Suzanne Côté

The Crown appealed as of right from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had rejected the accused's self-defence claim under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, finding that he acted out of vengeance rather than to defend himself.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal majority erred by reassessing the evidence without identifying a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's analysis, and failed to defer to the trial judge's privileged position in assessing credibility.

The convictions were restored.

Two appellants were convicted of sexual assault by the Court of Appeal for Alberta after having been acquitted at trial, where the trial judge had applied an impermissible principle of broad advance consent.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to address the scope of the complainant's consent and whether it was withdrawn, making the trial judge's credibility findings on subjective consent undeserving of deference.

The Court upheld the substituted convictions under s. 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code, finding the Cassidy test satisfied because the trial judge's explicit and implicit findings established both appellants continued sexual activity with the complainant after she cried out 'No' without taking steps to ascertain whether consent was withdrawn.

The Kienapple argument raised by one appellant was rejected as the offences involved different subsets of facts and addressed different forms of harm.

The Crown appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that quashed four convictions and entered a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) infringement but declined to stay proceedings on the basis that the accused had not been prejudiced by the delay.

The Court of Appeal erred by entering a stay without re-examining the reasonableness of the delays, even though the record contained a detailed statement of admissions.

The Supreme Court held that a functional analysis of the trial judge's reasons showed he considered the relevant Morin factors and reached the correct conclusion.

The defence-caused delays, including multiple unsuccessful applications and insistence on conflicted counsel, must be subtracted, and the transitional exceptional circumstance under Jordan further supported the conclusion that s. 11(b) was not infringed.

The Crown appealed a majority decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal upholding a stay of proceedings in favour of the accused for violation of the s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Supreme Court applied the Jordan framework to characterize two disputed delay periods.

The Court held that an 84-day delay was attributable to the defence due to the illegitimate manner in which counsel brought a late motion for an unredacted copy of the information, but that a 112-day delay could not be entirely attributed to the defence given institutional delay and the trial judge's lack of initiative.

After apportioning the second period, the net delay still exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling at 950 days.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay of proceedings upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of a strip search conducted incident to his arrest.

The majority held that there were reasonable and probable grounds justifying the strip search, relying on confidential source information, items consistent with drug trafficking found at the scene, and an officer's observation of the appellant reaching toward the back of his pants.

The majority further held that the appellant's failure to cross-examine officers on the impugned information undermined his hearsay argument.

Côté J., concurring, found a s. 8 Charter breach but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), applying the Grant framework and concluding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Appeal dismissed.

Former de facto spouses underwent Quebec family mediation, after which the mediator prepared a summary of mediated agreements; one spouse later denied the existence of any binding contract and objected to the summary being admitted in evidence.

The majority held that the settlement exception to settlement privilege recognised in Union Carbide applies in family mediation governed by the standard COAMF contract scheme, because the procedural safeguards inherent in the regime protect vulnerable parties without requiring absolute confidentiality.

The majority further clarified that the unsigned summary of mediated agreements is not itself a contract, but that parties may bind themselves by conduct or communications after mediation ends.

A concurring minority would have held that family mediation sessions are absolutely confidential and that the Union Carbide exception is incompatible with the Quebec family mediation regime, yet agreed the appeal should be dismissed given the limited record.

The appeal was unanimously dismissed with limited solicitor-client costs awarded against the appellant non-profit organisation.

An insolvent consulting engineering firm became subject to CCAA proceedings, after which the appellant municipality refused to pay for post-initial order work and sought to effect compensation between amounts owed to the firm and two pre-order fraud-related claims.

The majority held that participation in Quebec's Voluntary Reimbursement Program does not in itself establish that a claim relates to fraudulent misrepresentation under s. 19(2)(d) of the CCAA.

The majority further held that a supervising judge has broad discretion under ss. 11 and 11.02 to stay a creditor's right to pre-post compensation, though the absolute prohibition from the Quebec Court of Appeal was tempered to allow for exceptional cases.

The initial stay order covered the appellant's right to effect pre-post compensation, and no basis was shown to lift the stay on either claim.

Brown J. dissented, arguing the matter should have been remanded to the supervising judge to exercise her discretion.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and administering a stupefying drug, and brought an application for a stay of proceedings on the basis that his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial judge found that the total delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling but was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance and dismissed the application.

