Beth A. Allen

Adrian Bissoon pleaded guilty to three counts of cocaine trafficking and one count of offering a prohibited firearm for sale.

This decision addresses a Gardiner hearing to determine aggravating facts for sentencing.

The Crown sought to establish that the accused was involved in a commercial drug trafficking operation and intended to sell a firearm.

The court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was an active commercial-level cocaine dealer, considering this an aggravating factor.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused intended to sell a firearm, concluding that his representations were mere puffery.

Therefore, the offer to sell a firearm was not considered an aggravating factor.

The accused, Miguel Orlando Zavala-Martinez, was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

At sentencing, new defence counsel sought a reduction in sentence, including an absolute discharge or suspended sentence, alleging egregious violations of the accused's Charter rights (sections 7, 8, 9) and police misconduct during the investigation and search.

The defence argued that the evidence presented to the jury was obtained through fabricated grounds and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The Crown opposed, arguing that these issues should have been raised at a pre-trial admissibility hearing and that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to decide Charter violations at this stage.

The court denied the defence's claim of a section 7 Charter breach for non-disclosure but ruled that the defence could call a police witness to adduce evidence on the alleged Charter violations and state misconduct to determine if a sentence reduction is appropriate, potentially below statutory limits, in accordance with principles from R. v. Nasogaluak.

This criminal trial concerned charges of possession of a prohibited firearm and two prohibited extended magazines, and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of two police officers, whose accounts contained critical contradictions regarding the accused's actions and the sequence of events leading to the discovery of the firearm.

The court applied principles of possession and the assessment of circumstantial evidence, particularly the guidance from R. v. Villaroman, which states that if reasonable inferences other than guilt can be drawn, the Crown has not met the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due to the inconsistencies in police testimony, the lack of direct evidence of the accused handling the firearm, and the absence of forensic links (DNA or fingerprints), the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of or controlled the items.

The accused, Kadah Dematas and Christopher Lucas, brought motions for directed verdicts on multiple charges, including attempted murder, discharge firearm with intent, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon, stemming from a home invasion and shooting.

The court granted directed verdicts of not guilty for attempted murder and possession of a firearm knowing it was obtained by crime, finding insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill or a reasonable prospect of conviction for the latter.

However, the court denied directed verdicts for discharge firearm with intent, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon, concluding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to infer guilt for these general and specific intent offences (excluding the specific intent to kill).

The court also found a common purpose among the intruders.

The accused, Zaid Mohammed, sought a bail review after being denied bail by a lower court.

He was facing charges related to three incidents, including attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple drug possession, and breaches of recognizance.

The review court found a material change in circumstances due to the withdrawal of several serious federal drug trafficking and proceeds of crime charges.

Considering the accused's minimal criminal record, youth, and a stringent proposed release plan involving house arrest, a substantial surety pledge, and electronic monitoring, the court found that detention was not necessary on secondary or tertiary grounds to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was granted.

The offender, Muhammad Iqbal, was convicted of assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, break and enter, and theft under $5,000.00 following a home invasion where he entered the complainant's apartment while she and her children were asleep, and later used a knife found on the premises to threaten her.

The court considered sentencing principles including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and totality, as well as aggravating factors (home invasion, use of a weapon, prior domestic assault record) and mitigating factors (family ties, steady employment, willingness to participate in programs).

The collateral consequence of deportation for permanent residents was also considered, but the court affirmed that fundamental sentencing principles cannot be compromised to avoid deportation.

A global sentence of four years' imprisonment was imposed, along with a mandatory DNA order and a lifetime firearm prohibition.

The accused, DY, was charged with administering a noxious substance (cocaine), invitation to sexual touching, and trafficking cocaine involving his 11-year-old great-niece, TY.

The Crown withdrew a charge of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The court admitted videotaped interviews of the complainant and allowed her to testify outside the courtroom with a support person.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The defence argued that the complainant self-administered the cocaine and fabricated the sexual touching allegations under her mother's influence.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and consistent, rejecting the defence's theories.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts, concluding that he caused the complainant to take cocaine with intent to aggrieve or annoy, invited her to sexual touching, and trafficked cocaine.

The accused, Inderdip Sahota, brought an application for a stay of proceedings or exclusion of drug and proceeds of crime evidence, alleging breaches of Charter sections 7, 8, and 10(b) and abuse of process by police during an investigation and search.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, finding insufficient evidence to meet the "clearest of cases" standard.

The court also dismissed the application for exclusion of evidence related to the search of the condo unit and pat-down, finding no sufficient causal, temporal, or contextual connection to the trafficked drugs.

However, the court found a breach of the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) due to a six-hour delay in facilitating access to a lawyer.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that admitting the evidence, despite the s. 10(b) breach, would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the seriousness of the drug trafficking offence and the lack of bad faith by police.

The drugs, proceeds, and cell phones were ordered admitted for trial.

A criminal trial where the accused, Muhammad Iqbal, was charged with assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, break and enter, and theft under $5,000.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of Iqbal's videotaped statement to police, which the defence sought to exclude due to alleged Charter violations (s. 10(a) and 10(b)).

The court found Iqbal was psychologically detained and not properly informed of the reasons for detention or his right to counsel, leading to the exclusion of the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

During the trial on the merits, the Crown relied on the complainant's eyewitness identification and circumstantial evidence, while the defence presented an alibi.

The court rejected the alibi as fabricated and found Iqbal guilty on all four counts, concluding that his presence near the scene, combined with his deceptive alibi, led to the irresistible conclusion of guilt.

