Andra M. Pollak

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment for damages arising from the defendant purchaser's failure to close a real estate transaction.

The purchaser counterclaimed for the return of his deposit, arguing the contract was frustrated by a significant drop in the real estate market that prevented him from securing financing.

The court granted the vendor's motion, finding that a market decline does not constitute frustration or impossibility.

The vendor was awarded damages for the loss in property value upon resale and carrying costs, less the deposit, but the court declined to enforce a 20% interest rate provision in the agreement, applying the Courts of Justice Act rate instead.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to recognize and enforce a British Columbia default judgment in Ontario.

The B.C. judgment had recognized a Privy Council judgment against the defendant.

The defendant argued that the B.C. judgment was a 'ricochet judgment' and that B.C. lacked a real and substantial connection for the purposes of extra-provincial enforcement.

The court agreed, finding that while B.C. legislation provided a presumption of jurisdiction for local enforcement, it did not satisfy the common law real and substantial connection test required for enforcement outside of B.C. The action was dismissed.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of entitlement to renew a lease agreement for a gas station.

The Defendant opposed, alleging material breaches of the lease, specifically non-compliance with Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) requirements regarding daily dip records and unauthorized use of the premises for truck parking.

The court found that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving they were not in material default of the lease, particularly concerning TSSA compliance.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and equitable relief from forfeiture was denied, as the case involved a failure to crystallize a right rather than a loss of an existing right.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) for a declaration that it had standing as a third-party beneficiary to sue for breach of contract based on a restrictive covenant in an agreement of purchase and sale between the defendants and a non-party.

The defendants argued that contractual interpretation is a question of mixed fact and law, making it inappropriate for a Rule 21 motion where evidence is generally inadmissible.

The court agreed with the defendants, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Sattva, and dismissed the motion, finding that the interpretation of the agreement would require evidence and could not be determined as a pure question of law.

Metrolinx applied for a warrant to take possession of expropriated lands, while the respondent landlords and tenants applied to postpone possession, arguing Metrolinx failed to make a valid, good-faith offer of compensation under s. 25 of the Expropriations Act.

Metrolinx had offered $1.00 due to alleged environmental contamination but refused to answer questions or provide environmental reports during examinations.

The respondents sought an adjournment to bring a refusals motion before a Master.

The court granted the adjournment, finding the respondents had a reasonable basis to test whether Metrolinx's offer was made in good faith.

The defendant Toronto Police Services Board brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(a) and (b).

The plaintiff claimed damages in negligence, alleging a police officer failed or refused to lay charges after investigating his complaint of assault.

The court held that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime regarding the investigation or prosecution of alleged crimes, as this duty is owed to the public as a whole.

Finding it plain and obvious that the claim had no reasonable chance of success, the court struck the claim without leave to amend.

The defendant brought a motion to permanently or temporarily stay the Ontario action in favour of proceedings in Florida.

The plaintiff, a Florida mortgage lender, commenced the Ontario action to enforce a personal guarantee signed by the defendant in Toronto.

The defendant argued that Florida was the more appropriate forum due to ongoing foreclosure and deficiency proceedings against his company in Florida, as well as a separate action he commenced there alleging fraud.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant failed to establish that Florida was the clearly more appropriate forum, as the key witnesses and the defendant were in Ontario, and the guarantee was signed in Ontario.

The court also declined to grant a temporary stay, noting that the Florida proceedings involved different parties and subject matter.

In an automobile insurance priority dispute, the appellant insurer sought production of communications between two other insurers regarding a section 10 notice.

The appellant argued the notice was part of an inappropriate scheme to circumvent the 90-day notice requirement.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding the communications irrelevant as the initial notice was made in good faith.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the arbitrator's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, an Ontario corporation, sought declarations that certain provisions of British Columbia's Provincial Sales Tax Act were unconstitutional and did not have legal force in Ontario.

The respondent British Columbia Crown brought a motion to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The court granted the motion, finding that interprovincial Crown immunity applied and that the British Columbia Crown could only be sued in the courts of British Columbia pursuant to the British Columbia Crown Proceeding Act.

The appellant appealed a Master's order discharging a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a property owned by his former common-law partner.

The Master discharged the CPL unconditionally after finding the appellant failed to disclose two agreements stating he had no interest in the property and relied on a fraudulent invoice to obtain the ex parte CPL.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle in the Master's exercise of discretion in equity.

The appeal of the Master's substantial indemnity costs award was also dismissed.