A majority of the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erroneously characterized delay occasioned by the appellant's re-election of another mode of trial as a discrete exceptional circumstance, but upheld the dismissal on the basis of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's re-election was not done legitimately to respond to the charges and the resulting 13-month delay should have been characterized as defence delay.

The appellant Crown appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision holding that the respondent's Barbadian banking subsidiary qualified for the financial institution exception to the foreign accrual property income (FAPI) regime under the Income Tax Act.

The sole issue was whether the subsidiary conducted business principally with arm's length persons.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that a parent corporation does not conduct business with its controlled foreign affiliate when it provides capital or exercises corporate oversight.

Excluding capital injections and corporate oversight, the subsidiary's income-earning investment activities were conducted at arm's length for at least 86 percent of its income during the years in issue.

The arm's length requirement was therefore met and the respondent was entitled to the financial institution exception.

The appellant mother sought permission to relocate with the child, which was granted by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judge's orders on mobility, custody, parenting arrangements, and spousal support, finding misapprehension of evidence and failure to consider relevant factors, and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada found no reviewable error by the trial judge, even assuming the fresh evidence tendered by the respondent would have been admitted.

The trial judge's orders on mobility, custody, parenting arrangements, and spousal support were restored.

Côté J. dissented, holding the appeal should be dismissed as moot given she would have admitted the fresh evidence and remanded the matter to the Court of Queen's Bench.

A Luxembourg corporation created as a tax conduit sold shares in its Canadian subsidiary for approximately $680 million, realizing a capital gain in excess of $380 million, and claimed an exemption from Canadian income tax under the Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty's business property exemption for capital gains on shares deriving value principally from immovable property used in a business.

The Minister denied the treaty exemption and argued the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) applied because the respondent lacked genuine economic connections to Luxembourg.

The majority held that the Minister failed to discharge the burden of proving abusive tax avoidance, finding that the provisions of the Treaty operated as intended and that Canada had deliberately chosen not to include anti-conduit provisions in the Treaty.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's patent lack of economic connection to Luxembourg frustrated the underlying rationale of the Treaty's allocation of taxing rights.

Two appellants were charged with living on the avails of sex work under s. 212(1)(j) of the Criminal Code for conduct during the one-year suspension period following the Bedford declaration of invalidity.

The majority held that the Bedford suspended declaration of invalidity operated purely prospectively, meaning the law was valid during the suspension period and the appellants could be convicted for conduct committed during that period.

The majority reasoned that the purpose of the suspension — avoiding deregulation of sex work to protect vulnerable sex workers — would be frustrated by retroactive application.

The dissent concluded that the Bedford declaration had retroactive effect once the suspension expired, rendering s. 212(1)(j) void ab initio and precluding conviction.

The appeals were dismissed, with the appellants' convictions affirmed by the majority.

An insured motorcyclist died in an accident while in breach of his insurance policy due to alcohol consumption, but his insurer provided a defence for three years without knowledge of the breach.

The insurer ceased defending and denied coverage upon discovering the breach; a third-party claimant sought a declaration that the insurer was estopped from denying full coverage.

The majority held that promissory estoppel requires the promisor to have actual knowledge of the facts demonstrating the breach, as a promisor cannot intend to alter a legal relationship by promising to refrain from acting on information it does not have.

The court also rejected constructive knowledge arising from a breach of a duty to investigate as a basis for estoppel, holding that the insurer's duty to investigate fairly runs to the insured, not to third-party claimants.

The concurrence agreed the appeal should be dismissed but disagreed that actual knowledge is an absolute requirement, preferring an objective analysis of the promisor's intent.

Two appellants pleaded guilty to wholesale fentanyl trafficking and received sentences of 7 and 11 years respectively at trial.

The Crown appealed and the Alberta Court of Appeal set a 9-year starting point for wholesale fentanyl trafficking, increasing the sentences to 10 and 14 years.

The majority upheld the starting-point methodology as a permissible form of appellate sentencing guidance, finding it compatible with existing sentencing principles and the deferential appellate standard of review.

