Régis Boisvert

The Crown appealed from the Quebec Court of Appeal's decision remitting the respondents' files to the Court of Québec for preliminary inquiries.

The respondents were each charged with historical sexual offences against a child which carried a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment at the time of commission, but for which the maximum was later increased to 14 years.

Before charges were laid, each respondent appeared in court and reserved their election as to mode of trial; neither requested a preliminary inquiry until after the 2019 amendment to s. 535 of the Criminal Code came into force, restricting preliminary inquiries to accused persons charged with offences punishable by 14 years or more.

A five-judge majority dismissed the appeal, albeit by different routes: Côté and Rowe JJ. held the right vested at the time charges were laid; Kasirer J. (Jamal J. concurring) held the right vested when the accused reserved their election as to mode of trial with the court's approval; and Martin J. held the date of the offence governs temporal application.

The four-judge dissent (Karakatsanis J., Wagner C.J., O'Bonsawin and Moreau JJ.) would have allowed the appeal, concluding the right vests only when a request for a preliminary inquiry is made, and that the new rule applies where no such request was made before it came into force.

On the interpretive question, Côté and Rowe JJ. held that the 14-year threshold in the new s. 535 is tied to the seriousness of the offence and not to the accused's personal maximum jeopardy, while Karakatsanis J. and Martin J. held the accused must personally face a maximum of 14 years.

In this criminal appeal, wildlife and fisheries officers challenged convictions for assault causing bodily harm after a warrantless arrest attempt.

The officers argued they were entitled to a stay because they had relied on officially induced error of law.

The Court held that the conditions for that defence were not met, particularly that the advice was not from an appropriate official and was not objectively reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.

In a criminal appeal as of right, the Court addressed whether an erroneous jury instruction on fabrication of alibi and evidentiary rulings required appellate intervention.

The Court confirmed that an alibi-fabrication instruction must be limited to an inference of consciousness of guilt and requires independent evidence linking the accused to deliberate fabrication.

Although the instruction was erroneous, the Court held the evidence against the accused was overwhelming.

Applying the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, the convictions for first degree murder and attempted murder were upheld.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder for being a party, with her spouse, to the murder of their three children as part of a murder-suicide pact.

She argued the trial judge erred in not putting the defence of abandonment to the jury as an alternative to her primary defence of absence of mens rea.

The Supreme Court held there is no cardinal rule against putting incompatible defences to a jury, but the defence of abandonment did not meet the air of reality test because the appellant, who had supplied the murder weapon, failed to take reasonable steps proportional to her participation to neutralize its effects or prevent the offence.

The Court reformulated the test for abandonment under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code to include a fourth element requiring proportional neutralizing or preventative steps.