previous Superior Court order that dismissed its action, seeking to add a clause stating the dismissal was without prejudice to a parallel Small Claims Court action.

The court found that the applicant had obtained a default judgment in Small Claims Court without notice to the respondent and failed to disclose this to the Superior Court judge who dismissed the action the following day.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no justification to interfere with the Small Claims Court process and noting that the requirements for amending an order under Rule 59.06 were not met.

The court also noted significant evidence suggesting the applicant was a fictional entity created by a declared vexatious litigant using aliases.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order on charges including possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the proposal of new, closer sureties and the resolution of numerous outstanding breach charges.

Applying the principles from R. v. Zora, the court considered the applicant's history of bail breaches in the context of his drug addiction.

The court concluded that a strict house arrest plan with electronic monitoring and substantial sureties adequately addressed the secondary and tertiary grounds, and granted the applicant's release.

The applicant, charged with domestic assault and related offences, sought a bail variation under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to remove a no-contact condition and return to the family home.

The complainant supported the variation and recanted her initial allegations.

The court dismissed the application, citing a history of violence, the use of a weapon, a previous bail breach, and the transparent nature of the recantation.

The court emphasized the need to protect the complainant and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, while ordering an expedited trial to mitigate the hardship of the bail conditions.

The plaintiff successfully sued the corporate and personal defendants in Small Claims Court for unpaid wages.

At the outset of the trial, the trial judge excluded one of the personal defendants from the courtroom, despite defendants' counsel stating she was essential to instruct him.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that excluding the instructing witness contravened Rule 52.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and constituted an error of law.

Although the plaintiff had a strong case, the exclusion created an appearance of unfairness amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

On a section 525 bail detention review, the accused sought release by advancing a new surety plan after detention on secondary and tertiary grounds at the original hearing.

The court held that the availability of a surety constituted a material change in circumstances and also found two errors of law in the original decision: misapprehension of the secondary ground as turning solely on substantial likelihood of further offending, and failure to make a sufficient finding on the strength of the Crown's case.

Applying the proper bail principles, the court found the prosecution case to be of medium strength, accepted that the allegations were serious, and concluded that a surety-supervised house arrest plan adequately addressed both secondary and tertiary concerns.

Release was ordered on a recognizance with sureties and strict conditions.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant lawyer, alleging he falsely stated on an electronic transfer of real property that his client had obtained a full release of a writ of execution.

The defendant sought an adjournment through an agent, which was denied due to a pattern of obfuscation and lack of evidence of illness.

The court found that the defendant's law statement was false and known to be false, rejecting the debtor's late-filed affidavit as incredible and contradicted by documentary evidence.

Summary judgment was granted for the debt and enforcement costs, plus $20,000 in punitive damages to protect the integrity of the electronic registration honour system.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to sexual interference involving a 14-year-old complainant and two breaches of bail prohibiting contact with the complainant.

After a Gardiner hearing, the court found the sexual interference occurred without the complainant’s actual consent and treated the offence as a highly invasive, cruel, and exploitative act marked by significant psychological harm, abuse of a friendship-based trust relationship, and aggravating post-offence threats and contact.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence against the offender’s youth, lack of prior record, some remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

A penitentiary sentence of 46 months less enhanced credit for pre-trial custody resulted in a final sentence of 44 months, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

The applicant sought to exclude firearms found in his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a prior ruling that the search warrant violated his s. 8 rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court applied the Grant framework and found the police conduct was serious, as the ITO contained misleading and unsupported statements regarding the suspects' movements between residences.

Given the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests in his home, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the firearms offences.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Section 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.

The police had obtained warrants for three residences based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on confidential informant information and police observations following a shooting.

The court reviewed the ITO under the Garofoli framework and found that the evidence connecting the applicant's specific residence to the shooting was insufficient and largely based on conclusory statements by the affiant.

The court concluded that the warrant could not have validly issued for that address, resulting in a breach of Section 8 of the Charter, with the Section 24(2) analysis to follow.

The accused was charged with obstruct justice, intimidation of a witness, criminal harassment, and mischief based on allegations made by his mother.

The investigating officer grossly overstated and falsified the mother's allegations in the bail synopsis, leading to the accused being held in custody for three nights before being released on bail.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceedings for abuse of process.

The court found that the police conduct in falsifying the allegations and overholding the accused constituted an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter and an abuse of process in the residual category.

The court also found that the interviewing officer violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by disparaging his lawyer.

The proceedings were stayed.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of possessing two loaded handguns while bound by a firearms prohibition.

The reviewing judge found that the addition of a new surety and clarification of the sureties' financial assets constituted a material change in circumstances, and that the original justice of the peace erred in law by concluding the sureties had no reasonably recoverable assets.

However, upon conducting a full review, the judge dismissed the application.

The judge found that the circumstantial evidence strongly suggested the accused was involved in drug trafficking, which elevated the risk to the public.

The proposed supervision plan, while better than most, was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground risks associated with the combination of drugs and loaded firearms.

The applicant father applied to move the primary residence of the parties' two children from the respondent mother's home to his own.

The mother had unilaterally relocated with the children and the environment in her home was described as high-conflict and stressful.

Relying heavily on the investigation and evidence provided by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, which indicated the children preferred to live with their father and that the mother had engaged in coaching, the court found it was in the children's best interests to reside primarily with the father.

The application was allowed.