The majority also found both original trial sentences demonstrably unfit given the gravity of wholesale fentanyl trafficking, and declined to disturb the Court of Appeal's increased sentences.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals, finding neither original sentence demonstrably unfit and that the Court of Appeal improperly reweighed mitigating factors.

The appellant was acquitted of armed robbery at trial after the trial judge concluded the Crown failed to prove both that the appellant was a principal offender and that two specifically named individuals were the principal offenders, which the judge held was a prerequisite to party liability.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in requiring proof of the identity of specific principals as a prerequisite for party liability, but limited the new trial to the party liability theory only.

The majority of the Supreme Court agreed the trial judge erred in law in assessing party liability, as the Crown need not identify specific principals when prosecuting an accused as an abettor or counsellor.

The Court dismissed the appellant's appeal but allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal exceeded its powers under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code by restricting the new trial to a single theory of liability on a single charge.

A full new trial was ordered on the armed robbery charge, and the doctrine of issue estoppel was found inapplicable where the acquittal was set aside in its entirety.

The appellant sought to register in Ontario a default judgment obtained in British Columbia to enforce a Privy Council judgment awarding compensation for expropriation of its property by the respondent.

The application judge and majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the application on the basis that the respondent was not carrying on business in British Columbia under s. 3(b) of Ontario's Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the interpretation of "carrying on business" and no palpable and overriding error in the factual conclusion that the respondent lacked any actual presence in British Columbia.

Côté J. concurred but wrote separately to address the open question of whether recognition (derivative) judgments fall within the REJA's definition of "judgment", concluding that they do.

A professional comedian appealed a discrimination finding after a human rights tribunal held that his comedy routines mocking a public figure with a disability violated the right to the safeguard of dignity under the Quebec Charter.

The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the three elements of a discrimination claim under s. 10 of the Quebec Charter had not been established.

The majority found that the distinction was not based on a prohibited ground since the comedian had not targeted the complainant because of his disability but because he was a public figure.

Even if based on a prohibited ground, the majority held that the comedian's comments did not incite others to vilify the complainant or to detest his humanity, nor were they likely to lead to discriminatory treatment.

Four dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, finding that the comments constituted a discriminatory interference with the complainant's right to dignity as a child with a disability whose harm was broadly disseminated and deeply harmful.

A unionized health authority employee was suspended for attending work under the influence of alcohol.

After disclosing her alcohol addiction and refusing a last-chance abstinence agreement, the employer terminated her employment; her union grieved and she was reinstated on similar terms, then terminated again for allegedly breaching those terms.

The employee filed a human rights complaint alleging failure to accommodate her disability, and a human rights adjudicator assumed jurisdiction and found discrimination.

The majority held that Manitoba's mandatory dispute resolution clause in The Labour Relations Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the labour arbitrator over all disputes arising from the collective agreement, and that The Human Rights Code does not clearly express legislative intent to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the human rights adjudicator over such disputes.

The appeal was allowed and the reviewing judge's order setting aside the adjudicator's decision was reinstated.

The respondent was seriously injured when she stepped through a snowbank created by the appellant municipality while clearing angled parking stalls, blocking access to the sidewalk.

The trial judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the municipality's snow removal decisions were core policy decisions immune from negligence liability, and alternatively found no breach of standard of care and that the respondent was the proximate cause of her own injuries.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on all three grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the municipality's appeal, holding that the city had not met its burden of proving core policy immunity and therefore owed the respondent a duty of care, while confirming that the standard of care and causation analyses were tainted by legal errors requiring a new trial.

The Court clarified the framework for distinguishing core policy decisions from operational government activities subject to negligence liability, identifying four relevant factors: the level and responsibilities of the decision-maker, the process by which the decision was made, the nature and extent of budgetary considerations, and the extent to which the decision was based on objective criteria.

The appellant was part of a group that entered an apartment and assaulted several occupants, one of whom died from a single stab wound.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted the fatal stab wound.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess the appellant's culpability as a co-principal to manslaughter.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the stabbing was not a discrete act outside the scope of the group attack.

The Court also clarified that joint/co-principal liability is not automatically eliminated merely because force was applied by only a single perpetrator, and that triers of fact should focus on whether an accused's actions were a significant contributing cause of death.