Benoît Lauzon

In this criminal appeal as of right, the Court considered whether evidence obtained after an unlawful police detention should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms following a breach of s. 9.

Adopting the reasons of the intermediate appellate court judge, the Court held that the weighing of the relevant exclusion factors did not support excluding the impugned evidence.

The conviction was therefore left undisturbed.

The appeal was dismissed from the bench with brief oral reasons.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit after the trial judge found that straddle evidence rebutted the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and substituted a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that straddle evidence is admissible to rebut the statutory presumption, applying the principles from R. v. Gibson.

The trial judge committed no legal error in finding the presumption rebutted and no palpable or overriding error in weighing the other indicia of impairment.

The acquittal was reinstated.

The accused was arrested without a warrant and found in possession of crack cocaine.

The arresting officer did not investigate the accused's claim of mistaken identity at the time of the arrest.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the officer lacked objective grounds for the arrest and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not impose a more onerous standard for reasonable grounds under s. 495 of the Criminal Code, but rather based her conclusion on the inconsistent and contradictory evidence of the arresting officer.

The Crown appealed a sentence reduction entered by the intermediate appellate court after the accused had been convicted of sexually assaulting his young daughter and making, distributing, and possessing child pornography.

The Supreme Court held that appellate courts must show substantial deference to sentencing judges and may intervene only where a sentence is demonstrably unfit or affected by reviewable error.

It further held that a maximum sentence is not reserved for a hypothetical worst offence committed in the worst circumstances, but may be imposed where proportionality, gravity of the offence, and offender blameworthiness justify it.

The Court also held that a long-term offender supervision order serves a distinct protective function and must not be taken into account in determining the appropriate custodial term.

The trial sentence and long-term offender disposition were restored.