Thomas Albert Cromwell

The Court considered whether Ontario could assume jurisdiction over third party professional-negligence claims brought against Quebec law firms in a national class action context.

The majority held that a real and substantial connection existed under Van Breda’s fourth presumptive connecting factor because the Wind-Down Agreements were made in Ontario and were sufficiently connected to the negligence claims.

The Court further held that Quebec was not clearly a more appropriate forum and declined to apply forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, with dissenting reasons concluding Ontario lacked jurisdiction over the Quebec firms and would have allowed the appeal.

In an employment appeal, a non-unionized federally regulated employee challenged a without-cause dismissal under the unjust dismissal provisions of the Canada Labour Code.

The adjudicator held that severance in lieu could not displace the statutory requirement to assess whether the dismissal was unjust, and allowed the complaint.

The majority restored that decision, concluding the adjudicator's interpretation was reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose and dominant adjudicative approach under ss. 240-246.

The court held the scheme protects eligible non-unionized employees from dismissal without cause and supports meaningful remedies, including reinstatement.

A criminal appeal considered whether a nearly three-year period between charge and trial infringed the accused’s s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Applying the new Jordan framework, the majority held the net delay exceeded the 30-month ceiling for superior court matters and was not justified by exceptional or transitional circumstances.

The Court found the matter was relatively straightforward, institutional delay was substantial, and the Crown did not establish reasonableness.

A stay entered by the provincial appellate court was upheld, with dissenting reasons that would have restored the convictions under a different balancing approach.

The appellant sought a stay for breach of the constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time after substantial pre-trial and trial delay in a drug prosecution.

The Court held the delay was unreasonable and reformulated the governing section 11(b) framework by introducing presumptive ceilings of 18 months in provincial court and 30 months in superior court or post-preliminary inquiry matters.

Delay above the ceiling is presumed unreasonable unless the Crown proves exceptional circumstances outside its control.

Applying that framework contextually, the remaining delay far exceeded the ceiling and was not justified by complexity, transition, or institutional strain.

The convictions were set aside and a stay was entered.

The appellant challenged his conviction on the basis that a delay of over three years infringed the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court held that, despite moderate complexity, the overall delay became unreasonable where the accused consistently took proactive steps to expedite trial and did not cause delay.

It found that delay attributable to co-accused and two adjournments required a more proactive Crown response, including potential severance and earlier date management.

The conviction was set aside and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appeal considered whether police may conduct a warrantless penile swab as a search incident to arrest in a sexual assault investigation.

The majority held that such a search can be authorized at common law if police have reasonable grounds to believe it will reveal and preserve evidence of the offence and if it is carried out reasonably with safeguards protecting dignity and privacy.

Applying that framework, the Court found no breach of section 8 and upheld admission of the DNA evidence.

Concurring reasons would have found a section 8 breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

Dissenting reasons would have excluded the evidence and ordered a new trial.

This appeal considered whether a municipal notice of reserve that blocked construction at a federally approved antenna site was constitutionally valid.

The majority held the notice’s pith and substance was the siting of radiocommunication infrastructure, an exclusive federal matter, making it ultra vires.

The Court also held the measure significantly impaired the federal core protected by interjurisdictional immunity.

The appeal was allowed and the notice was unconstitutional and inapplicable to the appellant.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a bestiality count arising from sexualized conduct involving an animal and a complainant.

The central issue was whether penetration is an essential element of bestiality under s. 160 of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that the term retained its established legal meaning requiring penetration, and found no clear legislative intent in the 1955 or 1988 amendments to expand the offence.

The Court emphasized that expanding criminal liability is a legislative function, not a judicial one.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding penetration is not required.

The appellant sought to compel disclosure of a lawyer’s accounts receivable records under statutory audit and enforcement powers in federal tax legislation.

The court held that Parliament had clearly intended the statutory definition to exclude a lawyer’s accounting records from solicitor-client privilege as a matter of interpretation.

However, in light of the companion constitutional ruling, the disclosure scheme as applied to legal professionals was invalid, and the request for disclosure could not proceed.

The appeal was allowed only to vary the lower disposition, and the compliance application was dismissed.

In a constitutional challenge to federal tax requirement powers, legal professional secrecy was weighed against the state’s audit and collection objectives.

The court held that compelling production from legal advisers without adequate notice to clients, without judicially supervised safeguards, and with an overbroad accounting-records exception produced unreasonable seizures under s. 8.

The impugned provisions failed minimal impairment and were not justified under s. 1.