Oscar Sun, a minor, suffered catastrophic injuries after being hit by a car driven by Sergio Ferreira after exiting a TTC bus.

The plaintiffs (Sun, Chen, Sun) sued Ferreira, TTC, and the City of Toronto.

Ferreira also brought a third-party claim against TTC and the City.

The City, TTC, and Donald Carter brought two motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action against them and Ferreira's third-party claim, arguing the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed both motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the discoverability of the claims and whether it was appropriate to commence legal action earlier, particularly concerning the alleged negligent design of the bus stop and crosswalks.

The court also noted concerns about partial summary judgment.

The plaintiff, a wrongfully dismissed regional sales manager, sought damages including lost commissions during an 8-month common law notice period.

The defendant argued that sales plan provisions limited commission entitlement to sales booked and billed prior to active employment termination.

The court applied the O'Reilly v. IMAX Corporation two-step analysis, finding that the 2017 Sales Plan did not unambiguously remove common law rights to commissions during the notice period.

Furthermore, changes in the 2018 Sales Plan regarding termination provisions were not properly communicated, lacked consideration, and potentially violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for lost base salary, benefits, and commissions.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision to grant and not discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against Ms. Tan's property.

The appeal grounds included alleged failure of full disclosure, misrepresentation of facts, and lack of a reasonable claim to an interest in the property by the plaintiffs.

The court, applying the standard of review for Master's decisions (palpable and overriding error for factual findings, error of law/wrong principles for discretionary decisions), found no such error.

The Master properly determined there was a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in the property and that the plaintiffs did not fail to make full disclosure or misrepresent material facts.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondents/plaintiffs were awarded costs.

The applicants sought a declaration that a right-of-way across their property, benefiting the respondents' adjacent properties, had been abandoned and extinguished.

The applicants argued that historical non-use, the disappearance of original sheds, and various obstructions demonstrated an intention to abandon the easement.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondents and their contractors had recently used the right-of-way for property renovations and that the applicants failed to prove an express or implied intention to abandon the property right.

The plaintiff, a former student at York University, brought an action against the Attorney General of Ontario alleging that the government failed to protect him from mistreatment by the university and its professors.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action as the Crown owes no duty of care to university students and universities are autonomous entities.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process, as similar claims by the plaintiff against the university had already been dismissed by the Divisional Court.

The applicants, Laridae Communications Inc. and Family and Children's Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville (FCS), brought applications seeking declarations that Co-operators General Insurance Company owed them a duty to defend in a third-party claim and a class proceeding, respectively, arising from a data breach.

Co-operators denied coverage based on "data exclusion" clauses in the insurance policies.

Co-operators also brought an application denying a duty to defend Laridae.

The court found that Co-operators failed to discharge its onus to prove the claims clearly fell within the exclusion clauses and that there was no possibility of coverage.

The court granted the applications of Laridae and FCS, declaring a duty to defend, and dismissed Co-operators' application.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage brought a motion for summary judgment for unpaid commission held in trust.

The defendant vendor claimed a set-off for damages resulting from the plaintiff's agent's alleged negligence regarding the property's acreage, and argued there was an oral collateral agreement reducing the commission.

Applying the Hryniak framework and appellate jurisprudence on partial summary judgment, the court found genuine issues requiring a trial, including credibility issues and the existence of a collateral agreement.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured after slipping on ice on a municipal sidewalk after exiting a bus.

She sued the City of Toronto and the TTC, and later added the City's winter maintenance contractor, Pave-Tar.

Pave-Tar and the TTC brought motions for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

Pave-Tar argued the claim against it was statute-barred, while the TTC argued it owed no duty of care.

The court dismissed both motions, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the limitation period and concluding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate due to the intertwined facts and risk of inconsistent findings at trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to electro-convulsive therapy (ECT).

The appellant also sought a declaration that ECT amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter claim exceeded the scope of the appeal and should be brought as a separate application.

The court upheld the Board's decision on capacity, concluding it was reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant's mental condition rendered her unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of consenting to or refusing ECT.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached with LawPRO, the professional liability insurer for the self-represented defendant lawyer.

The defendant objected to the settlement, arguing he was entitled to costs for defending the action.

The court found that the LawPRO insurance policy clearly provided the insurer with the contractual right to settle the claim without the insured's consent.

The plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement was granted, and the defendant's motion to dismiss the action with costs was dismissed.