The defendants, individual principals of Times Group corporations, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike out the plaintiff condominium corporation's claim against them personally for construction deficiencies, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court found that most claims (breach of contract, negligent/fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and Building Code breaches) were not sufficiently particularized to establish personal liability distinct from the corporations, as they described actions within the principals' ordinary corporate duties.

These claims were struck without leave to amend.

However, the oppression remedy claim was struck with leave to amend, as the court acknowledged its potential as a personal remedy if properly pleaded with specific allegations against individual directors.

The accused, Shondell Lucas-Johnson, was convicted on two counts of procuring the sexual services of a person 18 years of age.

The complainant, ML, had prior experience in the sex trade and chose to work at a spa introduced by the accused.

The relationship was romantic and domestic, with ML retaining her earnings and sharing living expenses.

The court found the accused was not violent or threatening towards ML, who herself exhibited violence.

Aggravating factors included the accused's criminal record for domestic disputes and being on probation.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, and educational/employment history.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought nine to twelve months.

The court imposed a 12-month custodial sentence, with credit for 836 days of pre-trial custody, resulting in no further time to be served.

Ancillary orders included two years' probation, a DNA order, a five-year firearm prohibition, and a 150-meter no-contact/restriction order regarding the complainant.

One count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, noting it was a transitional case.

The total delay, calculated from the date the information was sworn to the anticipated end of trial, was 28 months and 12 days, which was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The defence conceded 14 days of delay.

The court rejected the defence's argument to include pre-charge delay in the s. 11(b) calculation and found no actual prejudice to the right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) due to pre-charge delay or missing evidence.

The court found the defence took meaningful steps to expedite, but the proceedings did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Anna La Force was found guilty of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the violent, prolonged, and premeditated nature of the attack on a "Good Samaritan," and the accused's lack of remorse.

Mitigating factors included her youth, lack of criminal record, and family support.

The court also addressed the collateral consequence of potential deportation due to her permanent resident status, affirming that while it can be considered, it cannot compromise fundamental sentencing principles.

A sentence of 20 months' imprisonment for aggravated assault and a concurrent 12 months for assault with a weapon was imposed, along with probation and ancillary orders.

Anna La Force was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and unlawful entry into a dwelling.

The charges stemmed from an attack on Allison Robinson, a friend of Luisa Botelho, with whom La Force and Botelho were both in a relationship with Cavin Banfield.

The court found La Force to be the aggressor, rejecting her self-defence claim.

She was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that La Force was in the dwelling without lawful excuse, leading to an acquittal on the unlawful entry charge.

T.E., a 32-year-old drug addict with a history of drug offences, was found guilty of three counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

Police seized 131.88 grams of cocaine and $14,500 from her apartment, where she lived with her young son.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the commercial nature of the trafficking and her criminal record, and mitigating factors, such as her abusive past, addiction, psychiatric condition, and harsh pre-trial detention conditions during pregnancy.

The Crown sought a 3 to 3.5-year sentence, while the defence sought 24 months after credit for pre-trial custody.

The court imposed a global sentence of 31 months, reduced to 24 months after credit for 7 months of pre-trial custody (137 days at 1.5:1 enhanced credit).

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearm prohibition, and forfeiture of drugs and proceeds.

The accused, M.B., was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against C.S., then age 15.

The case proceeded as a blended lost evidence application and trial.

The defence sought a stay of proceedings due to missing audio from the complainant's police interview, alleging a Charter breach.

The court found unacceptable negligence by the police but no abuse of process or irreparable prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence, thus denying the stay.

On the merits of the trial, the court found the complainant's credibility highly problematic, particularly regarding a second alleged incident which was found to be fabricated.

The court also considered the defence of mistake of age for the first incident, finding that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove M.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all four counts, and M.B. was acquitted.

The defendant Linda Lawlor sought a mistrial in her judge-alone fraud trial, arguing that the trial's scope improperly expanded beyond the single property she was committed on, leading to the introduction of prejudicial evidence and depriving her of an informed defence.

The court found a mutual error between Crown and defence regarding the scope but determined the evidence related to other properties was admissible for narrative and context, and the verdict was not tainted by impermissible reasoning.

The court distinguished the case from precedents involving adverse credibility findings and rejected a mistrial, offering a trial re-opening as an alternative remedy, which the applicant declined.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

The accused, B.M., pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault against two vulnerable women who sought his "spiritual services." The court considered aggravating factors, including the abuse of a position of trust and the public advertisement of deceitful services, and mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed a global sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, less 4 months' pre-trial custody credit, resulting in a 14-month total sentence, followed by two years' probation and various ancillary orders.

The accused, Michael Lights, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a collision.

The defense argued that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Lights was the driver.

The court found the evidence overwhelming that Lights was the driver, based on witness testimony, identification via health card, and consistent descriptions.

The court then applied the legal principles for dangerous driving and criminal negligence, finding that Lights' conduct—speeding through a red light with non-functional lights, low brake pads, and bald tires on wet roads—constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver and demonstrated wanton disregard for the safety of others.

Lights was found guilty on all four counts.

The accused, E.I., was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The forcible confinement charge was withdrawn during the trial.

The central issue was whether the complainant, D.H.-G., consented to the sexual activity.

The court found D.H.-G.'s evidence lacked credibility and reliability due to numerous contradictions and inconsistencies between her trial testimony, police statement, and preliminary inquiry evidence, as well as contradictions from the Crown's supporting witness.

The Crown failed to disprove consent beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal for the accused on the sexual assault charge.