The provisions were read down to exclude notaries and lawyers acting as legal advisers, and the accounting-records exception was declared invalid.

A mortgage appeal addressed whether s. 8 of the Interest Act invalidates a default-triggered charge structure framed as a discounted pay-rate.

The majority held that substance governs over drafting labels and that terms producing a higher effective charge on arrears than on principal not in arrears offend s. 8.

The Court also held that a rate increase triggered solely by passage of time does not itself breach s. 8.

The impugned 25 percent effect under the second renewal arrangement was void, and the lower pay-rate formula governed.

In a property and secured-transactions appeal, the Court considered whether municipal heritage incentive payments registered in an agreement by caveat ran with land, passed in a judicial sale, or remained personal property subject to priority rules.

The Court held that s. 29 of Alberta’s Historical Resources Act allows positive covenants to run only where they are in favour of listed public entities, not in favour of a landowner claimant to payment.

The Court further held the agreement and sale documents did not transfer the payment right to the purchaser and that awarding those payments to the purchaser would create a windfall without commercial rationale.

The payment right was characterized as a chose in action assigned as security, with priorities governed by the Personal Property Security Act and any residual priority dispute remitted to a master.

In a criminal appeal as of right, the Court addressed whether an erroneous jury instruction on fabrication of alibi and evidentiary rulings required appellate intervention.

The Court confirmed that an alibi-fabrication instruction must be limited to an inference of consciousness of guilt and requires independent evidence linking the accused to deliberate fabrication.

Although the instruction was erroneous, the Court held the evidence against the accused was overwhelming.

Applying the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, the convictions for first degree murder and attempted murder were upheld.

The Crown appealed a declaration that the restriction on enhanced pre-sentence custody credit in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

The Court held that denying enhanced credit to offenders denied bail primarily because of prior convictions is overbroad under s. 7 because the provision captures persons unrelated to the public safety objective and affords limited meaningful review of endorsements.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1, as the measure was not minimally impairing and its deleterious liberty effects outweighed its benefits.

The Court also rejected the proposition that proportionality in sentencing process is an independent principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

On a sentence appeal, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to the one-year mandatory minimum in s. 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for repeat trafficking-related offences.

The majority held provincial court judges may decide constitutionality in matters before them, although they cannot issue formal s. 52(1) declarations.

Applying the reasonable hypothetical framework, the Court found the provision captured less blameworthy offenders and could impose grossly disproportionate punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1, and the Court declined to decide s. 7 after resolving the appeal under s. 12.

The appeal was allowed and the 12-month sentence restored.

On a constitutional appeal, the appellants sought declarations that Métis and non-status Indians fall within Parliament’s jurisdiction under s. 91(24), that the federal Crown owes them a fiduciary duty, and that they have consultation and negotiation rights.

The Court held that Métis and non-status Indians are “Indians” under s. 91(24), restored the broader trial declaration, and rejected restricting Métis status to the Powley framework for this jurisdictional purpose.

The Court found this declaration had practical utility in ending the federal-provincial jurisdictional impasse.

The Court declined the second and third declarations as restatements of settled law lacking practical utility.

The Court considered the legal meaning of the phrase "her mind is then disturbed" in the infanticide provision of the Criminal Code.

It held that the phrase carries its ordinary meaning, does not require proof of a defined mental disorder, and sets a broad, flexible standard tied to childbirth or lactation effects at the time of the act.

Applying that standard, the Court found no reversible legal error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the infanticide verdicts and acquittals on murder counts.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether the confinement element required for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) was made out where the accused blocked the victim from escaping before the killing.

The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the forcible or unlawful confinement was distinct and independent from the act of killing.

The appellate intervention substituting second degree murder was therefore unwarranted.

The conviction for first degree murder was reinstated and the appeal was allowed.

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether evidence obtained after an unlawful police detention should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms following a breach of s. 9.

Adopting the reasons of the intermediate appellate court judge, the Court held that the weighing of the relevant exclusion factors did not support excluding the impugned evidence.

The conviction was therefore left undisturbed.

The appeal was dismissed from the bench with brief oral reasons.

In a criminal appeal as of right based on a dissent, the appellant argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel and resulting unfair trial.

The Court applied the two-part test requiring proof of counsel incompetence and a resulting miscarriage of justice.

It held that, although the dissent identified critical deficiencies, the reasons did not establish how those deficiencies caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court was not persuaded that any form of miscarriage of justice occurred and dismissed the appeal.