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Youth tribunal's corrective powers extend only to the individual child referred to it.
Appeal concerning the scope of corrective powers conferred on the Youth Division of the Court of Québec under s. 91 para. 4 of the Youth Protection Act, which empowers the tribunal to order the correction of a situation where a child's rights have been encroached upon during social intervention.
The Court held that the tribunal's mandate is to render individualized and particularized justice based solely on the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, and that preventive corrective measures are valid only if: the child is at risk of the encroachment recurring; the measure can effectively help prevent recurrence; and the measure is related to protecting the interests and rights of that specific child.
The Court further confirmed that the tribunal also holds a non-binding power of recommendation anchored in the text, scheme, and object of the YPA.
Since the young person had reached the age of majority and was no longer subject to social intervention, no corrective order was made.
Comedian's mockery of public figure with disability did not constitute discrimination under Quebec Charter.
A professional comedian appealed a discrimination finding after a human rights tribunal held that his comedy routines mocking a public figure with a disability violated the right to the safeguard of dignity under the Quebec Charter.
The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the three elements of a discrimination claim under s. 10 of the Quebec Charter had not been established.
The majority found that the distinction was not based on a prohibited ground since the comedian had not targeted the complainant because of his disability but because he was a public figure.
Even if based on a prohibited ground, the majority held that the comedian's comments did not incite others to vilify the complainant or to detest his humanity, nor were they likely to lead to discriminatory treatment.
Four dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, finding that the comments constituted a discriminatory interference with the complainant's right to dignity as a child with a disability whose harm was broadly disseminated and deeply harmful.
