Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault against his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence solely because he accepted the complainant's evidence, misapplied the burden of proof, and improperly ruled prior out-of-court statements inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the burden of proof was properly applied, and the trial judge's credibility findings were sound despite the evidentiary ruling on prior statements.

The applicants, Aaron Kennedy and Sean McDermott, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court applied both the R. v. Morin and the new R. v. Jordan frameworks for assessing delay.

While acknowledging significant Crown delay due to late disclosure, the court found that the total delay, after accounting for defence-attributable delays (such as Mr. McDermott's vacation choice), fell below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court also considered the prejudice to the accused, noting Mr. Kennedy's continued detention, but ultimately dismissed both applications, finding no Charter breach.

The applicant sought divorce and equalization of net family properties.

The respondent agreed to divorce but requested an unequal division of property.

The court granted the divorce and determined the date of separation as December 31, 2010.

The court calculated the net family properties and ordered an equalization payment from the respondent to the applicant, rejecting the respondent's request for an unequal division under section 5(6) of the Family Law Act, finding no unconscionability.

A deduction was made from the equalization payment for funds improperly taken by the applicant.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision finding that its declaration required the costs of waste disposal for the food court seating area to be paid as common expenses by all unit owners, rather than solely by the food court unit owners.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the declaration.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the application judge erred by effectively excusing the food court unit owners from paying for the disposal of their own individual unit wastes, contrary to an express provision in the declaration.

The issue of individual unit waste disposal costs was remitted to the application judge.

The appellant, a long-term employee who suddenly became deaf, was subjected to a campaign of abuse by her employer designed to force her resignation.

She was ultimately fired for a frivolous reason.

The employer was noted in default in her wrongful dismissal action.

On appeal from the damages assessment, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by awarding damages that were too low across several categories, including Human Rights Code violations, intentional infliction of mental distress, aggravated damages, and punitive damages.

The total damages were increased to $246,049.92, the maximum allowable under the unamended statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his motion to set aside minutes of settlement in a family law proceeding.

He argued the motion judge erred in making credibility findings based on affidavit evidence, demonstrated bias, and that the absence of a recording of the motion argument denied him natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to determine the matter on the affidavits, the judge's criticism of the appellant did not signal bias, and there is no legal requirement for motion arguments to be transcribed.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee $500,000 in damages for non-delivery of shares pursuant to an employment contract.

The appellant argued there was no evidence of the shares' liquidity to support the valuation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the liquidity issue was raised for the first time on appeal and the appellant had called no evidence at trial.

The court upheld the trial judge's reliance on the respondent's testimony regarding the company's value and the adverse inference drawn against the appellant for failing to call its president to testify.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and two counts of failure to comply with a probation order.

He was sentenced to two years less a day, minus pre-trial custody, and three months' probation.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it violated the 'jump principle' given his previous longest sentence for similar offences was seven months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the significant increase in sentence was justified by the appellant's disturbing pattern of criminal harassment involving multiple women and his commission of the offence while awaiting disposition on another assault charge.

The appellant commenced an action in January 2012 claiming negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and deceit relating to an investment and loan arranged in June 2008.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant argued she was unaware of her right to sue until receiving letters from the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada in 2011.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant knew the material facts of her claim by May 2009 at the latest, and that a lack of appreciation of the legal significance of those facts does not toll the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault on his father and was sentenced to 16 months' custody followed by 3 years' probation.

He appealed his sentence, arguing he was not receiving the recommended psychiatric treatment in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision.

The court noted the appellant's refusal of a proposed variation to facilitate a transfer to a psychiatric hospital and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the probation conditions were intended to ensure he receives help upon release.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to two and a half years in prison.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misconstrued the law on agency and made factual errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant intended to traffic the drugs regardless of whether he initially held them as an agent for his mother.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation are paramount for fentanyl offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 38-month sentence, arguing he should have been convicted of the lesser offence of assault causing bodily harm and that the sentence was out of range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge was entitled to conclude the prolonged beating and choking endangered the victim's life.

The sentence was deemed appropriate for a vicious domestic assault involving a repeat victim and breaches of court orders.

A duplicative conviction for assault causing bodily harm was stayed on consent.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an incident at a shelter.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting his unredacted criminal record and in finding that his statement to police was voluntary and not in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the criminal record or her conclusion that no re-caution was required despite the passage of time, alleged memory loss, and change in jeopardy during the police interview.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and driving without an interlock device, specifically challenging the lifetime driving prohibition imposed following a 5-year penitentiary term.

This was his third impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lifetime ban was within the trial judge's discretion and necessary for the protection of the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that inadvertent bad character evidence given by two witnesses prejudiced the jury and was not cured by the trial judge's instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that strong and unequivocal mid-trial and final instructions preserved the fairness of the trial, making a mistrial unnecessary.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and forgery, and his 18-month sentence.

He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call a bank teller as a witness and for advising him not to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and accepting trial counsel's strategic reasons for not calling the appellant to testify.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of insight into his moral blameworthiness, and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision, which upheld a $100 fine for possession of cocaine following a guilty plea.

The trial judge had declined to grant a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no error of law or issue of general importance.

The court also rejected the appellant's new argument that his diabetes prevented him from understanding the plea, as there was no evidence to support it and it was not raised below.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the appellant's costs for the underlying action.

The court awarded the appellant costs of the underlying action, including summary judgment motions but excluding costs associated with a cross-claim, on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $65,231.79.

The court declined to make an order regarding additional costs sought by the appellant's shareholders' counsel.

The appellant was charged in separate informations with Criminal Code offences and Highway Traffic Act offences arising from the same events.

With the consent of the parties, the trial judge tried both sets of offences together and convicted the appellant of dangerous driving and failing to stop for police.

The appellant appealed, arguing the joint trial was a nullity.

The Court of Appeal held that while the joint trial was impermissible because the offences could not be joined in a single information, the error was a procedural irregularity.

Because the trial judge had jurisdiction over both classes of offences and the appellant suffered no prejudice, the curative provisos in the Criminal Code and Provincial Offences Act applied to save the convictions.