Bradley W. Miller

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault on his father and was sentenced to 16 months' custody followed by 3 years' probation.

He appealed his sentence, arguing he was not receiving the recommended psychiatric treatment in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision.

The court noted the appellant's refusal of a proposed variation to facilitate a transfer to a psychiatric hospital and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the probation conditions were intended to ensure he receives help upon release.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to two and a half years in prison.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misconstrued the law on agency and made factual errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant intended to traffic the drugs regardless of whether he initially held them as an agent for his mother.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation are paramount for fentanyl offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 38-month sentence, arguing he should have been convicted of the lesser offence of assault causing bodily harm and that the sentence was out of range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge was entitled to conclude the prolonged beating and choking endangered the victim's life.

The sentence was deemed appropriate for a vicious domestic assault involving a repeat victim and breaches of court orders.

A duplicative conviction for assault causing bodily harm was stayed on consent.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and driving without an interlock device, specifically challenging the lifetime driving prohibition imposed following a 5-year penitentiary term.

This was his third impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lifetime ban was within the trial judge's discretion and necessary for the protection of the public.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an incident at a shelter.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting his unredacted criminal record and in finding that his statement to police was voluntary and not in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the criminal record or her conclusion that no re-caution was required despite the passage of time, alleged memory loss, and change in jeopardy during the police interview.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision, which upheld a $100 fine for possession of cocaine following a guilty plea.

The trial judge had declined to grant a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no error of law or issue of general importance.

The court also rejected the appellant's new argument that his diabetes prevented him from understanding the plea, as there was no evidence to support it and it was not raised below.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that inadvertent bad character evidence given by two witnesses prejudiced the jury and was not cured by the trial judge's instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that strong and unequivocal mid-trial and final instructions preserved the fairness of the trial, making a mistrial unnecessary.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and forgery, and his 18-month sentence.

He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call a bank teller as a witness and for advising him not to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and accepting trial counsel's strategic reasons for not calling the appellant to testify.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of insight into his moral blameworthiness, and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the appellant's costs for the underlying action.

The court awarded the appellant costs of the underlying action, including summary judgment motions but excluding costs associated with a cross-claim, on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $65,231.79.

The court declined to make an order regarding additional costs sought by the appellant's shareholders' counsel.

The appellant was charged in separate informations with Criminal Code offences and Highway Traffic Act offences arising from the same events.

With the consent of the parties, the trial judge tried both sets of offences together and convicted the appellant of dangerous driving and failing to stop for police.

The appellant appealed, arguing the joint trial was a nullity.

The Court of Appeal held that while the joint trial was impermissible because the offences could not be joined in a single information, the error was a procedural irregularity.

Because the trial judge had jurisdiction over both classes of offences and the appellant suffered no prejudice, the curative provisos in the Criminal Code and Provincial Offences Act applied to save the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic two kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The conviction was based on intercepted communications obtained via a wiretap authorization.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application, refusing leave to cross-examine the affiants, and failing to excise importation references from the affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reached an investigative impasse and established investigative necessity for the wiretap.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's record and the need for deterrence.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for catastrophic injuries sustained by the respondent at a municipal mountain bike park.

The respondent fell from a wooden obstacle and was rendered quadriplegic.

The trial judge found the municipality breached its duty of care by failing to post proper warning signs, negligently promoting the park, failing to monitor risks, and failing to provide an adequate progression of qualifiers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the duty of care, standard of care, causation, or assessment of contributory negligence.

The appellant, Coliseum Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that overturned an arbitrator's award in its favour regarding a commercial lease dispute with the City of Ottawa.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of Minutes of Settlement concerning the provision of an alternative site following the termination of Coliseum's lease at Frank Clair Stadium.

The Court of Appeal held that it had no jurisdiction to review the application judge's decision to grant leave to appeal the arbitral award.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by substituting her own interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement, as the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonable and owed deference.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award of $2,240,000 in damages was reinstated.

The appellants obtained a default judgment against Grocery Dayton for $980,200 after discontinuing their action against Wakefern Food Corporation.

Upon discovering Grocery Dayton was not a legal entity, the appellants moved to amend the judgment to add Wakefern as a judgment debtor, arguing Grocery Dayton was merely an alias for Wakefern.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence that the two were the same entity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing there was insufficient evidence and that it would be unfair to add Wakefern without allowing it to defend the action on its merits.

However, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the discontinuance against Wakefern.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim and granting judgment to the respondent on two mortgages.

The appellants argued the summary judgment violated res judicata because a previous motion for summary judgment in the original action had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge was entitled to conduct a mini-trial under the new Hryniak framework, and that changes in pleadings and law meant the second motion was not inconsistent with the first.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing the terms of a settlement of his action against the respondents.

The appellant had made a written offer to withdraw his claim, which the respondents accepted.

The appellant later claimed he had withdrawn the offer before acceptance and demanded an apology.

The motion judge found the offer was not clearly and unequivocally withdrawn and enforced the settlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding the offer was validly accepted and binding, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant wife appealed an order granting her an equalization payment of $60,000 following a short marriage with less than five years of cohabitation.

She argued the motion judge erred by not adopting a mathematical formula for unequal division and by misstating her alternative position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge was not required to use a mathematical formula and properly applied s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act to determine that equal division would be unconscionable based on the parties' respective contributions.

The appellants (lawyers) appealed a judgment finding that they had agreed to represent the respondent on a pro bono basis and ordering them to repay funds improperly applied to legal fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge made no errors in allowing the matter to proceed by application, in finding that the retainer was pro bono, or in resolving ambiguity in the retainer in favour of the client.

The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the application judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent sold a marina to the appellant, who subsequently defaulted on payments.

The parties entered into Minutes of Settlement, which the appellant also breached.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment.

The appellant appealed, arguing she was entitled to a set-off for snow storm damage that occurred while the respondent remained in possession, claiming he owed a duty as a mortgagee in possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty to maintain or insure the property was pleaded or established in the Minutes of Settlement.